# Unilat and Bilat CPs --- BFHR

### Notes

Thank you to Eshan, Ros, Eric, and Eloise for their work on this file.

# !!!Unilat CPs!!!

# Unilat Carrots CPs

## Top Shelf

### 1NC --- CP Shell

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase inducements for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to facilitate \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### The US can incentivize allies to avoid free riding.

Joel R. Hillison 14. Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and an Adjunct Professor at Gettysburg College. He is the author of Stepping Up: Burden-sharing by NATO’s newest members and spent three years working in NATO. “Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's Newest Members.” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, pp. 183-187, 2014. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1939&context=monographs> //EM

A RATIONAL CHOICE EXAMINATION OF FINDINGS

The rational choice explanation for continued burden sharing by new members of NATO after accession emphasizes the benefits of maintaining a reputation as a credible partner. Certainly, members join and remain in NATO for both the tangible and the intangible benefits of being in a powerful alliance. With a combined population of almost 880 million and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $28.5 trillion,4 NATO membership offers a degree of physical and psychological security to its member states.

The rational benefits of being in an alliance have also been studied in international relations theory. In his game-theoretic study of alliances, Alastair Smith found that defensive alliances deterred aggression. The more reliable the alliance was, the greater the deterrent effect it had. In his words, “nations form alliances because it improves the outcomes they expect to receive.”5 Certainly, this concern for physical and psychological security was influential in the burden sharing decisions of recent new NATO members. As the current Romanian President said in an interview, “with the accession to NATO, the Romanians felt safe . . . NATO meant the beginning of our road to prosperity.”6

Finally, a rational choice explanation might emphasize the quid pro quo that supports burden sharing decisions of member states in NATO. Certainly, there have been side payments made by the United States to new member states in order to encourage greater levels of military spending and in order to reward contributions to NATO and U.S.-led missions in the war on terrorism. For example, Poland received a generous $3.5 billion loan to buy F16 aircraft after committing sizable forces to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).7 In addition, NATO established the Joint Forces Training Centre in Poland in 2004. Both the Czech Republic and Hungary received side payments from the United States for their support in the war on terrorism.8 In 2002, the 1999 wave of new members received a combined $35 million in Foreign Military Financing with an equal amount requested for 2003 and 2004.9 Estonia, one of the 2004 waves of new NATO members, was scheduled to receive over $6 million per year over the same period.10 In 2005, in addition to normal International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance, President George W. Bush requested $200 million from Congress “for coalition allies that have supported military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”11 NATO also uses incentives to influence its member states. These incentives include investments in infrastructure resources by NATO common funds. For example, Poland funded most of its airfield renovation program through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP).12 Romania, a big supporter of both OIF and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was rewarded with the rotation of U.S. forces into Romania for training as part of Joint Task Force East.13

While the side payments discussed above provide some incentive, NATO has the greatest leverage over aspiring member states prior to accession through conditionality. In the case of NATO, conditionality consists of “specific conditions which an aspiring state must fulfill before accession. These conditions comprised of both adherence to the community values and the ability to contribute to the functional tasks of the organization.”14 The assessment of whether or not these conditions have been met is a subjective and very political matter. Oftentimes, geostrategic concerns can trump accomplishment of accession standards, as in the case of Georgia and the Ukraine, which have not been granted admittance into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) due to concerns over relations with Russia. Accession into NATO requires unanimous agreement by existing members and ratification by the legislatures of the member states. It is not surprising, then, that aspiring NATO members are keen to demonstrate they have not only met the intent of the conditions established, but also the objective benchmarks established by the Alliance. One of the two most recent NATO members, Albania, is a good example. In a recent visit to NATO Headquarters, Albanian representatives were “very proud to say they (were) meeting the 2% (GDP) benchmark as well as deployment and sustainability criteria.”15 These public declarations support the explanations based on conditionality and are consistent with the burden sharing behavior of new member states reviewed earlier.

Not surprisingly, conditionality was an effective tool in influencing aspiring NATO members. In Judith Kelley’s study of international institutions in the early post-Cold War period, she found that membership prerequisites were an essential factor in changing state behavior.16 Kelley also acknowledged that socialization played a role. Kelley found that while most changes in state behavior could be attributed to conditionality, “socialization-based efforts often guided them.”17 Yet, these explanations alone cannot explain why new NATO members did not free-ride once they became members of NATO. In fact, many new members increased their troop support to NATO missions after gaining membership. NATO Director of Policy

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The argument that once in the alliance, new members will slack off is not fair. For example, Romania currently has 720 (troops) deployed to Afghanistan and is trying to find another 120. That is not a bad effort for a new NATO member.18

However, conditionality is just one incentive to induce norm conforming behavior.

NATO has several informal mechanisms to reward states that support Alliance efforts after being granted membership. Research has shown that rewards can help states to overcome the incentives to free-ride.19 First, NATO uses a variety of prestige rewards that are not only beneficial for domestic political use, but are sought out by both diplomatic and military bureaucrats for their own benefit. These rewards range from hosting summits, conferences, or exercises to the assignment of commands and staff positions. One example of these types of rewards is called “flags to post.” A flags to post conference is convened to assign general officer billets to member states. These conferences often result in a contentious debate; these leadership positions not only yield influence in the Alliance but also prestige at home to the officers assigned to fill them.

During NATO missions, command positions are also allocated on the basis of relative troop contributions. Unless the forces are under a standing NATO Headquarters, such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, then command usually goes to the state with the largest number of troops in that sector or in the overall mission. NATO also provides material incentives in the form of investments. This reward allows leaders to bring home the bacon to their national constituents and thus build support for contributions to NATO. For example, NATO investment into Poland exceeded Poland’s contributions to NATO’s infrastructure budget in 2004.20 A portion of these NATO funds is being used to construct a training facility in the city of Bydgoszcz.21 This facility will cost approximately 33 million Euros to build. Finally, individual states within NATO often provide incentives to other members to reward cooperation. As the largest and most powerful member (and leader) of the Alliance, the United States often times provides these incentives.

#### Allies say yes---they have mutual incentives to partner with the US in the expectation of future security assistance.

Tommy Ross & Melissa Dalton 20. Non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation at the Pentagon and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. He has also held other senior positions in the House and Senate. Melissa Dalton directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to CSIS, she served in the U.S. Department of Defense for 10 years. “A Roadmap for Better Choices from Security Partners.” War on the Rocks. 1-17-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/ //EM

In the realm of security sector assistance, experience has been disproportionately focused on negative approaches, almost always negative and ex post. In addition to Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the United States has sought to limit or cut off security sector assistance in El Salvador in the 1980s, Rwanda in 2012, Bahrain in 2011, and Burundi in 2015. All these efforts followed the ex post/negative pattern in which the United States has taken essentially punitive measures to reframe an existing security sector assistance relationship. One might view the application of the Leahy Law, which restricts assistance in cases of human rights abuse, or post-coup legal restrictions as cases of ex ante/negative conditionality, given that partners are expected to be aware of these condition-triggering laws prior to the acceptance of assistance or the commission of violations.

By contrast, examples of positive conditionality in the security sector assistance arena have been few and far between, even though the idea is not particularly new. “Incentive-based conditions” might tie additional and/or more sophisticated levels of security sector assistance, including new military capabilities or specific weapons platforms, to reform milestones to incentivize behavioral changes. In addition, rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it, on the basis of shared interests, the United States might identify positive actions that a recipient is considering taking and then incentivize them. More recently, the U.S. Institute for Peace Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States argued for “graduated security sector assistance,” in which the United States calibrates its engagement with fragile states according to a jointly agreed plan that enables partners in those countries to achieve escalating levels and types of U.S. security sector assistance as partners achieve reform milestones leading to more inclusive governance. These recommendations build on recent experiments in new government approaches to security sector assistance, such as the Security Governance Initiative, which have sought to establish joint bilateral planning on the basis of overlapping interests as the foundation of assistance programs, though these initiatives have not ultimately meaningfully conditioned assistance. The challenge has been that, while positive conditionality has been posited as a potentially viable and beneficial approach to improving security sector assistance outcomes, it has neither been sufficiently attempted in practice nor sufficiently elaborated in literature.

Toward a Framework for Positive Conditionality

What if the United States had approached its relationship with Uganda differently in pursuit of shared objectives? It’s possible that if the United States had structured its assistance in a way that incentivized Uganda’s politicians and security officials to take specific steps toward clearly — and mutually — identified milestones, that could have led to the development of stronger capabilities for and commitment to civilian protection and governance by Uganda’s military over time. Instead, a reactive posture to human rights and corruption transgressions has had limited effects, and punitive measures may only strain the relationship and undermine possibilities for cooperation.

The United States should develop a framework for positive conditionality in security sector assistance to better shape political and security outcomes with partner countries. On balance an affirmative framework will offer the United States the widest latitude in shaping outcomes in a broad range of circumstances. This approach also does not rule out the sequencing of punitive steps — or a pause to assess partner performance.

First, this framework assumes an ex ante/positive approach to conditionality, at least in some manner. With the U.S. government providing security sector assistance to nearly 200 countries around the world, it is unlikely that the United States will be initiating a security sector assistance relationship wholly from scratch. An ex ante approach would focus on developing concrete plans, including triggers for clearly identified conditions, at the inception of an initiative or set of programs. It should involve a plan covering at least five years, identifying ultimate objectives and intermediate milestones, a theory of change for how objectives will be achieved, and metrics to provide a basis for assessing progress. Policymakers and planners can then link conditions to milestones and metrics. Moreover, such an approach builds on recognized best practices for capacity-building initiatives.

Second, the framework must include a partner government’s mutual participation in the creation of the assistance plan, the identification of objectives, and the agreement on conditions. The partner will be more incentivized to progress toward objectives when it understands and commits to such objectives based on its own identified interests. A memorandum of understanding, bilateral compact, or some other formal written instrument can commit both parties to its terms.

Third, the framework should structure conditions as positive inducements for the recipient to take steps toward milestones or objectives. Milestones could include completion of defense institutional reforms, starting with development of a process to align budget to strategy, progressing to completion of a first budget cycle with the new process, and culminating in institutionalization of the process through policy and/or law. They might also include progress toward capability or interoperability milestones (e.g., ability to conduct nighttime counter-terrorism operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict or command and control and intelligence integration across platforms and systems). In addition, milestones could include transparency and accountability activities (e.g., publication of public budget, completion of audit, investigation of specific incidents of resource waste and abuse or diversion, establishment and activity of an independent third-party investigative unit for accountability).

Partners will likely respond to inducements that are material in nature, including access to an expanded variety of types of assistance and an expanded quantity of assistance. However, partners may also value incentives such as eligibility for key agreements to facilitate access and information and/or technology sharing (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing, general security of military information, etc.) or eligibility for expanded partnership opportunities (e.g., National Guard State Partnership Program or the Military Personnel Exchange Program). Moreover, incentives may also be political, such as access to membership in certain organizations or eligibility for certain agreements.

Such inducements are consistent with the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States’ concept of graduated assistance: As a partner achieves key milestones, it is able to “graduate” into a new status that allows it to access increasing quantities and types of assistance, as well as other benefits. Policymakers should tailor the potential tiers of access and associated benefits, as well as the milestones triggering graduation to a higher tier, to the individual recipient, and accordingly integrate them into bilateral development plans or compacts, as discussed above. A possible tiering of graduated assistance could include:

Tier One: nonlethal training and individual education.

Tier Two: comprehensive training and nonlethal equipment.

Tier Three: lethal equipment and access to U.S. military staff colleges.

Tier Four: high-level exercises, high-level staff talks, and joint and combined planning and operations.

Yet, for fragile states with weak security institutions, the task force rightly notes that assistance should initially focus on institutional reforms, with “increasingly sophisticated and lethal capabilities and equipment … contingent on sustained improvements in security sector governance.” The reforms should also institutionalize inclusivity. In practice, such an approach may prove difficult if partner governments or their security forces are vested in a corrupt status quo, such that institutional reform poses an existential threat or compromise to their personal gains. In such partnerships, identifying geographic areas or bureaucratic processes that may be more receptive to change first should be the focus of investment, and may be most successful if there are third parties, such as other allies and partners, media, or civil society that are calling for similar changes. For a potential coalition partner with comparatively good governance, on the other hand, milestones and incentives may be built around coalition interoperability and the capability to perform certain roles within the coalition context. In collaboration with the partner, U.S. policymakers should design a program of graduated or tiered assistance, structuring incentives and milestones across the full portfolio of security sector assistance. The total program of assistance could grow in both scope and sophistication as the partner progresses through milestones.

In addition, within each broad category of security sector assistance provided by the United States, policymakers and planners may find opportunities to moderate U.S. investments based on a partner’s progress (in other words, in relation to specific security sector assistance lines of effort). The table below outlines engagement at low, moderate, and high levels across several broad assistance categories as they could be applied within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. As planners construct graduated assistance programs, they thus have options to moderate assistance both within a specific type of support and across the full portfolio of security sector assistance. In practice, the categories and degrees of security sector assistance options would be tailored to meet the objectives of the specific partner relationship.\*\*\*FIGURE 1 OMITTED\*\*\* Importantly, conditions should be based on realistic assumptions about what partners would be willing to do (in terms of both what steps can be realistically expected given the recipient’s unique political and institutional context as well as what leverage relatively small sums of U.S. assistance can be expected to produce). Also, conditions should be accompanied by concrete U.S. commitments. Positive conditionality will quickly cease to be attractive to partners when the United States fails to follow through on a promised inducement.

Of course, following through in this manner requires sustained availability of funding. Many security sector assistance programs have significant flexibility in the availability of appropriated funds over time. More importantly, in our experience, programs with more rigor in strategy and long-term planning are likely to win the sustained support of congressional appropriators.

This proposed model of positive conditionality offers new possibilities not only for incenting partners to take steps toward shared objectives but also for improving planning and management of security sector assistance resources. Assistance programs are structured such that the achievement of each milestone triggers an expansion of the assistance relationship. Each step also provides an opportunity for an assessment of goals and progress. It enables planners to incorporate natural mechanisms to provide exit ramps, through which the U.S. or partner government can determine to terminate the initiative, or to restructure efforts to achieve a defined milestone. To be effective, it is critical that overarching objectives, as well as milestones leading toward those objectives, are specific, measurable, and time bound.

### 2NC --- PDCP

#### Security cooperation only includes mil-to-mil cooperation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 21. “Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding.” 2021. https://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/Security\_Cooperation/Budget\_Justification\_FY2021.pdf //EM

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2017 defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:

• To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations

• To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation.

#### “Security cooperation” is military-to-military engagements.

Eerden ’20 [Captain James R. R. Van Eerden; Spring; recently graduate from the Expeditionary Warfare School of Marine Corps University, where he completed a prestigious fellowship program and graduated first in his class; Journal of Advanced Military Studies, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise: A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” vol. 11, no. 1]

Security Cooperation Defined

Security Cooperation, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, provides the following definition of security cooperation: Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives.5

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

#### Only military-to-military cooperation.

Arabia ’21 [Christina; May 17; CRS Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade; Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation,” https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf]

Security Cooperation (SC) Overview

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the term security cooperation (SC) to refer broadly to DOD interactions with foreign security establishments. SC activities include

• the transfer of defense articles and services;

• military-to-military exercises;

• military education, training, and advising; and

• capacity building of partner security forces.

### Solvency---Inducements

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The rational benefits of being in an alliance have also been studied in international relations theory. In his game-theoretic study of alliances, Alastair Smith found that defensive alliances deterred aggression. The more reliable the alliance was, the greater the deterrent effect it had. In his words, “nations form alliances because it improves the outcomes they expect to receive.”5 Certainly, this concern for physical and psychological security was influential in the burden sharing decisions of recent new NATO members. As the current Romanian President said in an interview, “with the accession to NATO, the Romanians felt safe . . . NATO meant the beginning of our road to prosperity.”6

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Tier Three: lethal equipment and access to U.S. military staff colleges.

Tier Four: high-level exercises, high-level staff talks, and joint and combined planning and operations.

Yet, for fragile states with weak security institutions, the task force rightly notes that assistance should initially focus on institutional reforms, with “increasingly sophisticated and lethal capabilities and equipment … contingent on sustained improvements in security sector governance.” The reforms should also institutionalize inclusivity. In practice, such an approach may prove difficult if partner governments or their security forces are vested in a corrupt status quo, such that institutional reform poses an existential threat or compromise to their personal gains. In such partnerships, identifying geographic areas or bureaucratic processes that may be more receptive to change first should be the focus of investment, and may be most successful if there are third parties, such as other allies and partners, media, or civil society that are calling for similar changes. For a potential coalition partner with comparatively good governance, on the other hand, milestones and incentives may be built around coalition interoperability and the capability to perform certain roles within the coalition context. In collaboration with the partner, U.S. policymakers should design a program of graduated or tiered assistance, structuring incentives and milestones across the full portfolio of security sector assistance. The total program of assistance could grow in both scope and sophistication as the partner progresses through milestones.

In addition, within each broad category of security sector assistance provided by the United States, policymakers and planners may find opportunities to moderate U.S. investments based on a partner’s progress (in other words, in relation to specific security sector assistance lines of effort). The table below outlines engagement at low, moderate, and high levels across several broad assistance categories as they could be applied within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. As planners construct graduated assistance programs, they thus have options to moderate assistance both within a specific type of support and across the full portfolio of security sector assistance. In practice, the categories and degrees of security sector assistance options would be tailored to meet the objectives of the specific partner relationship.\*\*\*FIGURE 1 OMITTED\*\*\* Importantly, conditions should be based on realistic assumptions about what partners would be willing to do (in terms of both what steps can be realistically expected given the recipient’s unique political and institutional context as well as what leverage relatively small sums of U.S. assistance can be expected to produce). Also, conditions should be accompanied by concrete U.S. commitments. Positive conditionality will quickly cease to be attractive to partners when the United States fails to follow through on a promised inducement.

Of course, following through in this manner requires sustained availability of funding. Many security sector assistance programs have significant flexibility in the availability of appropriated funds over time. More importantly, in our experience, programs with more rigor in strategy and long-term planning are likely to win the sustained support of congressional appropriators.

This proposed model of positive conditionality offers new possibilities not only for incenting partners to take steps toward shared objectives but also for improving planning and management of security sector assistance resources. Assistance programs are structured such that the achievement of each milestone triggers an expansion of the assistance relationship. Each step also provides an opportunity for an assessment of goals and progress. It enables planners to incorporate natural mechanisms to provide exit ramps, through which the U.S. or partner government can determine to terminate the initiative, or to restructure efforts to achieve a defined milestone. To be effective, it is critical that overarching objectives, as well as milestones leading toward those objectives, are specific, measurable, and time bound.

### Solvency---Inducements---Theory

#### Inducements work and spillover to create self-reinforcing cycles of cooperation in other areas.

Robert J. Reardon 10. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Public and International Affairs. “Nuclear bargaining: using carrots and sticks in nuclear counter-proliferation.” Department of Political Science at MIT. 11-12-2020. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/62473 //EM

A. Issue-Linkage Theory

The issue-linkage theory of negative sanctions and positive inducements presented in Chapter 3 is based on a number of fundamental assumptions about counter-proliferation diplomacy, and indeed any attempt to influence the behavior of another state:

First, both sanctions and inducements are bargaining strategies, and the strategic bargaining metaphor is an appropriate way to conceptualize their use. States choose their policies according how they anticipate the other state will respond.

Second, sanctions and inducements are best understood as forms of issue linkage, in which cooperation in one issue area is conditioned upon cooperation in another.

Third, states' preferences are central to understanding the bargaining process and outcomes. The value both states assign to the nuclear issue, their willingness to use extortion, and the value they assign to specific threats and promises are all important.

Fourth, states bargain under conditions of incomplete information. States must form beliefs about one another's preferences, and in turn form expectations about one another's reactions, in order to choose their own policies. These beliefs are built on the availability of intelligence, observations of past behavior, biases, and the nature of the relationship between the two states. States can more easily cooperate when they can accurately screen one another's preferences, and signal their own. States also have incomplete information about the gains that are possible from cooperation or defection. This is particularly the case with nuclear proliferation, as the consequences of developing nuclear weapons is both uncertain and carries substantial risk.

Fifth, bargaining is sequential. The sequential nature of bargaining introduces distributional and reputational barriers to cooperation, as states are typically willing to incur significant costs to avoid a reputation as an easy target for extortion, or to avoid conferring a strategic advantage to an adversary that could be exploited for significant gain in the future. However, sequential bargaining, paradoxically, reduces incentives for bluffing, endows "cheap talk" diplomacy with real influence, and allows states to change one another's preferences and beliefs in ways that make cooperation more likely.

Sixth, domestic politics is important. States' preferences are powerfully shaped by the external security context, but are ultimately determined by the particular preferences and beliefs of domestic actors, and the domestic political balance of power. Domestic political effects can be significant even when states are insecure if there is substantial uncertainty and there are divisions among influential elites over which policies are best. This is typically the case with nuclear proliferation. The security implications of nuclear weapons development are highly uncertain. The nuclear weapons issue is frequently contentious among elites, and is naturally linked to preferences regarding the state's economic and political orientation, the prestige of the regime, as well as nationalism. Both sanctions and inducements can be targeted in ways that successfully exploit these factors.

Building on these assumptions, I have presented an issue-linkage theory of nuclear counter-proliferation from which several general predictions about the effectiveness of positive inducements and negative sanctions can be deduced.

- First, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative sanctions. The sender can typically draw on a wider set of resources to offer inducements than it can with sanctions. Sanctions are also more likely than inducements to exacerbate distributional and reputational problems. Inducements also have fewer enforcement problems, as they can be withdrawn in the event of noncompliance.

- Second, the relatively superior effectiveness of inducements is much greater with adversaries than it is with allies. Inducements are a promising tool of international influence with adversaries, while sanctions are not. Moreover, sanctions are not only likely to fail, but can make a bad situation worse by triggering an escalatory spiral and wider conflict. The difference in utility between sanctions and inducements is wider with adversaries than it is with allies because informational, distributional, and reputational barriers to cooperation are all substantially higher. At the same time, with adversaries, the sender enjoys far fewer resources to draw from to issue meaningful threats.

Adversaries know less about one another, are more mistrustful, have higher expectations that they will be exploited, are more concerned with relative gains, and are more concerned about their reputation as a tough bargainer. They also typically have already taken measures to protect themselves from one another's influence attempts. All of this makes sanctions must less likely to be effective. However, there is substantially less of a problem with these negative effects when using positive inducements, as inducements either do not involve, or are more capable of mitigating, many of these same barriers to agreement. Finally, because adversaries lack existing cooperative arrangements, the sender often has only two options for threats: military force and multilateral economic sanctions. The policy options for inducements - better relations, security assurances, enhanced trade, technology transfers - tend to be more diverse and more flexible.

-Third, withholding diplomatic talks as a bargaining tactic is counterproductive. There is real value to private diplomacy. States are much less likely to bluff or try to exploit one another than is typically believed, and successful bluffs are difficult to achieve with 367 adversaries. Private diplomacy represents an important channel of communication between states in which policy preferences can be coordinated and private information revealed. Miscommunication and disagreement are more likely when these lines are severed.

- Fourth, cooperation and conflict can lead to self-reinforcing spirals. Cooperation in one area leads to reputational gains that make cooperation in other areas more likely. Similarly, smaller or even symbolic agreements can serve as powerful signals that can improve the chances of future cooperation. Incremental agreement is therefore more likely to succeed than attempts to craft all-at-once deals or set ultimatums for compliance with costly and inflexible demands.

#### Inducements open up concessions that can achieve unprecedented cooperation.

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There is a well-developed area of research on the use of side payments (of which issue linkage is a part) in the bargaining literature. According to bargaining theories, policymakers use side payments as either direct monetary payments (such as bribes) or material concessions on other issues (such as issue linages) to encourage concessions on a given issue.42 Side payments and issue linkages, if used to provide a positive inducement, help states to diminish conflict and to reach an otherwise unattainable level of cooperation during negotiations.43 Issue linkages, as a part of side payment mechanism, help states to solve distribution problems, arise when actors have different preferences over alternative possible agreements, in bargaining situations. As Morrow observed: “a linkage deal requires two issues that the sides believe are of different importance. Each side receives concessions on the issue it believes is of greater relative importance. . . [if] done properly, both sides prefer the linkage deal to going to war over the initial issue.” 44

A state may offer various types of incentives to encourage otherwise unwilling governments to cooperate with it. Side payments may come in the form of direct payments such as cash payments (or grants), loans, or military aid, etc. Positive incentives can also be in the form of indirect payments, such as unilateral trade concessions, investments, etc. In an alliance negotiation the nature and volume of side payments, however, will depend on the strategic value of the alliance to the more powerful side.45I contend that side payments serve as a compensation mechanism that closes the deficit in net gains sometimes felt by a member (usually, the weaker side) of the alliance. Side payments sometimes increase the scope of the alliance to include economic and/or military dimensions. For a great power considering an alliance with a small state, the strategic value of the alliance may justify the cost of side payments; for the small state gains involve both economic and strategic dimensions at the expense of concessions on issues deemed important to the great power.46 This study probes the conditions under which side payments are used as a bargaining tool in asymmetric alliances.

### Solvency---Inducements---Empirics

#### Incentives create the perception of future benefits---creating instant buy-in.

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Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions.

States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

### Solvency---Inducements---AT: Gwinn

#### The CP is the model that Gwinn calls for.

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Better Rewards, Tougher Inducements

The United States is not getting the most for its security assistance dollars. Programs intended to build partner capacity tend to underperform because they fail to address underlying weakness in defense institutions or take principal-agent problems into account. To build meaningful, long-lasting capacity in partners and better align security assistance with policy goals, the United States should shift from a “building partner capacity” approach to a reform focus using conditional aid as leverage. Doing so in an environment where security assistance is yet another arena for strategic competition with Russia, China, and others will require internal reform of the U.S. security assistance apparatus. Rather than a slow-moving bureaucracy, the United States needs an agile and streamlined security assistance enterprise able to deliver aid rapidly when needed and be paused or turned off just as easily when conditions require. In short, the United States needs sweeter carrots and harder sticks.

While the current U.S. effort to arm and equip Ukrainian forces is the most visible example today, it is not representative of the day-to-day work of security assistance which the United States carries out around the world. In most cases, the greater threat facing these partners is not an invading army but rather defense institutions for which reform is needed but not properly incentivized. Modifying the U.S. approach to security assistance is one way to create that incentive and better align aid with policy goals.

## Aff

### Inducements CP---2AC

#### Inducements are “neither necessary nor sufficient” to persuade allies.

Eugene B. Kogan 13. Former Research Director at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, American Secretaries of State Project. “Coercing Allies: Why Friends Abandon Nuclear Plans.” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill. August 2013. <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/kogan-apsa-aug-2013.pdf> //EM

Conclusions Regarding Inducements

Inducements of any type are neither necessary nor sufficient for success. Neither limited nonmilitary rewards nor full-scale military reassurance led to success in the Taiwan and South Korean cases. The provision of limited military reassurance likewise failed to lead to success in Pakistan and Israel. As noted, it remains to be investigated if massive military reassurance can stop low-dependence allies.

The U.S. offered full military reassurance to South Korea by promising to defend it with nuclear weapons. To Taiwan, the U.S. only offered limited non-military rewards, such as renewal of licenses for Taipei’s civilian nuclear power reactors. From these two complete success cases, the conclusion can be drawn that inducements do not play as significant a role for highly-dependent allies as the scholarship on incentives leads us to expect. The logic of the literature suggests that provision of military reassurance, rather than non-military rewards, should increase the chances of success because such inducements are more likely to undercut the ally’s insecurity that impelled it to pursue the NWP. In other words, the incentives that satisfy an ally’s current and future security needs are more likely to persuade it to abandon the future gains it hopes to enjoy if it persists and is ultimately successful in making its nuclear weapons program operational. However, inducements did not play significant roles in either Taiwan or South Korea. Taiwan was forced into submission when it was offered minimal non-military rewards. Having politically abandoned Taipei, the U.S. made little effort to reassure it of its future intentions; furthermore, having promised non-military rewards, Washington provided them inconsistently.14 The Taiwan case thus suggests that in the cases of the most acute dependence by an ally, the U.S. can economize on incentives and achieve success primarily by coercive denial.

The South Korean case is unique in that the U.S. made two public, high-level pledges to defend it with nuclear weapons. Both of these features (public and high-level) made the pledges highly credible because the U.S. was issuing a direct warning to the Soviets and the North Koreans about the consequences of an attack on South Korea. As noted previously, the strength of this military reassurance becomes clear once we compare it to the U.S. approach to the ArabIsraeli conflict. In that case, President Kennedy made a diplomatically “balanced” statement, speaking for the security interests of both parties, which, as could be expected, failed to reassure the Israelis.

The failure of these public and high-level military guarantees to change the South Koreans’ minds was surprising. Military reassurance did not work because in 1978 Seoul still engaged in negotiations with France about purchasing the reprocessing facility. President Carter’s coercion by export controls was necessary to stop this renewed attempt in its tracks. Donald Gregg's account helpfully illustrates this point by describing the failure of an earlier reassurance attempt: "The visit to Seoul of President Ford and Henry Kissinger, in the fall of 1974, en route to a meeting with the Soviet leadership in Vladivostok, was very reassuring to Park, and the relationship was stabilized. The nuclear program was stopped later on, when South Korea had to go abroad to purchase items that it could not produce itself [thus making itself vulnerable to coercion by export controls]" (Gregg 2013, emphasis added). In sum, South Korea was the only case in which the U.S. explicitly pledged to strengthen its deterrent for an ally, and this military reassurance failed alone to bring about a nuclear change of heart in Seoul.

For Pakistan and Israel, Washington chose to provide only limited military reassurance (selected military aid) to strengthen their defensive capabilities, and equally unequivocally refused to provide anything approaching a deterrent capability that both states repeatedly requested. The U.S. knew that the arms it offered to Pakistan would not even allow it to balance—let alone, deter—India.15 The Israeli case also shows that the Kennedy Administration drew a clear line between a defensive buildup to bring Jerusalem to the point of parity with its Arab adversaries and massive military aid that Israel requested that could have allowed Israel to deter its enemies.

### Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

#### Pressure is critical to change their mind

**Joyner 14**, associate professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center of International Security at the Atlantic Council, (James, July 13th, 2014, (“Europe's Free Ride on the American-Defense Gravy Train”), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/europes-free-ride-the-american-defense-gravy-train-10864)

Demands to do something the receiver **doesn't want** to do—in this case, spend money that could go to social welfare programs or job creation on **defense**—are **useless** without an "**or else**." While senior American officials have been vaguely threatening for years that, if the Europeans didn't pony up for their own defense, the American taxpayer would stop doing it for them, it's long been obvious that the **threat** is **hollow**. To be sure, the United States has drawn down most of its huge pre-positioned force from the Cold War days. But there's simply no question that we'll respond **rapidly** in the event an ally is seriously threatened. So long as the Europeans know that's true, they're **unlikely** to **change** their **behavior**.

#### Reassurances undermines pressure

**Techau 15**, senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). As a foreign policy analyst, his research focuses on European integration and the EU's role in the world, German foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and security and defense issues. (Jan, September, 2015, “THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe”, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP\_252\_Techau\_NATO\_Final.pdf)

And so the dilemma remains: Europeans are still dependent on U.S. services for their security, and they are **not too bothered** by that fact. At the same time, Americans eagerly want Europeans to do more but **can’t really sanction them** in any **painful way** because, in the end, Europe is too strategically important for the United States to abandon it and leave its defense to the Europeans alone. Meanwhile, the **U**nited **S**tates feels the need to demonstrate to both Europeans and external powers that it **stands by** its **security commitments** to Europe and that it is ready to show strength when needed. This could well **undermine** the **strong American push** for Europeans to adopt the 2 percent metric. It could make the target less realistic by creating a **false sense of security** among Europeans that serves as an **incentive against**, not for, more **European defense spending**. In the absence of any political will from the Europeans to significantly beef up their defense, this impasse can basically only be broken in one of two ways: Either the United States is completely honest about its role in Europe and says it will continue to subsidize the continent’s security. This will probably mean an expensive, permanent recommitment to Europe over the next decade or so. Or the United States reduces its commitment, thereby risking a security crisis in Europe and the erosion of the cornerstones of its global posture. Neither of these two radical solutions will be embraced, of course. Instead, a third option will likely **continue** for some time: balancing the two and hoping that a blend of demonstrated American **solidarity**, **lecturing**, and **threats** of leaving will move the Europeans in the desired direction. This will be a shaky compromise. It can only last as long as NATO and the territory protected by Article 5 of the NATO treaty are not really threatened by anyone, and as long as the political consensus in Washington survives that says Europe, America’s geostrategic countercoast, must be always defended by the United States. Should the strategic situation in Europe change dramatically, or should America’s support for Europe erode, as some say it inevitably will, the status quo will become **unsustainable**. No one knows how long it will take to reach that point.

#### Loss is more persuasive than gain for states and sub-state actors

**Berejikian & Early 13**, \*PhD, Professor at the University of Georgia, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs \*\*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean for Research at the University at Albany, SUNY's Rockefeller College (Jeffrey Berejikian; Bryan Early, 2013, “Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve,” *Political Psychology*, 34.5)

Loss aversion is perhaps the most enduring and intuitive finding in behavioral decision theory (Kahneman et al., 1991; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1980). Experimental results suggest that the subjective **pain of loss** is **greater** than the benefit enjoyed from an equivalent gain, and scholars have extended this finding beyond the laboratory to explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling human behavior. Building upon these results, and adding new findings from the field of neuroscience, we seek to contribute to the theory-building enterprise in the study of foreign policy by constructing a gener- alizable theory of loss aversion and foreign policy behavior. The approach is consistent with the call to continue to develop theories of foreign policy built upon solid micro foundations (Hudson, 2005). Specifically, we hope to explain why policy makers stubbornly stand firm in their prosecution of some international disputes while in others they are willing to back down. The question is relevant for any number of foreign policy issues, such as territorial disputes, trade negotiations, conflicts over water rights, arms control, and **international treaty compliance**. Much of the research on loss aversion in the foreign policy literature has relied heavily upon case studies (Mercer, 2005). However, for some time scholars have suggested that loss aversion should produce broad patterns of behavior that could, in principle, be captured by statistical analysis (e.g., Jervis, 1992, Levy, 1996). Large-n analyses of broader behavior patterns thus remain fertile territory for research and contain the potential for advancing our understanding of how loss aversion affects foreign policy. As we demonstrate in this article, foreign policy behaviors, like trade disputes, can be analyzed using contemporary insights about loss aversion derived from neuroscience. Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. First, we build upon neuroscience research to argue that policy makers' aversion to accepting losses can affect their willingness to back down in international disputes. Cognitive science has convincingly demonstrated that individuals tend to **strive harder** and take more risks **to avoid losses** than they will to achieve similar gains. More recent neuroscientific findings show that unrealized expectations, like those observed **in a broken agreement**, are processed in the human mind in a way almost identical to actual losses. The result is that unmet expectations can also trigger loss aversion. Policy makers' resolve during disputes can thus vary if they perceive themselves to be defending previously established agreements from violations by their counterparts. Such violations diminish expected and hoped for gains, triggering loss aversion. Generalizing from this phenomenon, we then distinguish between preventive goals in which policy makers seek to protect against perceived losses versus promotive goals in which policy makers seek to make new gains. We theorize that policy makers should be less willing to back down in disputes initiated for preventive reasons than for promotive ones. We employ our theory to help explain cross-case variation in the level of resolve demonstrated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in prosecuting Section 301 trade disputes designed to improve the terms of trade for U.S. businesses. Drawing on our preventive versus promotive framework, we hypothesize that the USTR should be less willing to back down in Section 301 disputes initiated because of breached trade agreements than those initiated to open up new markets. We test our theory via two different large-n analyses of a hundred Section 301 trade disputes. This approach is unique because - to the best of our knowledge - this study constitutes the first theoretically driven statistical analysis of loss aversion on foreign policy behavior grounded in a specific set of neuroscientific findings. In our first test, we conduct an analysis using binary logit, and, in the second, we employ a competing risks model. The two approaches allow us to model the effects of time on U.S. resolve in different ways. Our empirical results provide strong support for our theory, revealing that the U.S. Government was significantly less likely to back down in preventive disputes. Indeed, we find that the preventive/promotive distinction provides the single greatest determinant of U.S. resolve in prosecuting its Section 301 cases. We believe that this project offers a number of novel contributions. First, this study demonstrates that specific findings from cognitive neuroscience can make tangible contributions to explaining phenomena in **i**nternational **r**elations. Our study reveals that loss aversion and unrealized expecta- tions profoundly shape the behavior of even the most powerful states in the international system and that it does so in ways that traditional theoretical approaches are often blind to. This suggests that the loss-aversion-based framework we have developed may be able to yield novel insights into a host of other issue areas beyond the study of trade policy. Second, we test our arguments utilizing large-n statistical analysis - a method that has seen little use in evaluating cognitive and/or neuroscience theories of international relations (e.g., Drury, 2005). Moving forward with a program of quantitative analysis broadens the applicability of such theories and places them on equal analytical footing with rationalist models. Our project thus demonstrates that the empirical barriers that have to date "arrested" the development of the cognitive research agenda in international relations can be overcome (Walker, 2007). Lastly, our inquiry provides a number of case-specific insights explaining the comparative resolve demonstrated by the United States in prosecuting its Section 301 trade disputes and the policy implications that arise from them.

### Inducements CP---Fails---Bureaucracy

#### X.

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Security Assistance as Incentive Security assistance generates a classic principal-agent problem. In such relationships between a principal and its agent or proxy, there exists an information asymmetry where the agent inherently has more information about their own capabilities, activities, and interests than the principal. Agents, being rational actors, place their own interests above those of the principal and, in the absence of other incentives, behave accordingly. The greater the degree of misalignment, the more problematic this becomes. U.S. frustration during its 20-year war in Afghanistan over Pakistan’s perceived failure to adequately confront extremist groups, despite significant military aid, is an example of principal-agent problems at work. Fortunately, these are not insurmountable obstacles. Security assistance in the form of arms, equipment, or other support can be an effective incentive when it is used as a carrot to reward desired behavior, such as achieving a specific reform or taking some other action aligned with the interests of the principal. Alternately, such aid becomes a stick when it is withheld. An example of this carrot-and-stick approach being used effectively is described in Walter Ladwig’s study of U.S. assistance to the Philippines to combat the Hukbalahap rebellion in the decade following World War II. Heavy-handed tactics used by the local constabulary forces were a major factor driving support for the rebels. Recognizing this problem, U.S. advisors insisted on a series of reforms within the security forces as a precondition for further aid. These measures, along with the appointment of the reform-minded Ramon Magsaysay as defense chief, contributed to a far more effective counterinsurgency campaign and the eventual defeat of the rebel movement. This approach of using aid as an incentive stands in sharp contrast to Ladwig’s other case study, Vietnam, where U.S. aid was used as an inducement in the hope that it would eventually change partner behavior. In this case, U.S. advisors tried in vain year after year to cajole prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem and successor regimes to implement reforms that would have broadened domestic political support and made the South Vietnamese forces more effective. All the while, massive U.S. assistance continued to flow in with the expectation that it would eventually bring about a change of heart in the host-nation government. Such change never came, and the United States and its South Vietnamese proxies lost the war. The more recent U.S. experience in Iraq from 2003 until the withdrawal in 2011 contains echoes of Vietnam. David Lake’s study of that conflict suggests that provision of unconditional security assistance may still be America’s default setting. Despite massive volumes of military aid provided to the Iraqi government during this period, U.S. urging to reform the security forces and national government repeatedly failed. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister during much of this period, resisted efforts to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive and apolitical, instead continuing to employ them as his own sectarian instrument. Again, the United States used an approach focused on training and equipping, known in the current lexicon as building partner capacity. The Iraqi government received assistance regardless of its effort, or lack thereof, to implement much-needed reform while the United States failed to use the leverage which hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance could buy. Several years later, the Iraqi military in which the United States had invested so much fell apart virtually upon first contact with the Islamic State’s irregular militia. The “building partner capacity” approach has two main flaws. First, it ignores fundamental problems, such as corruption, coup-proofing, and otherwise weak defense institutions which additional military capacity cannot overcome and may even exacerbate. Paradoxically, a focus primarily on capacity-building often fails to build meaningful, long-term capacity because it neglects underlying institutional problems. Second, it ignores principal-agent problems by assuming that once in possession of highly capable security forces, the partner will wield them in a manner aligned with U.S. interests. U.S. advisors and diplomats may recognize the pressing need for security sector reform in the partner. Unfortunately, the ingrained culture of U.S. security assistance seemingly relies on the false premise that with enough U.S. training and relationship-building, other countries’ militaries will voluntarily reform even though it is often not in their personal interests to do so.

# Unilat Non-SC CPs

## Solvency---Unilateral

### Solvency---Baltics---Generic

#### US unilateral action solves.

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With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a renewed assessment of efforts by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter Russia from taking military action on NATO’s eastern flank has become particularly salient. In the coming weeks, NATO leadership will meet to discuss what longer term force posture adjustments are required to create such a deterrent.[1] This paper proposes several modest policy recommendations which will help inform the discussion and ultimately strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence posture.

Contemporary academic research on conventional deterrence highlights clear gaps in the deterrence capacity of the United States and NATO, despite their concerted efforts to strengthen conventional military capability since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. For example, studies indicate that the rotational military forces established by the United States’ Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, still lack the requisite conventional capability to prevent a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, these studies lack a well-defined formula for what constitutes adequate capability and say little about what adjustments the United States and NATO must make to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltics and Poland.

To help clarify capability requirements in the region, we reviewed conventional deterrence theories and models from the Cold War. Though long-standing, this research provides a clearer picture of the ideal defensive force posture and adequate force ratios needed to improve deterrence, compared to recent policy analyses. Focusing on land-based operations, we then applied these correlation of forces models to analyze the current balance of conventional ground forces in the Baltics. Through comparing the relative combat power of NATO’s forces in the Baltics with Russia’s forces in its Western Military District and Kaliningrad oblast, we confirmed that the NATO capability gaps identified in previous studies remain large. We also found that potential NATO high readiness reinforcements would be incapable of closing the gaps for at least a month in a crisis scenario. These capability shortcomings clearly hinder the United States’ and NATO’s ongoing efforts to conventionally deter Russian aggression in the Baltics or to decisively respond in a crisis.

Accounting for U.S. military budget limitations, force structure constraints, and competing global requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) could make several policy adjustments to strengthen U.S. capabilities and rapidly reinforce security in the Baltics. Specifically, the U.S. military could increase U.S. armored forces in Central Europe, enhance the operational readiness of U.S. ground forces, and support upgrades to NATO mobility systems and infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. These modest recommendations, outlined in this paper, represent feasible options to strengthen NATO’s deterrence against an increasingly aggressive Russia. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine and attempts to coerce NATO members into making concessions underscore the compelling and urgent need to address critical U.S. and NATO capability deficits.

#### Robust American presence alone deters Russia from invasion.

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VILNIUS, Lithuania — For the Baltic states, the desire for steadier and more robust American presence to deter Russia is high.

Ever since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO and the U.S. military have drastically bolstered their presence in Eastern Europe to include deploying NATO rapid response forces, embedding units under the command of Baltic states’ forces, building up arsenals of equipment, deploying a heel-to-toe rotational U.S. armored brigade combat team and conducting increasingly complex exercises.

The deployment of the enhanced forward presence, or EFP, battalions in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, for instance, have significantly reduced the risk of military conflict in the Baltic region, Lithuanian Defence Minister Raimundas Karoblis recently told Defense News and a group on an Atlantic Council-organized, fact-finding mission in Lithuania.

“On the other hand, let me be very clear: [The] U.S. is the most powerful ally and its deterrent effect is not comparable to other allies,” he told Defense News in a statement. “I am convinced that Russia would not dare to test NATO if U.S. military units are deployed on [a] persistent basis in the three Baltic states.”

Karoblis suggested even a rather small U.S. military presence like short-range air defense units or an Army company in addition to each EFP battalion “would significantly boost NATO’s deterrence.”

The desire for a stronger American presence doesn’t just stem from Lithuania’s Ministry of Defence; it’s also preferred by top military leaders of the country’s Iron Wolf Brigade and the German-led NATO EFP unit.

Keeping the Russian bear at bay

Lithuania, in a tenuous position bordering Belarus and Kaliningrad, has dramatically ramped up its military capability since Russia’s move on Crimea. Lithuania is joined to Poland by a short 40-mile border — the Suwalki Gap — that separates Belarus from Kaliningrad. Should Russian forces close the gap, it would isolate Lithuania and its northern Baltic state neighbors from the rest of Europe.

The country hasn’t sat idly by, waiting for Europe or America to help; it has taken steps to modernize its military by buying new infantry fighting vehicles, tactical vehicles, howitzers and medium-range air defense systems, and it’s grown its ranks by adding another brigade and reinstating conscription.

Lithuania also met the NATO pledge to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense in 2018, and it’s planning to increase that effort to 2.5 percent by 2030.

But despite Lithuania’s military buildup and its Eastern European neighbors’ moves to strengthen defense of the eastern front, Russia continues to build up its military might in the Western Military District, increase cooperation in military exercises with Belarus, and militarize Kaliningrad with missiles and tanks, all to make Russia capable of succeeding in a regional conflict.

Then there are the allegations of Russia’s unconventional operations in the gray zone of conflict aimed at fracturing NATO and Europe by tampering with elections, engaging in cyberattacks and attempting to influence populations through false narratives in social media.

The U.S. Army is using heel-to-toe rotational deployments of armored brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades in Europe to practice rapidly massing equipment and troops in countries near the Russian border.

When officials in Lithuania were asked what types of American military units it might want most, they were hesitant to provide specifics but reiterated the importance of U.S. presence.

The U.S. Army currently deploys 6,000 soldiers throughout seven countries as part of Atlantic Resolve in three separate rotations — armored, aviation and logistical — according to a U.S. Army Europe spokeswoman. In Lithuania specifically, the Pennsylvania National Guard, through the State Partnership Program, has traveled to the country on more than 275 occasions and conducted over 600 security cooperation engagements, the spokeswoman told Defense News.

There is also a unit-based partnership between the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the Iron Wolf and Griffin brigades.

What would an additional US presence look like?

The U.S. Army regularly holds meetings to ensure it’s aligning its operations with the National Defense Strategy, which includes deployment strategy, Army Under Secretary Ryan McCarthy told reporters in a recent interview at the Pentagon.

The NDS squarely places Russia and China as the top two threats to the United States.

McCarthy said 60 percent of the Army’s brigade combat teams are nearing the highest level of readiness. “Those units could be put in the queue to go forward and deploy, but it’s got to be something where the [combatant command] comes forward and asks for that capability,” he said.

U.S. Army Europe would not tell Defense News possible options for further deployment in the Baltics, instead referring the inquiry to the Department of the Army.

What might be provided in the Baltics probably wouldn’t be a big rotational brigade, but much smaller units, McCarthy said. “What is encouraging is the dialogue within NATO, as well as [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], for the desire for expeditionary-like basing throughout both of those areas of responsibility with investment coming from host nations,” he said.

Poland, for instance, offered to pay $2 billion for a permanent base for a U.S. armored division in 2018, and the possibility seems to be gaining traction, but it is more likely to accommodate a brigade-sized unit scattered at installations already in existence.

Former U.S. Army Europe commander, retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, who continues to study European defense as the Pershing chair in strategic studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, believes additional units, albeit small and specialized, should deploy to the Baltics on a more consistent basis.

If the U.S. were to put additional troops in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Hodges told Defense News in a recent phone interview from his home base of Frankfurt, Germany, the units should have capabilities that fill host-nation gaps.

“I believe that the capabilities that we need would be logistics, intelligence, communications, and, really, air and missile defense,” he said. “In other words, enablers that take a little bit more time to get established, but which provide the important networks necessary for rapid reinforcement.”

Additionally, by deploying key enablers, many of the units can come from the Army National Guard and Army Reserves because those capabilities are resident in reserve formations and ideally suited for rotational presence, Hodges said.

### Solvency---Space

#### US leadership can ensure multi-lateral diplomatic compliance with domestic deterrence-by-denial on adversarial ASATs.

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ASATs in the Global Community

Despite our advantage, the U.S. has an interest in preventing an ASAT arms race, which could lead to the proliferation of ASAT technologies across the globe and an increase in ASAT tests. Given the negative impacts of ASAT tests on the space environment, all countries would benefit from a treaty establishing a moratorium on ASAT testing. Each ASAT test conducted by a major power is a signal to smaller, developing space nations that ASAT technology is a necessary part of being a space power. Developing space powers may seek to improve their standing in the international community and garner prestige by conducting high-profile ASAT tests. An international treaty denouncing ASAT tests and binding signatories to a testing moratorium could eliminate these incentives and prompt developing space powers to forego ASAT tests.

Such a treaty could help establish norms in space, an area in which U.S. leadership has failed. To work towards the goal of the Outer Space Treaty in establishing space as a peaceful, non-militarized realm, it must be clear that ASAT tests are unacceptable. This would make ASAT weaponry a less desirable acquisition.

Most roadblocks to international cooperation in this area have been established by the U.S. The Union of Concerned Scientists explains:

In 2006, the United States added a provision to its National Space Policy opposing the development of any new legal regimes or other mechanisms that would restrict U.S. access to or use of space, including any arms control proposals that would impinge on military space acquisitions or operations. Such categorical rejection of international efforts to address space security issues, however, runs counter to U.S. interests: by forgoing the possibility of new mutually agreed-upon rules or constraints, the United States limits its options rather than keeping them open. Without constraints on ASAT weapons, for example, threats to satellites will continue to proliferate and mature, leading to less predictability and stability in crises and forcing the United States to expend more effort in securing satellites.23

U.S. policymakers should reconsider the costs and the benefits of blocking international cooperation on ASAT weaponry.

Satellite Defense

Diplomatic agreements can take a long time to take effect. In the meantime, the U.S. should diminish vulnerabilities present in its space systems. This can be accomplished in several ways:

Increase System Redundancy

Smaller satellite sizes and reduced launch costs have made it cheaper than ever to put satellites into orbit. System planners should utilize these favorable conditions to ensure satellite systems enjoy sufficient redundancy. Planners should examine systems and ask the following questions:

• How many satellites would need to become inoperable for this system to malfunction?

• What impacts would users on Earth experience if this system lost one satellite? Two? Three? Four?

If the answers to these questions prove less than desirable, system planners should consider adding satellites to the system to increase its damage tolerance.

Planners should not limit their scope to satellites alone. Ground stations and the corresponding abilities to communicate and control satellite systems should be redundant.

Radiation Hardening

Scenarios exist in which an adversary would detonate a nuclear weapon at high altitudes to disable satellites. “One low-yield (10-20 kt), high-altitude (125-300 km) nuclear explosion could disable – in weeks to months – all LEO satellites not specifically hardened to withstand radiation.”24 The severity of damage sustained by LEO satellites in this scenario makes hardening these satellites impractical. They are a lost cause. But satellites in GEO would receive a smaller dose of radiation and EMP effect. 25 Hardening these satellites would increase the likelihood of their survival.

To harden GEO satellites against the threat of a high-altitude nuclear detonation, the components of strategic or sensitive satellites should be housed in a radiation-safe vault. To guard against the threat of an EMP, satellites could be equipped with a nuclear event sensor that would turn the satellite off and then on once the EMP threat had passed. A variety of safeguards exist at relatively low costs (5-15% of total cost) to guard against serious damage.26

Establishing “Do-Not-Orbit” Zones

Space is a crowded space. Still, our strategic satellites should be given their space. The U.S. military should publicize policy that establishes a “Do Not Orbit” zone around each of our strategic satellites. Adversarial satellites that breach “Do Not Orbit” zones will be treated as hostile attackers and appropriate reciprocations will ensue.

Ensuring Maneuverability

Ensuring satellites are maneuverable could increase their chances of survival when faced with known man-made and natural threats.

Protecting Optics

Placing removable shields near optics could insulate reconnaissance or intelligence satellites from the threat of weaker lasers aimed at damaging or dazzling optics.

### Solvency---ASW

#### Unilateral US deployment of ASW solves deterrence.

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Anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, is one of a navy’s most difficult missions. Sonars detect submarines with only a fraction of the range and precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above the water. Submarines can carry missiles able to hit targets hundreds of miles away, requiring searches to cover potentially vast areas. And the torpedoes that aircraft and surface ships use to sink submarines need to be dropped right on the submarine to have any chance of sinking it.

These challenges led the Cold War-era U.S. Navy to rely on a sequential approach for tracking enemy submarines. Electronic or visual intelligence sources would report when an opposing sub was leaving port, and it would hopefully get picked up by sound surveillance, or SOSUS — sonar arrays on the sea floor — as it entered chokepoints, like that between Iceland and the United Kingdom.

Patrol aircraft would then attempt to track the submarine using sonar-equipped buoys, or sonobuoys, and eventually turn it over to a U.S. nuclear attack submarine, or SSN, for long-term trail.

The U.S. ASW model broke down, however, in the decades following the Cold War as U.S. submarine and patrol aircraft fleets shrank, the Chinese submarine fleet grew, and Russian submarines became quieter. Today, the U.S. Navy devotes enormous effort to tracking each modern Russian submarine in the western Atlantic.

During the 2000s, the strategy of full-spectrum ASW started an essential shift in goals, from being able to sink submarines when needed to being able to defeat submarines by preventing them from accomplishing their mission.

Full-spectrum ASW and other current concepts, however, still rely on aircraft, ships and submarines for sensing, tracking and attacking enemy submarines to bottle them up near their own coasts or sink them in the open ocean. Although SOSUS has improved since the Cold War and is joined by a family of new deployable seabed arrays, the next link in the U.S. ASW chain is still a P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, or a U.S. SSN. These platforms are in short supply around the world, cost hundreds of millions to billions of dollars to buy and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars a day to operate.

Workers prepare the launching ceremony of the Russian diesel-electric attack submarine Stary Oskol on Admiralty Shipyard in Saint Petersburg on Aug. 28, 2014. (Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images)

With defense budgets flattening and likely to decrease in a post-COVID-19 environment, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to continue playing “little kid soccer” in ASW, with multiple aircraft or ships converging to track and destroy submarines before they can get within missile range of targets like aircraft carriers or bases ashore.

The Navy should instead increase the use of unmanned systems in ASW across the board, which cost a fraction to buy and operate compared to their manned counterparts. Unmanned aircraft could deploy sonobuoys or stationary sonar arrays, and unmanned undersea or surface vehicles could tow passive sonar arrays. Unmanned surface vehicles could also deploy low-frequency active sonars like those carried by U.S. undersea surveillance ships that can detect or drive off submarines from dozens of miles away.

Although autonomous platforms will not have the onboard operators of a destroyer or patrol aircraft, improved processing is enabling small autonomous sensors to rapidly identify contacts of interest. Line-of-sight or satellite communications can connect unmanned vehicles and sensors with operators ashore or on manned ASW platforms.

A significant shortfall of today’s ASW concepts is “closing the kill chain” by attacking enemy submarines. Air- or surface-launched weapons have short ranges and small warheads that reduce their ability to sink a submarine, but their cost and size prevents them from being purchased and fielded in large numbers.

Unmanned systems could address this shortfall in concert with a new approach to ASW that suppresses enemy submarines rather than destroying them. During World War II and the Cold War, allied navies largely kept submarines at bay through aggressive tracking and harassing attacks, or by forcing opposing SSNs to protect ballistic missile submarines.

The modern version of submarine suppression would include overt sensing operations combined with frequent torpedo or depth-bomb attacks. Although unmanned vehicles frequently launch lethal weapons today under human supervision, the small weapons that would be most useful for submarine suppression could be carried in operationally relevant numbers by medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs or medium unmanned surface vessels. Moreover, the large number and long endurance of unmanned vehicles would enable the tracking and suppressing of many submarines over a wide area at lower risk than using patrol aircraft or destroyers.

Today the U.S. Navy uses unmanned systems in ASW primarily to detect submarines. To affordably conduct peacetime surveillance and effectively defeat submarines in wartime, the Navy should increase the role of unmanned systems. Using manned platforms to conduct command and control, and unmanned vehicles to track, deter and engage submarines, could significantly reduce the costs of ASW operations and enable the Navy to scale its ASW efforts to match the growing threat posed by submarine fleets.

### Solvency---ASW---Black Sea

#### US deployment of ASW capabilities in the Black Sea pools the necessary data required for effective deterrence.

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These Russian exercises underscore the significance of the undersea threat the country poses. Russia’s Navy is smaller and less capable compared to the U.S. Navy, yet its submarine fleet is extremely advanced, lethal and sophisticated. Russian cruise-missile-armed attack submarines could potentially attack the coastal areas along Romania and Bulgaria and inland military infrastructures. The U.S. Navy regularly uses its destroyers to conduct security and stability missions in the Black Sea in support of exercises at times including U.S. Coast Guard vessels.

It would be unsurprising if the Defense Department were to send additional anti-submarine warfare assets to the Black Sea to track and ultimately counter Russian submarines. Such an initiative could take the form of large, sub-hunting surveillance planes such as the P-8 Poseidon or surface drones tasked with towing sonars to track activity beneath the surface. Then there is the possibility that U.S. Navy submarines could conduct clandestine undersea surveillance missions or launch smaller, quieter and less detectable undersea drones capable of surveilling sensitive and high-risk areas for potential threats. It’s important to operate with the ability to track moving Russian submarines because they can launch cruise missiles prior to quickly taking off to prevent enemies from finding the launch location.

Russian submarines operating at depth may be difficult to spot with overhead drones focused primarily on the surface, a circumstance which may call for the use of destroyer-launched MH-60 helicopters equipped with air-launched sonobuoys to search for undersea enemy activity.

### Solvency --- Black Sea

#### U.S assistance can ensure black sea deterrence

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US defense assistance to Ukraine has more than quadrupled from USD 91 million in 2014 to USD [415 million](https://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/security-assistance-focus-ukraine?gclid=CjwKCAjwsMzzBRACEiwAx4lLGzlKXU1xOyo9ziv5xjJUz8bqFrJyC7ve4vY65oBccY-CGTgcOvLTbBoC8_UQAvD_BwE) in 2019. It has been the only NATO power to significantly contribute, providing approximately 90 percent of the military assistance received by Ukraine. But this hasn’t been without hurdles. The Trump-Ukraine scandal, which saw the president block US military assistance to Ukraine and ultimately face impeachment proceedings, shocked the global community.

While Ukraine has received lethal and non-lethal equipment worth more than USD 1.5 billion since Crimea’s annexation, this has been insufficient in deterring Russian aggression. Counter-battery radar systems may have helped [drastically reduce](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/UkraineReport_February2015_FINAL.pdf) Ukrainian fatalities but Ukrainian armed forces are struggling to defend themselves against Russian attacks. In November 2018, Russia attacked Ukrainian military and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels at the Kerch Strait – a passage connecting the Black Sea with the much smaller, land-locked Azov Sea. The incident led to massive economic loss for Ukraine, which depends on maritime access, and has had a significant economic impact for Western trade partners.

Signs of hope, but more to achieve

Billions of dollars in military assistance could well deter Russian aggression and improve Black Sea security. But as we’ve seen in the case of Ukraine, the impact of a few tens of millions of dollars in lethal equipment has so far been limited.

### Solvency---ASW---Arctic

#### Expanded unilateral action creates sufficient deterrence beyond submarine forces.

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Arctic Threats and Opportunities

The key threats to U.S. interests in the region are from Russian military forces in the Arctic and from Chinese influence attempts. Russian military activity in the Barents and Greenland Seas (the northern part of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap) poses the most direct threat to U.S. security interests. Russian forces there could attack the U.S. homeland, ships and data links crossing the North Atlantic, and threaten NATO allies in northern Europe. Russian forces in the Bering and Chukchi Seas off the Alaskan coast are equally concerning. Russian capabilities could also be used to flout international law through unilateral assertions of control along the Northern Sea Route or the undersea Lomonosov Ridge, should the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf rule against Russia’s recent expansive claims to the Arctic seabed.

China’s regional actions are troubling, particularly its use of government-linked investments, loans, and trade deals to influence Arctic states or populations. Threats could also arise from the military potential in China’s bathymetric mapping or its polar research stations across Scandinavia. Any U.S. security strategy in the Arctic should alleviate these threats.

The most obvious opportunities for the United States in the Arctic are in private-sector infrastructure development and security coordination with allies. Poor infrastructure and communications plague Alaska. A hard-security strategy that prioritized infrastructure development in the name of national security, a green-energy transformation, or broadband connectivity initiatives could improve infrastructure and resilience in Alaska. Internationally, security coordination among U.S. allies and partners could generate momentum on nonsecurity behavioral norms for resource extraction, investments, and economic cooperation across the Arctic.

The Strategy’s Ways and Means

To deter Russia and China from threatening U.S. interests in the Arctic, the U.S. military needs to demonstrate presence in the region beyond submarines. Submarines can deter large-scale attacks but are less useful against coercion and intimidation. Deterring Russia will require Navy surface assets (manned and unmanned) and a more robust air and ground presence in the European and North Atlantic Arctic. It is difficult to police fisheries, monitor potentially hostile surface ships, or target airborne intruders without capabilities in the region. As Adm. James Foggo said of the Arctic when commanding Allied Joint Forces Command in Italy, “In order to deter, you have to be present. You’ve got to be there and you’ve got to be there quickly.” Gen. Glen VanHerck, commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, made similar remarks in late April 2021.

Capabilities

Budget constraints, however, will prevent large-scale acquisition of military equipment designed for the Arctic. There are just too many competing demands on the defense budget. A handful of modern icebreakers and limited numbers of the Army’s new cold-weather vehicle may be the extent of new, manned Arctic capabilities funded for the foreseeable future. That said, the United States could shift cold-weather-capable equipment to the region, especially unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. Unmanned capabilities need not have been developed for the Arctic per se but could be adapted for use in the region.

There is a role for the U.S. private sector in developing Arctic capabilities and infrastructure if given the right government inducements. One promising area is satellite communication and positioning systems. Satellite companies are potentially attractive government partners. The U.S. military is looking into private-sector efforts such as the OneWeb and Starlink polar communication satellites. The European Space Agency is doing the same with Arctic weather satellites. There is no reason these initiatives could not be expanded.

The Biden administration’s Arctic strategy should consider the role of extractive industries (oil, mining, timber, fishing) in the region. Those industries have built much of the nonmilitary infrastructure in Alaska. In the future, as the global economy shifts from hydrocarbons to green energy, government efforts to foster infrastructure development could focus on distributed electricity grids, port facilities, and overland freight transport associated with mineral extraction (particularly rare earth minerals) rather than on oil and gas. All are consistent with the Biden climate plan. New ports and rail lines could be funded through cost-sharing agreements between the government and business, which could make infrastructure cost-effective for business while saving the taxpayer money. The private sector could use the infrastructure during normal times, with the U.S. military having priority use during military exercises or national emergencies.

Political Will

Demonstrating the political will to use Arctic capabilities unilaterally or in conjuncture with allies and partners is the other prerequisite for successful deterrence and defense. The most important priority should be to convince allies that the United States is a reliable security partner. Some of that persuasion has already begun with the Biden administration’s reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees and Blinken’s consultations in Denmark before the May 2021 Arctic Council ministerial meeting.

Persuading allies also requires demonstrating the ability to come to their defense if needed, regardless of climate conditions. Unilateral, bilateral, and “mini-multilateral” military exercises are all useful as practice and as international signals in the Arctic. Unilaterally, the U.S. Army is starting to relearn how to operate in the Arctic, as highlighted in its Arctic strategy. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps learned important lessons from NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise in 2018 and smaller exercises since then. More exercises are needed to demonstrate to friend and foe alike that the U.S. military can again operate in cold climates.

In addition, the United States should expand its use of flexible basing and deployment agreements with allies. The recent agreement covering the U.S. military’s use of the Ramsund naval facility and Evenes air base in northern Norway are a good start. A similar arrangement could be made for the Danish air force to have permanent facilities at the U.S. base in Thule, Greenland, for search and rescue, air surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and air interdiction missions, something that could tie allied forces more closely together, better defend this early warning facility, and improve surveillance in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Expansion of the runway and facilities on Norway’s Jan Mayen island and refurbishing an additional airfield in Greenland in conjunction with the Danes could serve similar purposes. Finally, the United States could coordinate existing niche capabilities amongst Arctic allies, an Arctic version of NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative.

The Way Forward

The Biden administration should publish a new Arctic national security strategy. The last U.S. Arctic strategy was written in 2013, before the country refocused on geopolitical competition with Russia and China. The strategy should prioritize deterring attacks from the Arctic on U.S. or allied territory, minimizing and defending against Russian or Chinese coercion, and preventing either country from achieving future regional hegemony. The United States could achieve these objectives through cost-effective military acquisition, incentives for private-sector infrastructure development, activities that demonstrate military presence, and political and military commitments to Arctic allies.

### Solvency---ASW---AT: DoD Processing Fails

#### CDAO application solves sonar data processing.

Michael C. Horowitz & Lauren Kahn 22. American author and professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania; Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Why DoD’s New Approach to Data and Artificial Intelligence Should Enhance National Defense.” Council on Foreign Relations. 3-3-2022. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-dods-new-approach-data-and-artificial-intelligence-should-enhance-national-defense //EM

The ability of the United States to compete in the 21st century depends on U.S. leadership in data and artificial intelligence (AI). In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a new and much-needed approach to U.S. defense efforts in data and AI. David Spirk, the departing Chief Data Officer of the Pentagon, made clear yesterday that the office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), in addition to its other functions, will be the successor organization for and replace DoD’s much-touted Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). While the JAIC symbolized DoD’s efforts to get smart on AI beginning in 2018, the integration of data and AI represents a maturation of the U.S. AI approach—one that elevates the importance of AI in national defense. The JAIC itself was not as important as what the JAIC stood for—DoD’s commitment to U.S. defense AI leadership. In paving the way forward and getting AI on the agenda, the JAIC succeeded. From this point on, a more cohesive approach to AI and data through the CDAO is more likely to accelerate AI adoption throughout the U.S. military because it links DoD’s AI efforts with data, the fuel AI requires. For U.S. defense AI adoption, in particular, aligning these organizations could be game-changing. Addressing DoD’s siloed data, standardizing and improving its quality and access, is a precondition to having the data necessary to train algorithms for many defense uses, and any future technologies that rely on collecting, processing, and using information. Implementation will be critical and heavily dependent on two things. First, to catalyze AI adoption, the CDAO will need to develop close relationships with the military services and combatant commands. Second, the CDAO will need to coordinate with DoD’s research and development organizations, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, leading on AI experimentation and research. There is hard work ahead, but the new organizational design is promising.

The office of the CDAO brings together previously independent components of DoD: the JAIC, the office of the Chief Data Officer, the Defense Digital Service (DDS), and the Office of Advancing Analytics (ADVANA). The office of the Chief Data Officer is in charge of data management and coordination, DDS finds digital solutions for internal data and security issues, and ADVANA aggregates data and conducts data analytics. The combination of these offices raised questions about whether an independent JAIC was necessary for U.S. defense AI leadership. Departing CDO Spirk says that the CDAO will be “taking the best parts of all the organizations it is overseeing and redistributing them for faster and better decision-making.” We agree. At present, not only is DoD’s data siloed but its AI efforts and initiatives are as well. According to the company Govini, in FY21, fifteen separate departments and organizations funded and worked on AI and AI-adjacent technologies, often without formal coordination or throughlines. This has led to redundancies, gaps, inconsistencies in application and access to data and resources, and an overall hodge-podge of AI efforts. DoD has acknowledged this and is making organizational changes necessary to accelerate AI adoption even more by restructuring its AI approach from the ground up. Now, CDAO will have teams working on policy and governance, technology development, and rolling out data and AI for the Pentagon and the military services, to avoid bureaucratic duplication and confusion that could undermine the CDAO’s overall authority. In particular, bringing the data and AI teams together will improve the data DoD needs for AI development.

Some might fear that the reorganization of the JAIC’s functions within the CDAO means the United States is not as committed to the role of AI in the future of U.S. national defense. Based on current information, this concern is misplaced. First, the JAIC was created so the U.S. military could effectively take advantage of the way AI will shape the future of war. It succeeded in many ways. Recognition of the importance of AI for the future of U.S. defense, and national security in general, is much more widespread. The JAIC made headway on AI adoption and data literacy, with initiatives like “AI 101,” and on the data integration issue, as part of the Artificial Intelligence and Data Initiative (AIDA). The military services are investing more in AI and related technologies such as autonomous systems. This, ironically, makes an independent JAIC less necessary.

Second, the JAIC has also faced challenges that the CDAO approach can address. The JAIC had multiple missions, including advising DoD on AI adoption, funding AI research, and building AI tools itself. The JAIC also lacked the authority to advance military service adoption of AI on its own, or to itself transform the connection between AI and overall DoD policy and strategy. The JAIC ended up arguably not policy-focused enough to lead on policy, and not technically equipped enough to lead on algorithm development. While the JAIC encouraged AI investment within DoD, its existence also highlighted how the uncoordinated DoD AI portfolio required even more organization. The CDAO approach will address some of these issues by fusing DoD data and AI efforts, as will a growing focus on AI in other DoD components, from Research & Engineering on the technology development side to OSD-Policy (Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy) on the strategy and governance side.

Third, it is difficult to get things immediately right when it comes to converting emerging technologies into adopted innovations, especially for conservative institutions like militaries. We think about experimentation as a critical part of how the technology invention process works, but the same is true when it comes to transforming organizations. Given the way data access and integration are essential to innovation, consolidating data and AI, rather than having a specific JAIC only focused on AI, will make technological adoption across DoD more likely.

### Solvency---ASW---AT: Links to Net Benefit---NATO Bad

#### Unilateral action avoids Russian aggression.

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Nevertheless, individual NATO members with territory or territorial waters in the Arctic (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States) have taken the initiative to advance their Arctic interests. Recently, the United States has taken a more assertive role in the region. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called out Russian and Chinese Arctic behavior at the May 2019 Arctic Council ministerial meeting, the U.S. Air Force has stationed more fifth-generation fighter planes in Alaska than exist in any other location on the planet, and the U.S. Navy reactivated the Second Fleet with responsibilities for the North Atlantic. The Defense Department and individual services have released, or will release, several Arctic strategies. The U.S. Coast Guard published an Arctic Strategic Outlook in April 2019, followed by an Arctic strategy from the Defense Department in June 2019 and the U.S. Air Force in July 2020. The Navy and Army are expected to follow suit with revised Arctic strategies in late 2020 and 2021 respectively.

So far, all of those strategies reference the value of regional partnerships with like-minded states, which begs the question — should NATO play a greater role in the Arctic? Some argue yes, saying that NATO should create an Arctic security forum with Russia or engage in visible contingency planning. Others disagree, believing that since there is no consensus within the alliance on actions in the Arctic, the matter should be left to individual member states. Camille Grand, NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense investment, said when asked about the topic in an a recent interview, “I don’t think we are there yet.”

NATO itself should play a very limited, direct role in the Arctic. The alliance should only engage in circumscribed contingency planning and conduct the occasional large exercise like Trident Juncture in 2018. To do more risks weakening alliance unity and needlessly antagonizing Russia. Specifically, NATO should avoid creating a new alliance command dedicated to the Arctic, pushing for Sweden and Finland to join the alliance, or establishing a new Arctic security forum between NATO and Russia. These policy options have been floated in expert dialogues and ought to be tabled, at least for now. Rather than coordinating through NATO, which would continue today’s policy, member states and their non-NATO partners should meet Arctic security threats by engaging in more frequent and deeper unilateral, bilateral, or coalition-of-the-willing defense cooperation focused on cold weather training, regular military exercises, and rotational force deployments. This is a subtle but important distinction. Some physical activities would look the same in this alternative policy, but they would not be under a NATO moniker.

### Solvency---5G---Cyber

#### Unilateral action incentivizes NATO to repair cyber vulnerabilities AND creates US resiliency to avoid attacks.

Milo 1AC Medin 19. Member of the Defense Innovation Board at the Department of Defense, Vice President of Access Services at Google; and Gilman Louie, expert and Special Government Employee to the Defense Innovation Board at the DoD. April 2019. “The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DoD.” *Defense Innovation Board*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1074509> //EM [italics in original]

*Recommendation #1*

DoD needs to make a plan for sharing sub-6 GHz spectrum to shape the future 5G ecosystem, including an assessment of how much and which bandwidths need to be shared, within what timeframe, and how that sharing will impact DoD systems.

* DoD and the FCC must flip their prioritization from mmWave to sub-6 GHz spectrum for 5G. DoD and FCC have been prioritizing the 28 and 37 GHz bandwidths as options for 5G development, but this effort is misplaced. This study has covered the broad range of limitations associated with mmWave, and reasons why the rest of the world will adopt a sub-6 GHz 5G ecosystem. In light of this, DoD must prepare itself for that future operating environment by focusing on co-existing, if not explicitly sharing, with civil 5G operations in those bands of spectrum.
* DoD should particularly focus on the bands of the sub-6 GHz spectrum that are already being used by China. Chinese 5G systems and infrastructure operate in the 3.2-3.6 GHz range, as well as the 4.8-5.0 GHz range. As a result, the commercial world has developed semiconductors and handsets that are configured for that range, and DoD should angle for the most developed market to expedite 5G sub-6 GHz deployment in the United States. It takes approximately two years to add new frequency bands to complex multiband transceivers, and the United States would be able to avoid those two years of development by leveraging subcomponents and devices already on the market for more mature spectrum usage, such as existing Qualcomm products with functionality in the bands leveraged by China.
* As an additional consideration, DoD currently occupies ~500 MHz of space in the 4 GHz spectrum. DoD should take action to share parts of this space, given that it is a material amount of bandwidth that could make a serious impact on 5G development. 5G functions most optimally on large amounts of consecutive bandwidth, and this range could provide the real estate to drive 5G development forward.
* For additional spectrum availability, DoD should recommend that the NTIA, FCC and Department of State should advocate the reallocation of the C-band satellite spectrum to IMT-2000 5G use at the World Radio Conference later this year (WRC-19), and take measures to adopt sharing in all 500 MHz of the band in the United States on an accelerated basis for fixed operations. While this will have limited impact on the U.S. 5G mobile ecosystem, sharing in this band could provide broad coverage at 100 Mbps and above for fixed broadband service to a large section of the rural United States.
* DoD should encourage other government agencies to incentivize industry to adopt a common 5G network for sub-6 deployment. Incentives can include: accelerated depreciation, tax incentives, low interest loans and government purchase of equipment and services.
* This recommendation does not call for the eviction of DoD systems operating in the sub-6 GHz spectrum, nor does it call for the sharing of ALL DoD spectrum. DoD must conduct thoughtful but candid analyses of the cost and schedule associated with sharing different spectrum bands, and prioritize accordingly.
* However, DoD must bear in mind that the status quo of spectrum allocation is unsustainable. 5G capability requires larger bands of spectrum, and without that additional bandwidth, the United States will not gain true 5G capability beyond the limited range that mmWave can provide. In the next year, DoD is in the position to enable or inhibit 5G adoption in the United States based on its use of sub-6 GHz spectrum.
* DoD stands to significantly benefit if it shares some of its sub-6 GHz spectrum. As the commercial sector develops and deploys 5G technologies and networks, DoD will be able to leverage commercial innovations to build its own new and improved technologies and networks. At a strategic level, 5G can create a step-change in situational awareness and decision-making by integrating more systems into a network that shares more data faster and at lower latency.
* This effort will require close coordination with NTIA to clear and reassign spectrum. Timing is critical - it is not enough to simply share spectrum, it must be done quickly to keep the United States competitive with China, South Korea, and Japan.
* Without aggressive action as outlined in this report, we believe there is a high likelihood that the United States will be unable to convince the rest of the world to adopt mmWave technologies as the standard 5G pathway. This may bifurcate the global market and result in the majority of the world adopting 5G sub-6 technologies, which will be dominated by the Chinese equipment and handset manufacturers.

*Recommendation #2*

DoD must prepare to operate in a “post-Western” wireless ecosystem. This plan should include R&D investments towards system security and resiliency on an engineering and strategic level.

* Sharing parts of the sub-6 spectrum will certainly help the U.S. 5G effort, but gaining a competitive edge over China would require action at a rate and magnitude previously unseen within DoD. For this reason, it is probable that most of the world outside of the United States will adopt a sub-6 5G solution, forcing DoD to operate on a “post-Western” wireless ecosystem. In this event, DoD should assume that all network infrastructure will ultimately become vulnerable to cyber-attack from both an encryption and resiliency standpoint.
* DoD must adopt a “zero-trust” network model. Perimeter defense models have been proven to be ineffective, and 5G will only exacerbate this problem as more systems are linked into a common network. Information access should no longer be granted simply through attachment to a specific network, and instead should be granted through various security checks within the network. DoD should also plan to move to quantum-resistant key exchange mechanisms to deal with the eventual fall of public key exchange algorithms, particularly given China’s investments in quantum computing.
* While “zero-trust” networks can protect context exchange through cryptography, these exchanges will still be subject to traffic analysis and detection of surges in network utilization. DoD should work to keep large amounts of data flowing on a constant basis so that increases in operational tempo will not be noticed.
* In addition to these security precautions, DoD must brace for cyber-attack and penetration by improving resiliency and building in layers of redundancy throughout its networks to ensure uninterrupted connectivity.
* DoD will need to consider options for defending against a compromised supply chain, where Chinese semiconductor components and chipsets are embedded across multiple systems. DoD should invest in R&D to study the impact of compartmentalizing systems to limit an attacker’s ability to move laterally into other systems. This will come with performance costs, and DoD must find the line where it can balance baseline capability with security.
* DoD should advocate for aggressive protection of U.S. technology intellectual property rights (IPR) in an effort to slow down China’s telecommunications ecosystem expansion. The United States should leverage export controls to slow the rate of market loss for Western vendors, even if it may increase the pace at which China becomes self-sufficient.
* DoD will increasingly be driven to operate on shared commercial networks without their own bespoke infrastructure (as in the case of nuclear C3). DoD must analyze the risks and benefits associated with that shift, and adjust its concept of operations to account for it.
* DoD needs to consider the broader implications of a compromised supply chain, such as risk to personal devices and information that can be derived from activity on those DIB 5G Study Preliminary Release, 3 April 2019 30 devices. If China is able to collect this data, DoD should consider discrete directives to defend against these vulnerabilities that fall outside the traditional DoD systems and platforms, such as training to limit inadvertent sharing of PII through personal device use.
* In addition to these efforts, DoD should initiate testing and experimentation on its bases for future generations of wireless technology beyond 5G. This testing and experimentation will occur over a longer timeframe to ensure that the United States is prepared to lead the next generational transition. These activities can include testing for sub-6 sharing, as well as future mmWave deployment and propagation improvement.

*Recommendation #3*

DoD should advocate for adjusted trade policies to discourage vulnerabilities in its supply chain on the grounds that they put national security assets and missions at risk.

* The compromised supply chain issue poses a serious threat to national security by introducing vulnerabilities into networks and systems, which can be leveraged by a hostile actor to disrupt DoD operations. The spread of these vulnerabilities creates an increasingly unstable environment by lowering barriers to offensive action while weakening defensive positions.
* The proliferation of security vulnerabilities creates incentives for all nations to take offensive action in a conflict, as the barrier to offense decreases while the difficulty of defense increases. This reality is reflected in the new U.S. Cyber doctrine of “forward defense”.
* To counter this threat, DoD should advocate that trade policy reward good security/coding and penalize vulnerabilities through tariffs (“monetization” of good development practices). For example, the United States could automatically impose a heavy tariff (say, 75%) on any goods from any nation found to have backdoors or serious security vulnerabilities. This would impose a market cost for insecurity, and would also create incentives for domestic companies to fund security researchers to find vulnerabilities in competitors’ products, thereby triggering the tariff. This would improve the overall security of DoD ecosystems without having to disclose vulnerabilities found by Title 50 entities.
* The United States should encourage Five Eyes and NATO partners to adopt the same tariffs, regardless of product country of origin. The United States stands to benefit the most in a trade conflict over security of devices.

### Solvency---5G---Cyber---Hardening

#### Distributed 5G networks and hardening solve vulnerabilities.

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The deployment of 5G networks by the U.S. military will be an historic moment for today’s warfighter. From improved C5ISR [command, control, computers, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] readiness and geolocation accuracy to more effective enemy engagement and perimeter defense, 5G gear will enable scalable, extremely low-latency, mobile radio platforms and an Internet of Things edge-sensor network that puts the power of real-time AI and machine learning into the hands of the combat soldier. This future state is achievable, but not without confronting a blunt reality: 5G is an open architecture designed for commercial applications and as such suffers from a great many security vulnerabilities. To build a resilient, secure, survivable 5G military communications network, we must first harden and future-proof the COTS [commercial off-the-shelf]-based hardware, software, and firmware that are the foundation of today’s civilian 5G infrastructure.

As commercial 5G service rolls out across the U.S. with the promise of 100 times greater speeds than its 4G predecessor, it’s time to examine how the U.S. military can equip the modern warfighter with an upgrade to today’s outmoded battlefield communications infrastructure.

This is no small feat. 5G was designed by an international coalition of technology companies, with heavy input from state-owned Chinese firms. As an open-source, commercial standard, 5G is riddled with potential security threats, nearly 800 of which have yet to be resolved by the governing 3GPP standards body. Moreover, the uptake of 5G by the warfighter will require the U.S. military to forego a decades-long practice of developing bespoke, incompatible radio hardware and move toward a shared, hardened communications framework.

Communications alignment is a national security imperative

The good news? The overhaul and unification of the military’s communications network is already underway in key areas.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to its Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) mission, which according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), aims to “connect sensors from all military services – Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force – into a single network.” This alone will accelerate the speed of decision-making for the soldier and command-and-control (C2) center, which is an urgently needed component of the U.S.’s National Defense Strategy as it prepares for the emergence of Mach 5+ hypersonic weapons.

The U.S. Air Force is contributing to the JADC2 mission by developing the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), a C2 framework that the CRS describes as “using secure cloud environments and new communications methods to allow Air Force and Space Force systems to share data seamlessly using artificial intelligence.” In effect, this is an attempt at integrating a sensor-based Internet of Things (IoT) network that reinvents the conventional, airborne C2 structure by extending the eyes and ears of our warfighters to an intelligent edge.

Just as importantly, a unified communications topology must support the nation’s Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS), which guides the chain of command in providing the President with information required to authorize (and prevent unauthorized) use of nuclear weapons.

Allure of 5G processing speeds tempered by inherent security risks

The military has long been eager to build a common telecommunications and computing platform that enables new software applications to be adopted at the same speed as the commercial sector – or better yet, harden Android and Apple iOS smartphones for use in the field. At best, however, today’s warfighter is relegated to using the phone’s GPS map function for geolocation, which is often more reliable than their military-issued gear.

5G is the enabling technology that will underpin the military’s digital transformation, but 5G was never designed as a native military radio waveform. This reality presents significant challenges and entails the recognition that more than 60% of what the 3GPP ratified as 4G and 5G standards were developed primarily by state-owned Chinese companies. That raises concerns relative to the influence China may have exercised over an industry standards-making body – and the number of unsecured backdoors and man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities through which classified data can be siphoned or modified.

As a point of reference, a 2019 report released by IoT cybersecurity specialist, Finite State, looked into Huawei Technologies and found that 55 percent of tested Huawei devices had at least one potential backdoor. In its summary of findings, Finite State concluded that “if you include known, remote access vulnerabilities along with possible back doors, Huawei devices appear to be at high risk of potential compromise.”

What a 5G future will look like for the warfighter

The future 5G state we should be working to realize will enable users to harness the power of AI, machine learning, and hundreds of thousands of sensors at the IoT edge. Doing so will give troops real-time intelligence and processing while providing secure battlefield computing and communications using fixed and transportable cellular towers supplemented by vehicle-mounted data center nodes. All of this can be achieved using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, software, and firmware, as long as it’s all sufficiently hardened to ensure a secure connection to both the network and computing platform.

So, practically speaking, what would a typical 5G application look like? Let’s consider base security: A lot of what occurs on the battlefield involves establishing and maintaining a security perimeter. We can surmise that 5G-enabled communications technology will enable easy supplementation of the perimeter with field-of-motion and pressure sensors. When activated, those sensors feed into a tower-based alert system that sends out drones to investigate. The drones leverage video streaming and facial recognition, and if a threat is detected, can trigger an automated targeting system. If deployed properly, 5G will enable users to very quickly automate their field operations.

Marry the cell tower and data center node

In a commercial 5G application, a smartphone streaming data sends a signal to a nearby tower, which routes the request to a data center that may be hundreds of miles away. The data is retrieved and sent back through the tower and on to the user. That’s a large threat surface, as was seen with the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware cyberattack.

A more secure, resilient solution is to co-locate the cell tower and data center and build hundreds of them as part of a distributed, compartmentalized network. Not only does this provide better, more even coverage, but if one tower is compromised the others will continue to send and receive data. In turn, that data is wrapped in purpose-built security layers from the inside out – not as a programming afterthought – and provides the warfighter with a “zero-trust network” that includes encryption, user authentication, sandboxing, behavioral analytics, and other protective measures.

It’s this concept that led to the development of the SEMPRE Tower, which is based on the idea that a hardened, COTS-based 5G telecommunications and computing infrastructure can be adapted by the military to improve collaboration on the battlefield while maintaining a secure, resilient C5ISR [command, control, computers, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] framework that can withstand a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. (Figure 1.)

### Solvency---5G---Leadership

#### Diplomatic US action can overcome Chinese 5G implementation.

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A coronavirus-induced economic crisis could send Europe bargain-shopping for critical infrastructure—in ways that might be dangerous. Europe’s argument on moving forward with the implementation of Huawei 5G technology against U.S. objections has long centered on cutting costs. The U.S. calls for a ban of the Chinese telecommunications firm’s 5G equipment in European networks have failed to gain traction in most European capitals. Just a handful of countries have echoed U.S. demands for tougher restrictions to supplement the recently released EU toolbox for 5G security, and even fewer have called for an outright ban.

The United States has highlighted the risks that Huawei poses to national security, including the threat of espionage. Given the Chinese Community Party’s effective control of Huawei, there is concern over data integrity. More serious is the potential to debilitate critical infrastructure. 5G will be the backbone of communications and controls needed for power grids, water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. In January, the United Kingdom announced it would allow Huawei equipment on 35 percent of its 5G networks—a decision that could provide top cover for Germany, France, and others to do the same.

Even so, there are bright spots. Estonia and Poland announced stronger restrictions to ensure 5G network security, and some lawmakers, such as Iain Duncan Smith in the United Kingdom and Norbert Röttgen in Germany, remain opposed to Huawei’s inclusion in their networks, leaving hope that a clear-eyed risk assessment will prevail. Recently, technology industry leaders for open radio access networks sent a letter to the U.K. House of Commons Defense Committee urging it to abandon implementation of Huawei technology. Given the uneven response across Europe, where should the United States go from here? It can still sway countries that remain on the fence, but it will need to change tack.

For one, the United States should create a multilateral coalition with like-minded European allies, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, to reboot conversations about Huawei’s role in Europe. A number of European countries perceive Washington as a self-interested messenger and see its fight against Huawei as merely part of a geopolitical game against China. That’s a criticism Washington should answer, and it can emphasize a few key messages to do so.

The coalition should emphasize that the EU toolbox is designed to be a baseline for a common approach, not a final answer. The coalition should emphasize that the EU toolbox is designed to be a baseline for a common approach, not a final answer. Countries should do their own risk assessments based on their technical capabilities to mitigate risk and secure their networks. The coalition should also dispel the oft-cited myth that there are no viable alternatives to Huawei. The United States, and European adopters of Nokia and Ericsson technology, must tout the value and quality of Nokia and Ericsson kit. For one, the United States should point to the obvious fact that it is building world-class 5G networks using solely Nokia and Ericsson radio access network equipment.

Then there’s the pernicious myth, pushed by Huawei’s public relations team and through Huawei-commissioned reports, that the firm is the undisputed 5G technology leader. While Huawei leads the pack in number of patents, qualitative assessments show that the value of its portfolio is much less than that of its competitors—a classic case of quantity over quality.

Finally, the coalition should also take on the cost argument. While Huawei may provide the cheapest upfront option on the market, countries should examine how Huawei could impose hidden costs on the backend for maintenance and installation, beyond the considerable expense associated with risk mitigation efforts.

The United States should also lead to make new alternatives to Huawei available. A promising approach is to promote open architecture as a way to upend the 5G status quo. Open architecture consists of proprietary software for functions like switching, routing, and firewalls that run on vendor-neutral hardware and standardized interfaces. This would offer Europe a new way to bypass adoption of Huawei in ways that promote vendor diversity, lower cost, and better interoperability. The United States should work with Finland and Sweden to help Nokia and Ericsson, Huawei’s key competitors, transition to this new telecommunications infrastructure model over the next three to five years.

The United States must face the reality of Europe’s strong reliance on China for economic growth. Beijing has been clear that it is willing to retaliate over any country’s decision to ban Huawei from its networks with economic coercion. In December, China’s ambassador to Berlin threatened to torpedo German car sales in China. Beijing directed similar warnings at France. In order to remove the teeth from China’s threats, the United States must show Europe that it is a reliable trade partner, ending its deleterious trade policies toward Europe and threats to levy tariffs on European goods. Further, the United States should expedite U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations. A robust agreement would help stimulate economic growth and assure Europe that the United States has its back when European countries exclude Huawei from their networks. The United States remains the largest single export destination for EU goods, nearly twice as big as China. Washington should use this economic clout as a bulwark, not a bludgeon.

Finally, the United States should focus more on the norms and values that it shares with its European partners to dissuade them from purchasing Chinese telecommunications equipment. A large part of Huawei’s success in Europe stems from its large-scale lobbying campaign to convince Europe that it is a trustworthy vendor. Huawei launched a campaign highlighting its so-called shared values with Europe. Huawei has likened voting for Huawei 5G with voting for European values. Largely absent from the 5G debate is the fact that China generally, and Huawei specifically, uses 5G technologies as part of its campaign to suppress and isolate Uighurs in Xinjiang, counter protesters in Hong Kong, and exert greater control over the daily lives of all Chinese. Buying Huawei kit subsidizes these actions—ones that go against the core values of the EU itself.

#### The CP ensures safe 5G adoption through US norms and standard setting.

James Lewis 21. Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. “Accelerating 5G in the United States.” CSIS. 3-1-2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/accelerating-5g-united-states //EM

The United States is more than holding its own in 5G. 5G is more than cellular telephony. It is a central part of a new digital environment that blends artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and 5G networks to enable new services and products. 5G meets the growing demand to create and move data and new knowledge faster and more efficiently to support an increasingly digital and interconnected economy.

This 5G strategy offers a comprehensive approach to network technologies, building on the strength of the United States to innovate and invest while designing government policies to support and complement those strengths. The report is the work of a group of experts and provides ideas and recommendations on how to speed infrastructure deployment, how to ensure supply chain security, and how to accelerate 5G use. Our recommendations include:

Accelerate spectrum repurposing. Compared to other countries, the United States is doing well in allocating high-band and low-band spectrum for 5G. However, it lags in the allocation of mid-band spectrum. The United States needs to repurpose mid-band spectrum for 5G using auctions, spectrum sharing technologies, and compensation for agencies if they need to relocate. The recent C-band auction, while expensive, was an important step in providing the spectrum needed for American 5G networks.

Remove regulatory obstacles. Telecommunications regulation in the United States is a complex blend of federal and local authorities. The interpretation and implementation of those rules by some local governments has often been inconsistent. The next administration should continue efforts to remove regulatory obstacles, accelerate deployment, and identify those instances where federal law should supersede local regulation to provide uniform national rules.

Promote supply chain trust. The two keys to supply chain trust are promoting supplier diversity and creating risk management strategies for technology acquirers. The work of the Department of Homeland Security’s Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force provides guidance on supply chain security, and the United States can encourage the adoption and use of the Prague Proposals, including the criteria developed by this working group, for governments and network owners or operators to determine trustworthiness and security. An essential action for building trust is for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to move ahead with Rip and Replace, using the $1.9 billion recently provided by Congress.

Directly counter predatory practices. Use transparency and diplomatic pressure to counter predatory practices. The United States should make transparency and accountability for predatory trade practices a central part of 5G policy. In other areas, it has been helpful to intervene privately with foreign governments or to make public instances of foreign corrupt practices. The United States and its partners should expose Chinese misbehavior, such as illicit subsidies, and assign intelligence resources to identify predatory behavior.

Redirect American and allied export credits. One major advantage Huawei has is that its prices are subsidized, making them artificially low. We do not need to match Chinese subsidies, but we do need to reduce the financial burden of not buying from Huawei. Cooperative policies with Japan, Australia, Korea, and the European Union to use foreign assistance, co-financing, and export support in the developing world for 5G infrastructure can accomplish this but require reforms to ExIm Bank rules and procedures.

Make 5G security part of a larger cybersecurity strategy. Building on the work already done in the European Union, a 5G cybersecurity strategy should look beyond supply chain security to build cooperative mechanisms among allies for cybersecurity. This requires closer intelligence, technology, and security partnerships with countries that share the assessment of the risk of using untrustworthy Chinese network technologies. The foundation for this partnership is the Five Eyes, Nordic countries, Japan, and other nations that share our concerns.

Increase federal spending in support of 5G and 6G. Federal spending on R&D is crucial in a competition with China. The private sector already invests heavily in 5G research. The next administration should identity those areas where there are R&D shortfalls. Remedying these shortfalls requires providing substantially more funding to the National Science Foundation. Important areas for R&D investment include spectrum sharing, developing new waveforms, and finding new approaches to 5G security. Congress should allocate sufficient funds for R&D and test beds and encourage collaboration among government, service providers, and cloud service providers.

Congress needs to appropriate funds. Several congressional initiatives have authorized federal action to accelerate 5G, but they were unaccompanied by appropriations. These include the Multilateral Telecom Security Fund to be administered by State Department, the Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) grants program authorized for the National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA), and the funding of the CHIPS Act, including funding for federal matching grants and the act’s investment tax credit. These key programs require federal funding to accelerate adoption and use of 5G in the United States and globally.

Safeguard the international standards process. China has made a wholesale effort to capture the standards process. While American and Western companies have held their own, the pressure continues. The United States and its partners need to ensure the independence of the standards processes, consider means to promote American attendance using tax policy or federal support for academic researchers, and remove impediments that prevent holding standards meetings in the United States. As part of a new approach to standards, we should avoid a directive role for government agencies.

### Solvency---5G---Leadership---Innovation

#### Unilateral action ensures innovation and competitiveness---AND ensures cooperation with allies outside NATO.

James Lewis 18. Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies. December 2018. “How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security.” <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181206_Lewis_5GPrimer_WEB.pdf> //EM

The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components.

▪ The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies.

▪ Another task will be to find ways to encourage undecided countries to spend on 5G security. Huawei’s telecom networks cost between 20 to 30 percent less than competing products. Huawei also offers foreign customers generous terms for leasing or loans. It can do this because of its access to government funds. Beijing supports Huawei for both strategic and commercial reasons. Many countries will be tempted by the steep discount. Not buying Huawei means paying a “premium” for security to which economic ministries are likely to object. The United States will need to encourage others to pay this security premium while at the same time preparing for a world where the United States unavoidably connects to Huawei-supplied networks and determine how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in countries using Chinese network equipment.

▪ The United States does not need to copy China’s government-centric model for 5G, but it does need to invest in research and adopt a comprehensive approach to combatting non-tariff barriers to trade. 5G leadership requires a broader technology competition policy in the United States that builds the engineering and tech workforce and supports both private and public R&D. The United States also needs to ensure that U.S. companies do not face obstacles from antitrust or patent infringement investigations undertaken by other countries to obtain competitive advantage.

### Solvency --- AI Innovation

#### STEM Education solves AI innovation

Desouza 22 [Kevin C. Desouza is a professor of Business, Technology and Strategy in the School of Management at the QUT Business School. He is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the China Institute for Urban Governance at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2-3-2022, How the U.S. can dominate in the race to national AI supremacy, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/03/how-the-u-s-can-dominate-in-the-race-to-national-ai-supremacy/] Eric

The Russian launch of the world’s first manned space flight on April 12, 1961, shook the U.S. to its core. Prior to the launch, the U.S. and Russia had already been engaged in a race to space, but those investments were driven as much by [scientific curiosity as they were national security](https://blog.tcea.org/space-race/). But the Soviet launch put the spotlight on the uncomfortable reality that the US had fallen far behind in the space race and significant educational investments were necessary to close the gap. Life magazine, writing about the state of the US educational system at that time said, “[The schools are in terrible shape. What has long been an ignored national problem, Sputnik has made a recognized crisis](https://books.google.com/books?id=PlYEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false).” As a result, in the 20 years after Sputnik, the National Science Foundation invested five hundred million dollars (in 1960 dollars) into teacher and classroom development. According to [research from Clemson University](https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2551&context=all_dissertations), “by connecting the quality of scientific training to the survival of the nation, NSF was able to increase its fellowship budgets more than 100% immediately after Sputnik.” Congress also passed the National Defense Education Act which also infused more than a billion dollars (in 1960 dollars) into science education.

In an age where the race to AI has become a critical gamechanger, we suggest that China’s emergence as the leader in the race to AI dominance should necessitate the same singular national focus as the Russian launch of Sputnik in the 1960s. To produce the talent necessary to achieve its national AI strategies, the U.S. must dramatically reinvigorate its approach to STEM education and force a focus on computer science at very early ages. [The Computer Science for All Act of 2021](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3602/text?r=62&s=1), currently proposed in Congress, is an excellent step in this direction. Failure to invest in STEM technology has the potential to relegate the U.S. to a second-tier nation when it comes to innovation and the labor force in AI.

#### Strengthening the India-US relationship solves AI

Desouza 22 [Kevin C. Desouza is a professor of Business, Technology and Strategy in the School of Management at the QUT Business School. He is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the China Institute for Urban Governance at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2-3-2022, How the U.S. can dominate in the race to national AI supremacy, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/03/how-the-u-s-can-dominate-in-the-race-to-national-ai-supremacy/] Eric

The U.S. can create a partnership with a country that has an ample supply of talent (which the U.S. lacks) but who lacks adequate funding (which the U.S. has in abundance). In this option, we view a potential partnership with India as a dream scenario. At present, [relationships between India and China](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/02/us-india-face-these-5-challenges-can-they-depend-each-other/) are increasingly frayed and India is openly worried about an increasingly assertive China. [With the existential threats posed by China and Russia](https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-dangerous-population-decline-indo-pacific-pivot-research-development-taiwan-ukraine-11639497466) to the U.S. and India, jointly facing a common challenger may make sense. As U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken [pointed out](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/02/us-india-face-these-5-challenges-can-they-depend-each-other/), “…the U.S. has few better options than India for managing a rising China.”

From an AI standpoint, a joint U.S.-India partnership makes a great deal of sense. India produces far more STEM graduates than the U.S., and the U.S. invests far more in technology infrastructure than India does. A U.S.-India partnership eclipses China in both dimensions and a successful partnership could allow the U.S. to quickly leapfrog China in all meaningful aspects of AI.

### Solvency --- ASATs

#### U.S unilaterally through diplomatic and military efforts can effectively deter China.

Chow and Kelly 22 [Brian Chow has Ph.D. in physics, MBA with distinction, and Ph.D. in finance. He is an independent policy analyst with over 160 publications. He can be reached at [brianchow.sp@gmail.com](mailto:brianchow.sp@gmail.com). Brandon Kelley is the director of debate at Georgetown University, and a graduate student in the Security Studies Program. He can be reached at [bwk9@georgetown.edu](mailto:bwk9@georgetown.edu), 5-12-2022, Op-ed, SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-antisatellite-test-ban-reveals-a-new-approach-for-security-and-sustainability-in-space/] Eric

On April 18, Vice President Kamala Harris [announced](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/18/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-ongoing-work-to-establish-norms-in-space/) a U.S. commitment to forgo “destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing.” This carefully designed ban has the potential to be the first step in a new approach to security and sustainability in space. If so, the United States will be well-positioned to ensure peace and prosperity in space in the emerging era. However, if the U.S. continues its present course, it is unlikely to counter the range of space threats emerging over this decade and beyond.

To succeed, the new U.S. approach must be characterized by three elements.

First, it must be unilateral and multilateral, synthesizing concerns of both hawks and doves. The U.S. should continue to lead the West in seeking multilateral consensus on norms and agreements, whether voluntary or binding, including with our potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia. At the same time, the U.S. must employ unilateral measures for several purposes: to lead in establishing new rules and norms, to influence other actors’ incentives toward consensus and compliance, and to ensure that deterrence and crisis stability hold even if adversaries refuse to join or subsequently defect from these agreements. Unfettered freedom of action and unilateralism alone are unnecessary and counterproductive, but so is being overly sanguine about the intent of other actors or beholden to slow, consensus-driven international forums — what is needed is a careful synthesis of both unilateral and multilateral measures. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s anemic response provides a stark reminder that we cannot rely solely on agreements nor presume our values are shared.

Second, it must be nuanced and specific. Sweeping, one-size-fits-all measures are insufficient; instead, the U.S. must carefully assess individual threat vectors on a case-by-case basis and tailor solutions to the unique characteristics of each specific threat.

Third, it must be timely. Preventing, deterring, and managing these threats will require putting in place appropriate legal frameworks, policies, doctrine, and technological capabilities well in advance — a process that takes years. Therefore, delay is untenable. As Gen. John Hyten, the former Strategic Command and Air Force Space Command chief, [noted](https://spacenews.com/hyten-blasts-unbelievably-slow-dod-bureaucracy-as-china-advances-space-weapons/) shortly before his 2021 retirement as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “the DoD is still unbelievably bureaucratic and slow” in its response to China’s rapidly advancing space weapons. He advised his successor to “reinsert speed into the process.”

Fortunately, Vice President Harris’s ban and recent comments made by other top space officials hint at a possible embrace of all three elements.

In December, Harris [tasked](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/) the National Space Council, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies to collaborate on proposals to “advance U.S. interests and preserve the security and sustainability of space.” Harris’s April 18 moratorium on debris-producing, direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) tests was [identified](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/) by the accompanying White House fact sheet as the “first initiative” of many under this broader effort. The White House statement further clarified the Biden administration’s priorities, declaring that “developing a shared understanding of what constitutes safe and responsible space activities contributes to a more stable space environment by reducing the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation.” It also said the U.S. will “uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for space,” and that by “working with commercial industry, allies, and partners, [the U.S.] will lead in the development of new measures that contribute to the safety, stability, security, and long-term sustainability of space activities.”

#### Tweaking our BMD systems solve – the US is the best!!

Miller 21 [Amanda Miller is an Assistant Superintendent at the US Air Force and is an experienced leader with a demonstrated history of working in the U.S Air force with a Top Secret/SCI clearance, 11-29-2021, Rendering ASATs Obsolete, Tweaking Missile Defenses in Light of Russian, Chinese Tests, Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/rendering-asats-obsolete-tweaking-missile-defenses-in-light-of-russian-chinese-tests/] Eric

Tweaking Missile Defenses

Saltzman addressed speculation that Chinese testing this summer, reported in October, could have been of a [nuclear first-strike weapon](https://www.airforcemag.com/us-catching-up-to-do-hypersonic-missile-space-force/), saying it is “front and center because this is a very forward-edge technology capability,” in part because it likely can stay in orbit for long periods. However, he cautioned, “the words that we use are important so that we understand exactly what we’re talking about here. I hear things like hypersonic missile, and I hear suborbital sometimes, and so this is a categorically different system.”

For one thing, space objects have “inherent overflight capabilities” and the proposition “that you could routinely orbit a nuclear weapon over a country.” Analysts frequently point out that the Space Force’s X-37B autonomous spaceplane amounts to the same thing.

In terms of detecting such a weapon that can go into orbit then deorbit, his point was that it’s not a ballistic missile with a predictable trajectory.

“A lot of our warning is based on ballistic missiles because that’s been the primary threat for so many years,” Saltzman said. “So it’s incumbent on the Space Force, in my mind, to make sure that we’re developing the capabilities to track these kind of weapons—before they’re launched, ideally, but then throughout their life cycle, either on orbit or in execution of their mission set.

“And if we can track, we can attribute. And if we can attribute, I think we can deter,” he added.

Saltzman hinted at one way the Space Force might advance its ability to track in a discussion of defending against Russia’s long-range cruise missiles.

“We own a great number of radars that provide missile warning. We own overhead capabilities from an [infrared] standpoint that can track some of these capabilities,” he said.

“So it’s incumbent on us to make sure we get the most out of those sensors to be able to maybe use them in a way they weren’t designed. We have a long history of this. We’ve gotten the most out of our systems because we have some really talented engineers that can change the way data is fused on the ground and actually pull more information out of the sensor data that we collect. So when we see a new threat, we immediately start pouring resources and brainpower into it.”

#### Adversary satellites can be easily jammed and developing energy weapons “blinds them."

Bateman 20 [Aaron Bateman is a Ph.D. student in the history of science and technology at Johns Hopkins University. Previously, he served as a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer, 7-30-2020, America Can Protect Its Satellites Without Kinetic Space Weapons, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/america-can-protect-its-satellites-without-kinetic-space-weapons/] Eric

The United States should be able to prevent China and Russia from using their space-based capabilities without transforming them into hazards that could impede American, allied, and commercial space operations. Using non-kinetic space weapons has long been on the minds of senior national security officials. When Ford authorized the development of a new kinetic anti-satellite system in 1977, he also [called](https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/policy_archives/NSDM-345%20ASAT%20Jan77.pdf) for “a non-nuclear anti-satellite capability, including means for electronic nullification.” Today, the emphasis should only be non-kinetic weapons with reversible effects.

Most importantly, the objectives of the Defense Space Strategy can be achieved through the use of non-kinetic space weapons like the Space Force’s [counter communications system.](https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-declares-offensive-communications-jammer-ready-for-deployment/) Instead of destroying communications satellites, they can be jammed. Rather than developing weapons to completely eliminate adversary intelligence satellites, the United States can invest in [directed energy weapons](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/9/27/space-commander-warns-chinese-lasers-could-blind-us-satellites) that could “blind” them.

## Russia

### Solvency --- Cyberattacks

#### “Savvy response solves.”

Alperovitch and Charap 22 [Dmitri Alperovitch is chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, is on the board of directors of Dragos, Inc. and is the former chief technology officer of CrowdStrike and Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, 4-14-2022, Perspective, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/04/15/us-russia-cyber-attacks/] Eric

The United States and Europe have already implemented a large-scale campaign of diplomatic isolation and economic pressure against Russia and allocated unprecedented military aid to Ukraine in response to Moscow’s unprovoked invasion — yet so far, these steps have not fundamentally changed Putin’s calculus. A response to cyberattacks that relies on those same tools to incrementally increase the economic and military pain to the Russians is likewise unlikely to cause the Kremlin to stop.

Unlike sanctions or kinetic attacks, a carefully executed cyberattack on specific targets is relatively easy to implement and, more importantly, easy to end without causing lasting damage. Assuming the initial Russian actions do not lead to loss of life — if they did, then expect Washington to take the gloves off — it would be beneficial for the United States to tailor a response that can provide a powerful demonstration to the Kremlin of U.S. capabilities but avoid widespread destruction that could lead to escalation. Combined with a clear public and private message that the United States will go much further in the cyber arena if Russia attacks again, such a move would demonstrate America’s resolve while creating an off-ramp for Moscow to end its cyber aggression.

One such measured response could be a cyber operation that causes a widespread — but brief — disruption to Internet service across Russia. Such an attack, which is well within the capabilities of the U.S. Cyber Command, would provide a powerful example of what the United States can do. It would also show Kremlin leadership what life would be like for government officials, businesses and regular citizens alike without Internet connectivity. Like all advanced economies, Russia is dependent on the Internet, and even temporary connectivity disruptions — lasting an hour or two at most — would affect every sector of the Russian economy, from energy to media to national defense. And yet a short disruption that does not cause permanent damage would be less likely to generate further escalation.

This approach is no surefire bulwark against a second Russian attack, which would warrant a broader and more devastating course of action. But it does create an opportunity to avoid an escalation spiral. Because Russia is likely to view its initial cyberattacks as a vindicable counter to Western sanctions, a more destructive U.S. response could prompt Putin to double down.

Russia appears poised to make a first move against the United States and its allies in cyberspace. A savvy U.S. response that is deliberately measured and accompanied by the right message could end this fight after the first round.

### Solvency --- Disinformation

#### Nutrition Labels solves disinformation. Yum!

Crovitz 22 [L. Gordon Crovitz, a former publisher of the Wall Street Journal, is co-CEO of NewsGuard, which rates news websites based on their journalistic reliability, 04-29-2022, Opinion, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/29/law-counter-putins-propaganda-unused-00020805] Eric

The first invasion by Russia was not dispatching his military into Ukraine. It was the malignant propaganda the Kremlin skillfully deployed to poison public opinion in the U.S. and Europe. The Biden administration — specifically Attorney General Merrick Garland — should now enforce a longstanding law requiring that propaganda from hostile foreign governments be labeled as such so that Americans know who’s feeding them the news. Silicon Valley should atone for its role as Putin’s long-time enabler by pledging to give users the information they need to know when they see propaganda in their social media feeds and search results.

Russian falsehoods about its role in Syria, American bioweapons and Ukraine reached millions of people in Western democracies, including through Facebook, Google, YouTube, TikTok and Twitter. Moscow myths included that Ukraine politics is dominated by Nazis (reported by Russian government sites RT and TASS), that the government in Kyiv committed genocide against ethnic Russians in its Donbas region (Sputnik News and TASS) and that Western governments staged the coup in 2014 that led to the resignation of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president (RT and Sputnik News). This disinformation continues to find an audience in the U.S. and Europe and is being [repeated by](https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/popular-podcasters-spread-russian-disinformation-about-ukraine-biolabs/) far-right and far-left commentators. The Kremlin seeks a moral equivalence between Moscow and Washington, hoping to undermine Western resolve to defend Ukraine.

Since Stalin, the Russian government has used dezinformatsiya as the spear tip of its foreign policy. What’s changed is that the internet now provides Moscow with an enormous distribution network and even revenue opportunities for its efforts — and that the U.S. no longer enforces disclosure requirements for foreign propaganda.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) was created in the 1930s to counter Nazi propaganda by requiring distributors in the U.S. to disclose the nature of the source. Pamphlets and magazines sent from hostile foreign governments were required to be labeled, such as with a stamp added by the distributor indicating that the organization behind the propaganda was a registered foreign agent. In introducing the law in 1937, [Rep. John McCormack explained](https://www.salon.com/2018/12/21/it-started-with-nazis-concerns-over-foreign-agents-not-just-a-trump-era-phenomenon_partner/) this would ensure Americans knew Nazi propaganda when they saw it: “The passage of this bill will label such propaganda just as the law requires us to label poison.” The House Judiciary Committee [report on the proposed law](https://www.caplindrysdale.com/files/24384_h._rep._no._75-1381_1937.pdf) said, “The spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve as a deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda.”

The U.S. continued to enforce the labeling requirement through the Cold War. Magazines such as Soviet Life came with warnings stamped on them by distributors alerting readers that the publisher was an agent of Moscow.

Russian disinformation websites were [required to register with the Justice Department](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-propaganda/u-s-based-russian-news-outlet-registers-as-foreign-agent-idUSKCN1G201H) under FARA during the Trump administration, but the attorneys general under several presidents have failed to update [the law’s labeling requirements](https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/frequently-asked-questions#46) for the internet. (FARA gives the attorney general discretion to update how FARA’s broad rules are applied.) The modern equivalent of a stamp in every copy of a pamphlet paid for by the Nazi or Soviet government would be a detailed disclosure included in every article or video from the Kremlin that appeared in anyone’s social media feed or search result.

Instead of updating FARA, over the past few years there have been calls to dilute the law as an outdated relic of the Cold War. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a forceful reminder why the kind of disclosure required by FARA matters. To its credit, the Federal Communications Commission invoked the invasion to [start requiring broadcasters to disclose](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-broadcasting-foreign-idCAKCN2LC1QL) when a foreign government has paid to distribute its propaganda, but no such rules are being applied online. Twitter on its own has at least started to identify some Russian disinformation sources as “state affiliated” in tweets, but this provides readers with limited information. (Meanwhile, Putin began requiring labeling of all Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty stories on the web in Russia in 2020, [which led to more than $13 million in fines](https://www.usagm.gov/2022/01/11/russia-intensifies-attacks-on-rfe-rl/#:~:text=RFE%2FRL%20now%20faces%20a,(ECHR)%20over%20the%20law.) for non-compliance by the U.S. sources.)

Labeling through extensive disclosure is more practical on the internet than in print or through broadcasts, where space is limited. Disclosures online can be detailed enough to give readers all the information they need to decide how trustworthy to consider a source. My analyst colleagues at NewsGuard often write “Nutrition Labels” for news sites in the thousands of words, with numerous citations, to explain why sites like RT and Sputnik News fail basic criteria of journalistic practice and differ fundamentally from government news sources with effective independent charters such as the BBC. Microsoft makes NewsGuard’s detailed ratings and reviews of news websites available to its users, but the other large platforms don’t yet provide this kind of transparency to their users. And labels work: Gallup research found that when given access to apolitical source ratings, a [majority of readers](https://www.newsguardtech.com/press/gallup-research-finds-newsguard-ratings-of-news-websites-effective-in-countering-false-information-misinformation-and-disinformation/) became less likely to believe or share news from websites rated untrustworthy and more likely to believe and share news from websites rated trustworthy.

Joshua Geltzer, who is now on the staff of the National Security Council, has argued for more disclosure (though not specifically through FARA), writing on [the Just Security website in 2018](https://www.justsecurity.org/61908/extraordinary-lesson-reports-russian-disinformation-reveal-white-house-paralysis/): “The spread of disinformation is the rare type of national security threat for which informing the public actually can diminish the threat: if Americans know what to look out for online and what not to accept at face value on social media, the power of disinformation deliberately spread by hostile actors is reduced.”

#### FARA transparencty

Morgus 22 [Robert Morgus is a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, 2-3-2022, Foreign Disinformation: What the US Government Can Start Doing Now, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/80057/foreign-disinformation-what-the-us-government-can-start-doing-now/] Eric

The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a law passed in 1938 in response to Nazi propaganda, provides a framework to promote transparency regarding the sources of information available to the American public. However, many of the rules created by the law are antiquated, and FARA must be reformed to ensure that all agents of foreign adversaries, including such media organizations, register. In the last Congress, Representative (and CSC Co-Chair) Mike Gallagher (R-Wisc) proposed the Chinese Communist Party Influence Transparency Act, which would require all Chinese corporations to register under FARA. Congress should look at expanding this effort to include corporations domiciled in other adversaries like Russia and Iran. In addition, Congress should amend the definition of “informational materials,” which registered foreign agents are required to both label as such and report to the Department of Justice, in FARA to make clear that social media and email communications are included. In addition, Congress should provide greater specificity regarding the types of social media and email communications that need to be included in FARA filings to ensure that the Department of Justice adopts a records system that better captures the dynamism and interactiveness of digital media and communications, allowing, for example, for social media posts filed to be maintained along with, for example, comments on or replies to a post,  while preserving appropriate privacy protections.

Combatting disinformation also requires imposing costs on adversaries responsible for influence operations – what the CSC refers to as a strategy of layered cyber deterrence in the information landscape. For example, the U.S. government should continue to engage in robust “defend forward” operations to dismantle adversary disinformation infrastructure and cause friction in adversary disinformation campaigns, as it did, for [example](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html), with the Internet Research Agency around the 2018 midterm election.

#### Disinfor combatin

Morgus 22 [Robert Morgus is a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, 2-3-2022, Foreign Disinformation: What the US Government Can Start Doing Now, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/80057/foreign-disinformation-what-the-us-government-can-start-doing-now/] Eric

On the issue of social media, for example, the CSC and Aspen agree that the federal government should push for greater transparency on how social media platforms sort, moderate, and remove [content](https://www.justsecurity.org/tag/content-moderation/) on their platforms. The unique position of platforms in the information ecosystem allots them an outsized opportunity to exert positive influence over the media and information environment. But rather than trying to regulate content on these social media platforms, lawmakers and regulators should endeavor to establish clearer transparency expectations and guidelines for social media companies related to labeling advertisements and paid content, bots, and content created by foreign registered agents. In addition, the two commissions argue that the federal government should work with social media companies so that the American public better understands the various platforms’ policies on content moderation and takedowns.

In addition, both the CSC and the Aspen Commission agree that Congress should take action to ensure that third-party researchers can access data to better understand, identify, and – most importantly – explain foreign disinformation campaigns to the American public. The federal government could support these research efforts through grants to nonprofit centers, such as the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s Hamilton 2.0 dashboard and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Finally, both the CSC and the Aspen Commission identify the importance of civic empowerment and education. In keeping with this conviction, the CSC recommends the creation of a bipartisan Civic Education Task Force to enable greater access to civic education resources, and raise public awareness about foreign disinformation. The task force should be tasked with providing civic education resources, including courses and course materials, for the military and civil servants, all while making these materials available to the broader population.

Beyond these shared recommendations, the CSC advocates for some additional approaches to counter foreign disinformation.

## China

### Solvency --- Taiwan

#### Deterrence by punishment solves

Yau 22 [Dr.[Hon-Min Yau](https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3737-0438) is an associate professor of strategy and international affairs as well as the director of the Graduate Institute of International Security at the National Defense University in Taiwan. Their views expressed in this analysis neither represent the official positions of the current or past affiliation of their institutions nor their respective governments, 6-5-2022, Can America Prevent a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan?, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-prevent-chinese-invasion-taiwan-202783?page=0%2C2] Eric

McKinney and Harris believe that deterrence by denial will fail, but deterrence by punishment will succeed. It seems that at a certain point in time, any of the U.S. deterrence strategies in stopping the occurrence of a war over the Taiwan Strait may very likely be destined to fail. This assessment is predicated on not only China promoting a nationalist dogma, but also the structural development in China’s growing ambitions and modernization of its military strength. It is not about whether China would want to use its force against Taiwan, but when China—under CPC rule—will feel that the conditions are conducive to doing so. However, it would be a misconception to quickly equate U.S. “strategic clarity” to a great power war as McKinney and Harris maintained.

As exemplified by the Russia-Ukraine war, while the United States and NATO are undecided to confront Russia directly, there are indirect ways that the international community could provide continuous support to Ukraine without creating an escalated conflict. The objective of traditional deterrence is to prevent a war—not to win a war. Nevertheless, deterrence across the Taiwan Strait may be less about stopping the CPC’s ambitions, but more about prolonging the war and deterring the People’s Liberation Army’s triphibious invasion.

In that situation, China now has two aircraft carriers and five new theater commands. Since its 2016 military reforms, it could be[expected](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202009/1200845.shtml) that an invasion of Taiwan would certainly be a conflict involving military assets beyond the Taiwan Strait, but including assets from the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Henceforth, a robust Taiwanese defense (i.e., a “[porcupine strategy](https://tnsr.org/2021/12/a-large-number-of-small-things-a-porcupine-strategy-for-taiwan/)”) would be better to complement, but not to[replace](https://en.csstw.org/events_detail/4.htm) Taiwan’s offensive fighting capability. A strategy of sustaining Taiwan’s fighting capability and enlarging the conflict area—with U.S. support—would allow Taiwan to create more political leverage and cost against China while the economic activities in southeast China would likely be depressed due to concerns about the ongoing war. It would place immediate economic and political pressure on China’s invasion. This improved design follows McKinney and Harris’ strategy in principle, but uses different tactics in a new security context over the Taiwan Strait.

# Unilat Threaten CPs

## Top Shelf

### 1NC --- Tariffs Threats CP Shell

#### Tariffs incentivize NATO security improvements without direct cooperation.

Marc Thiessen 22. Twice-weekly column for The Post on foreign and domestic policy and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. . “Thiessen: Trump’s tough stance proves effective on NATO, tariffs.” Columbian. 6-2-2022. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2S3jHtr-eucJ:https://www.columbian.com/news/2018/jul/31/thiessen-trumps-tough-stance-proves-effective-on-nato-tariffs/+&amp;cd=24&amp;hl=en&amp;ct=clnk&amp;gl=us //EM

Give President Trump credit. When he chastised NATO allies over their failure to spend adequately on our common defense, his critics said he was endangering the Atlantic alliance. Instead, his tough stance persuaded allies to spend billions more on defense, strengthening NATO instead.

Now, Trump is doing the same on trade. At the Group of Seven summit in Quebec, Trump was roundly criticized for publicly berating allies over their trade practices and provoking a needless trade war. Well, once again, it appears Trump is being proved right. On Wednesday, he and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced a cease-fire in their trade war and promised to seek the complete elimination of most trade barriers between the United States and the European Union. “We agreed today . . . to work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods,” declared the two leaders in a joint statement.

### PDCP---2NC

#### Security cooperation only includes mil-to-mil cooperation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 21. “Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding.” 2021. https://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/Security\_Cooperation/Budget\_Justification\_FY2021.pdf //EM

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2017 defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:

• To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations

• To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation.

#### “Security cooperation” is military-to-military engagements.

Eerden ’20 [Captain James R. R. Van Eerden; Spring; recently graduate from the Expeditionary Warfare School of Marine Corps University, where he completed a prestigious fellowship program and graduated first in his class; Journal of Advanced Military Studies, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise: A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” vol. 11, no. 1]

Security Cooperation Defined

Security Cooperation, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, provides the following definition of security cooperation: Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives.5

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

#### Only military-to-military cooperation.

Arabia ’21 [Christina; May 17; CRS Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade; Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation,” https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf]

Security Cooperation (SC) Overview

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the term security cooperation (SC) to refer broadly to DOD interactions with foreign security establishments. SC activities include

• the transfer of defense articles and services;

• military-to-military exercises;

• military education, training, and advising; and

• capacity building of partner security forces.

### Solvency---Tariffs---AT: Backlash Turn---Thumper

#### It’s thumped---Trump did it in 2018.

Josh Boak 18, Editor at The Associated Press. “US might tie NATO contributions to tariff exemptions.” Defense News. 3-10-2018. https://www.defensenews.com/news/2018/03/10/us-might-tie-nato-contributions-to-tariff-exemptions/ //EM

WASHINGTON — U.S. allies seeking to avoid the steel and aluminum tariffs approved by President Donald Trump might be asked to step up their financial commitments to NATO.

Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin told CNBC in a Friday interview that the president will consider national security, noting that Trump wants to be sure that NATO gets more funding from European allies who Trump has previously criticized for not contributing enough.

“If we’re in NATO, he wants to make sure that NATO gets more money so that NATO can protect all of us and fulfill its goal,” Mnuchin said, underscoring Trump’s push to get NATO allies to pay 2 percent on defense.

Trump drew on rarely used national security grounds to place a 25 percent tax on steel imports and 10 percent tax on imported aluminum. Only Canada and Mexico — both partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement being renegotiated — were excluded from the tariffs.

The Treasury secretary said he has been speaking with his foreign counterparts and “my expectation is there may be some other countries that he considers in the next two weeks.”

### Solvency---Threaten---AT: Gilli

#### Gilli is wrong.

John Glaser 17. Adjunct scholar with the Cato Insitute and host of Cato’s Power Problems podcast. “Encouraging NATO Burden Sharing: What Works?” Cato Institute. 02-08-2017. https://www.cato.org/blog/nato-burden-sharing //EM

President Donald Trump has repeatedly complained that the United States carries too much of the economic and military burden in NATO. He has even gone so far as to call the European alliance “obsolete” and to suggest that his administration might not fulfill the treaty’s Article 5 obligation that commits NATO countries to come to the defense of any member that is attacked (Note: administration officials have repeatedly sought to reassure NATO allies that we remain committed to the collective defense of Europe, and Trump has contradicted himself on this score).

Many think this provocative rhetoric is just a ploy to get our NATO allies, who habitually underspend on defense and free‐​ride on America’s security guarantees, to pay more of their fair share of the burden. At the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, Andrea Gilli argues this approach is unlikely to jolt NATO allies into spending more on defense, though. Among other reasons, most NATO allies “face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure” in part because U.S. security assurances “have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services.” And since cutting welfare benefits is typically a political non‐​starter, we shouldn’t necessarily expect NATO countries to boost defense spending due to Trump’s abrasive rhetoric.

But the historical record seems to contradict Gilli’s argument. According to the RAND Corporation, Europe has historically spent between 43 percent and 78 percent of U.S. spending on defense. The ratio reached its peak in 1980, and then again in 2000 — years that were at the tail end of periods of defense budget cuts. And according to the RAND report, one of the the most successful techniques in getting NATO allies to share more of the burden was “threats by Congress to withdraw its troops from Europe.”

The only period of signficant real growth in European defense spending was during the 1970s; otherwise European defense expenditure has been remarkably flat in real terms…

Historically, efforts to create incentives or to manage the burden‐​sharing problem have taken four different approaches. The first approach (1966 to the mid‐​1980s) was based on the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals. With a series of resolutions and amendments from 1966 to 1975, Senator Mike Mansfield sought to use the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals to force Europe to contribute more and to lessen U.S. costs. As noted, that effort—plus other factors relating to economic growth and the Soviet threat—may have had a positive effect: European defense spending grew by 44 percent between 1970 and 1984.

Certainly other factors contributed to this period of growth in NATO burden sharing — higher rates of economic growth, increased perceptions of the Soviet threat, defense budget cuts as we withdrew from Vietnam, etc. But U.S. threats to pare back its commitment to the region seem to have had a significant impact.

### Solvency---Threaten---Studies

#### 70 years of studies confirm follow-on.

Brian Blankenship 21. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Miami. “The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure”, Security Studies, 30:5, pp. 720-724, 2021, http://www.bblankenship.com/uploads/6/6/2/1/66215933/blankenship\_priceofprotection.pdf //EM

7 Conclusion

This article presented a theory of coercive burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances. I argued that allies are more likely to increase their defense spending when their patron can more credibly threaten to abandon them. Specifically, allies are likely to contribute to the alliance when their patron faces constraints on its resources that make it difficult to sustain its foreign commitments, while allies are less likely to burden-share when they are more strategically valuable to their patron, as this reduces its ability to threaten abandonment. Moreover, the patron’s threats of abandonment are more salient to the extent that allies have a high perception of threat, which renders them in greater need of protection. I tested these claims using data on the military expenditures of U.S. allies between 1950 and 2012. My findings show that U.S. allies vulnerable to attack spend more on defense, while strategically valuable allies near key maritime chokepoints spend less. Additionally, allies are more likely to increase their defense spending when the United States faces resource constraints and pressure to retrench in the wake of costly foreign wars.

My findings suggest numerous avenues for future research. For one, although this study focuses primarily on the effectiveness of negative inducements – and in particular threats of abandonment – as means of exerting burden-sharing pressure, further research could investigate the effectiveness of other forms of persuasion. These include but are not limited to economic coercion, promises of rewards and positive inducements, and efforts to “name and shame” states that under-contribute to their alliances. Additionally, more research could be done on the conditions under which burdensharing is a salient political issue to domestic actors, as well as how much burden-sharing is “enough” to deter major calls for putting pressure on allies. Work on political psychology, for example, could provide micro-foundations to help understand demands for “fairness.”

Finally, my findings have implications for U.S. foreign policy. The Trump administration has made burden-sharing a major priority, and to this end U.S. officials – not least of all Trump himself – have pressed allies to contribute more to the common defense, using implicit and often explicit threats of abandonment. Indeed, there is some evidence that this has been effective, with NATO allies agreeing to increase their defense spending by an average of 4.3% in 2017.149 Nevertheless, the findings presented here suggest that the effectiveness of U.S. pressure is likely to be shaped by both allies’ perception of threat and by the extent to which the United States faces resource constraints.

## Other Threat Options

### Solvency---Threaten Withdrawal

#### The CP threads the needle---it pressures allies to create concessions for the [X]---while sustaining allied unity.

Tad A. Schnaufer 21. Doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (UCF). Additionally, he serves as a Captain in the Florida Army National Guard. “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 1-15-2021. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/ //EM

In order to pressure allies, the United States has to send costly signals, such as withdrawing troops from Europe, to demonstrate that their security interests have diverged. This political pressure acts as a forceful method to motivate NATO allies to do more because it provides a credible threat of exclusion from the benefits of US protection. Within NATO, only the United States maintains and controls the conventional and nuclear capacity to deter and defend against existential threats to the alliance. No other ally has the expeditionary military capacity to do so. For example, Estonia is not worried about being abandoned by Romania, Portugal, or even Germany, knowing none of them could bring a sizable military force to bear in response to a Russian invasion or fait accompli. In this case, Estonia’s chief concern revolves around the United States’ guarantee of their sovereignty through NATO. Suppose the United States can make credible claims that it is willing to abandon an ally and not fulfill its treaty obligations. In that case, the ally will experience a drastic incentive to increase its military capabilities to defend itself.

It may seem that these tensions and fears will only lead to negative outcomes, but some disunity within an alliance can yield positive results. Several articles researching the implications of free-riding and burdening-sharing in alliances have supported this notion. In Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal article on burden-sharing, they wrote, “This fact leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a decline in the amity, unity, and community of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance…” and “The United States, at least, should perhaps not hope for too much unity in common ventures with other nations. It might prove extremely expensive.” Similarly, Plumper and Neumayer note in reference to the smaller allies (non-US allies), “Unless the interests of alliance members are independent, the existence of NATO allows the smaller allies to free-ride to some extent.”

Moreover, the breakdown of unity in the alliance caused by the Trump administration demands has compelled European allies to take a larger role in their defense. The former German Ambassador to the United States, Peter Wittig, described the Trump administration’s approach as a “healthy wakeup call for the Europeans…to not free-ride.” Currently, the leaders of NATO member-states feel they cannot rely on the United States as the sole guarantor of Europe’s security. Back in 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands” and, “We can’t rely on the superpower of the United States.” A year later, French President Emmanuel Macron reinforced this sentiment declaring, “It is up to us today to take our responsibilities and guarantee our own security, and thus have European sovereignty.” More recently, in response to the planned troop withdrawal announced this past summer, the German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer called the move “regrettable” and noted, “The truth is that a good life in Germany and Europe depends more and more on how we ensure our security ourselves.”

## Congress Threatens

### 1NC --- Congressional Threats Shell

#### Text: The United States Congress should use constructive pressure to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### They can easily pressure allies AND gives the executive political cover in negotiations

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

“Bad cop” for allies. The function of critiquing undesirable actions extends to foreign nations. Congress frequently serves as a useful source of pressure on other countries, drawing attention to problematic behavior and opening the door for the executive branch to follow up with negotiations or other measures.

When it comes to NATO, Congress has played the “bad cop” most frequently in the area of burden-sharing. Members routinely put pressure on allies to increase their contributions to the alliance, which gives executive-branch negotiators political cover to make the same demand because they can claim Congress is tying their hands. NATO expert Stanley Sloan is worth quoting at length on the history of congressional involvement in burden-sharing: From the very beginning, the congressional partner regularly raised questions about the persistent burden-sharing issue. This questioning began with the initial debate in the Senate on whether it should give its advice and consent to the Treaty. The administration of President Harry Truman reassured senators that the European allies would contribute to their own defense and that the United States would not end up carrying a disproportionate share of the burden. As the European states recovered from the devastation of World War II, some senators argued that the Europeans had become capable of defending themselves. Montana’s Senator Mike Mansfield (D) famously promoted resolutions from the mid-1960s into the early 1970s that sought to force administrations to begin withdrawing US forces from Europe. While US administrations—Democratic and Republican—sought to contain the financial burdens and to get the Europeans to compensate the United States for some of NATO’s costs, the established pattern persisted into the post– Cold War years. Over all these years, Congress did most of the complaining while successive presidents of both parties urged allies to do more but largely defended the alliance and its costs as necessary for US national interests [emphasis added]. 53 Interviewees with experience in the executive branch repeatedly told me that congressional “complaining” or “needling,” sometimes seen as unproductive grandstanding, is actually a useful way to pressure allies and get issues on the agenda.54 To be sure, congressional critiques can also cause headaches for the executive branch if they create diplomatic friction. Interviewees emphasized the need for useful congressional pressure that is coordinated with the executive and stops short of disrupting fragile bilateral relationships.

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Allies

#### Close relationships ensure demands are followed.

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

Relationships abroad: Closely related, members of Congress and congressional staff have strong relationships with representatives of foreign governments. One staffer argued that congressional relationships with foreign dignitaries are underused and that behind-the-scenes diplomacy with members of Congress can have an important impact.75 Foreign dignitaries are often eager to engage with members of Congress, which is a source of legislative strength.76 Again, however, there’s a balance to be struck, as interviewees emphasized that the executive branch should retain the lead in diplomatic negotiations. Travel: An important part of congressional relationships with foreign counterparts is travel. Many experts argued that members of Congress can have a significant impact by traveling to a NATO-related location and meeting with stakeholders. 77 Lawmakers sometimes travel with congressional delegations (CODELs) to places like NATO headquarters in Brussels and the Munich Security Conference. CODELs offer a chance to communicate American priorities to foreign governments, including wielding threats of punitive action if a country is seen as not cooperating.78 To be sure, it’s difficult to get members on these trips, in part because traveling to seemingly glamorous places like Europe may come off to constituents as spending taxpayer dollars on a luxurious getaway.79 More generally, NATO is low on the list of places that are worth members’ limited time. Still, members should note that travel offers a way to have a big impact, particularly on foreign governments.

Congress retains significant influence on foreign policy despite today’s constrained environment and the executive branch’s general dominance of this area. Notably, most of these avenues of influence can be pursued in a highly partisan climate. Initiatives like spotlighting rights abuses abroad, critiquing the executive branch, and interacting with allies often have bipartisan support, while tactics like private conversations with foreign counterparts and statements to the media do not require reaching across the aisle at all.80

Perhaps most importantly, many of the legislature’s most important channels of influence are informal ones, largely separate from the formal, constitutional powers that today’s Congress often struggles to exercise. Indeed, Congress wields influence even when it does not pass legislation. As James Lindsay wrote three decades ago: …focusing on the legislative track record captures only part of the story. Congress influences policy through several indirect means: anticipated reactions, changes in the decision-making process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding. Indeed, the same factors that frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign affairs encourage legislators to use indirect means to influence policy.81

Today, these indirect means may be even more important. This section has found that Congress does have a role to play on day-to-day foreign policy issues like alliance management, and that the legislative branch remains relevant despite the institutional and political constraints that hamper its governing capacity.

#### Threatening allies works – Congress has significant leverage.

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

Calling out wrongdoing. First, Congress is especially well-suited to vocally and forcefully critiquing bad behavior by other actors at home or abroad. As the branch of government that represents the American public, Congress has long embraced a duty to investigate wrongdoing within the broader constitutional system of checks and balances. 44 More generally, it derives unique legitimacy from its role as the voice of the people and the body that ultimately determines whether a policy can be backed by funds. 45 As Richard Fontaine, a former foreign policy advisor to Sen. John McCain, put it, “They have institutional authority and power that doesn’t exist anywhere else in government, from the power of the purse to the confirmation process to other forms of power and leverage.”46

Lawmakers have added incentives to engage in “callouts” because fighting unethical or unlawful behavior plays well with constituents and in the media. In addition, the sheer size of Congress creates a messiness that lends itself to the calling-out function: It is much easier to get a group of lawmakers with different interests to agree on criticizing something than on, say, proposing a new initiative.

#### Through narrative shaping, hearings, and reporting requirements, they can easily influence allies.

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

Influencing the executive agenda and shaping the narrative: A third set of strengths has to do with Congress’ ability to put priorities on the executive branch’s agenda and generally shape the domestic and international narrative around particular issues.60 These strengths, which are closely related to the “calling out wrongdoing” idea, similarly stem from Congress’ status as the representative of the American people, which endows its priorities with a unique legitimacy.

Narrative-shaping through hearings and more: Congressional attention to a given foreign policy priority can significantly influence the debate over that issue at home and abroad. Interviewees who have worked in the executive branch and with NATO agreed that both actors pay close attention to what happens in Congress. As Fontaine and Schulman argue, “Congress can play a vital role in encouraging, convening, and organizing public and alternative sources of information.”61 For instance, they argue that congressional hearings can uncover new issues or new ways of thinking about old issues. 62 Nicholas Burns, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, told me that calling a hearing “shines a bright light on a big issue...It’s a convening power to ask members of the administration to appear before Congress and to engage in conversation and debate about the administration's policies.”63 As a 2018 Foreign Affairs article noted, “Hearings and investigations draw attention to neglected issues and can force administrations to rethink decisions. They can divert the executive branch from its priorities and focus the attention of the press.”64

The same applies to other non-legislative tools such as requests for briefings, resolutions, letters to the president and Cabinet officials, floor statements, and media interviews. 65 Even resolutions, far from serving a purely symbolic function, can frame the narrative and push the administration to care about something.66

### 2NC --- Solvency --- (Constructive Pressure)

#### Comparatively, Congress can better mediate tensions and encourage burden-sharing.

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

Transatlantic tensions over burden-sharing: Burden-sharing is the area of NATO policy where Congress has traditionally been most active. Congressional pressure, calibrated effectively, can give the executive branch leverage with allies. The legislative branch, as the representative of the American taxpayer and the overseer of the U.S. defense budget, is well-equipped to play this role.

However, Congress should consider several caveats. First, the issue of burden-sharing is especially sensitive after the Trump presidency. With allies wary that future U.S. administrations will treat burden-sharing the way Trump did,88 congressional pressure could easily become a source of friction. Second, while Congress may find it politically valuable to crack down on “free-riding” allies, ultimately the executive branch does the negotiating.89 A heavy-handed congressional approach that isn’t coordinated with the executive could disrupt ongoing diplomatic efforts on a variety of issues.

With these obstacles in mind, members of Congress can contribute to a better burdensharing debate by keeping in mind Stanley Sloan’s idea of “constructive pressure.”90 Members can signal their continued wish for more equitable allied contributions without weaponizing the issue (particularly in public). At the same time, they can make an important concession to allied concerns by showing that they understand the problems with the two percent metric and are open to rethinking it. In this way, Congress could help tackle the burden-sharing challenge as well as the “need for new metrics” challenge. 91 I recommend:

Ø Use carefully framed NDAA language to focus attention on burden-sharing. Congress should insert language about burden-sharing into the much-watched annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), one of the only pieces of foreign policy legislation that Congress consistently passes. The NDAA is one of Congress’ most important formal tools for influencing foreign policy, and the executive branch and foreign countries pay close attention to it.

In the spirit of “constructive pressure” and given lingering concerns about the Trump era, it’s important that any NDAA language on burden-sharing avoid a punitive or demanding tone. One approach might be to emphasize the importance of equitable burden-sharing while avoiding specific reference to the two percent metric, which carries some sensitivity because it has been wielded as a hammer in the past. This approach would also have the advantage of opening the door to new proposals for measuring contributions.

On this and other recommendations, congressional practitioners should keep in mind that their strengths are setting the agenda, shaping the narrative, and convening political support for priorities, not legislating specific alliance policies. Even fairly vague NDAA language can serve this purpose. Compared to more detailed provisions, general language is also likely to be more feasible for members to agree on and more helpful to the executive branch and to NATO.

Ø Encourage allies to meet their commitments, but be constructive. Several interviewees suggested that members of Congress should directly communicate to foreign counterparts that burden-sharing is important to them, while avoiding being overly punitive or calling countries out publicly.

Acknowledge other forms of contribution. Individual members can use hearings, briefings, statements to the media, and Dear Colleague letters to build a two-pronged narrative: Allies need to meet their defense spending commitments, but contributions to NATO consist of more than just military spending numbers.93 Again, members should remember that as narrative-shapers and agenda-setters, they can make a meaningful contribution to the burden-sharing debate by simply engaging with it. They don’t need to have a specific solution or policy proposal in mind before they can get involved.

### 2NC --- Solvency -- NATO

#### Can better solves NATO cohesion – create a more realistic agenda and increases coordination

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

Participate in ongoing efforts to redefine NATO’s mission. The current Congress has a timely opportunity to engage with two internal NATO processes that will shape the alliance’s future mission and purpose. The first is the “reflection process,” a study group convened to “reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role.”83 In late 2020, the group published a report that included 138 recommendations to achieve those three goals.84 A reaction from members of Congress to the report could help the alliance choose which recommendations to focus on and develop a narrower, more feasible agenda for NATO policy meetings.

Congressional engagement on the reflection process could take the form of a joint letter to the secretary general responding to the report, a request to the administration for further information about some of the recommendations, or simply a public statement endorsing certain recommendations while expressing the need for more study on others. One interviewee suggested that the Senate NATO observers’ group, an informal existing group of senators who are interested in NATO, could take the lead on this initiative. 85

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Democracy

#### Pressure can encourage democratic reforms

Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay is a Belfer IGA fellow and a first-year MPP candidate at HKS. Prior to Harvard, she was the managing editor of War on the Rocks, where she remains editor-at-large. She has been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost, and a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation., 2021, “Revitalizing NATO A Role for the U.S. Congress,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf] Eric

Help shift NATO’s narrative to highlight democratic values. NATO’s primary function as a military alliance is far better understood (and more widely agreed on) than its more nebulous secondary role as a community of democracies with shared values.107 Just as Congress can shift the narrative by emphasizing NATO’s military and consultative strengths, it can highlight NATO’s role as an alliance of values. Such signals would indicate that Congress is paying attention to the behavior of Turkey, Hungary, and Poland while avoiding an overly public callout that could create diplomatic friction or undermine other areas of cooperation. Members can use questions at hearings and briefings, media statements, and private conversations with allied counterparts to emphasize that they understand that NATO is a community of democracies in addition to a military alliance. In this way, it will lend urgency to the backsliding issue and elevate it on NATO’s agenda.108 Ø

### 2NC – AT: PDB

#### Combining Congressional and executive action guarantees an ineffective policy – defers to executive security cooperation.

Sideris 18 [Vicki Sideris worked as a project consultant at the Social Impact Hub and as a contract administrator at Insurance Australia Group, 10-03-2018, American Allies and Congress: A Friendly Face in the Age of Trump?, Australian Institute of International Affairs, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/resource/american-allies-and-congress-a-friendly-face-in-the-age-of-trump/] Eric

As the current US President challenges the post-war status quo on the American alliance system, Congress is increasingly stepping up as one of its most vocal defenders. While there are limits to how far Congress would challenge the President and how much difference this would make, cultivating closer congressional ties represents a useful opportunity for allies seeking stability in America’s alliance management.

America’s traditional [European](https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/allies-wonder-will-nato-survive-trump-20180709-p4zqed.html) and [Asian](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/us-relations-with-asia-under-trump-taking-stock/) allies have been dismayed by the President’s challenging of the alliance system. While past presidents have had disagreements with allies over [defence spending](https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/obama-nato-pay-fair-share-231405), [security commitments](https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/evolution-of-the-u-s-rok-alliance-abandonment-fears/), [trade](https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Trade-wars-lessons-from-the-1980s2) and [the use of force](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/22/germany.france), President Trump’s questioning of the fundamental value of alliances and the national [interests](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/fears-us-allies-benefits-us-alliances/) they serve, [represents](https://www.csis.org/programs/alliances-and-american-leadership-project) a significant shift from the post-war consensus in Washington. “[America First](https://books.google.com.au/books/about/A_World_in_Disarray.html?id=VEkKDAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y)” portrays allies as taking advantage of the US, judges the burdens of alliances to be greater than the benefits and prefers more transactional relationships. Allies are increasingly [concerned](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/08/nato-atlantic-alliance-survive-trump-analysis) that the President’s anti-alliance outlook may not be an aberration and that business-as-usual will not resume after his term.

Yet for now, the day-to-day management of alliances goes on and Congress has increasingly stepped in to fill the President’s void by supporting alliances. The US Constitution grants foreign policy powers to both the executive and legislative branches, with the system designed as an “[invitation to struggle](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-president).” Article I [outlines](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-president) Congress’ powers over trade, declarations of war, approval of presidential appointments, treaty ratifications and oversight of departments, as well as their control over the budget. Most foreign affairs-minded congressional members [tend](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zw-r9RO_DP8) to subscribe to the [traditional](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/alliances-are-net-gain-not-loss-america-24562) view of America’s alliances and recently have come their defence.

For example, Congress differs from the President over its support for NATO. Pre-empting the President’s visit to the July NATO summit in Brussels, the Senate overwhelmingly [passed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-11/trump-strikes-combative-tone-as-leaders-arrive-nato-update) a bipartisan resolution expressing support for NATO. The NATO Observer Group was [relaunched](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/03/01/us-senators-revive-nato-observer-group/) in early 2018 and saw its Senate membership [increase](http://thehill.com/policy/defense/397519-senate-adds-members-to-pro-nato-group) after the [contentious](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/world/europe/trump-nato-russia.html) Brussels summit; with its Republican leaders [voicing](https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/19/congress-would-stop-trump-from-nato-exit-key-senators-say/) that Congress had the means and will to prevent the President from withdrawing the US from NATO. In [August](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/congress-to-nato-we-have-your-back), twenty senators organised a private meeting with NATO officials and European diplomats to reassure them of Congress’ commitment to NATO and downplay the President’s behaviour. While the President has not indicated that he will soften his [criticism](https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-threatens-to-pull-out-of-nato/) of NATO, Congress’ support for the alliance system and their increasing willingness to get involved in foreign relations would be useful for allies seeking to prevent the President from taking drastic action, such as withdrawing from security treaties.

Australia has long recognised the value of cultivating relationships with Congress, using [diplomatic lobbying](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/lobbying-key-to-australia-us-relations/) as a tool to build connections, gain information and advocate for Australia’s interests. Establishing its [“own in-house lobbying firm”](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/lobbying-key-to-australia-us-relations/) called the Congressional Liaison Office, the embassy’s congressional outreach has delivered tangible results, including the passing of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement and E3 visa. The aftermath of the [tense](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/no-gday-mate-on-call-with-australian-pm-trump-badgers-and-brags/2017/02/01/88a3bfb0-e8bf-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_term=.104cb56c6f64) Turnbull-Trump phone call illustrated the [benefits](https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/congress-rallies-around-australia) of these efforts, as more than sixty members of Congress reached out to Australia’s ambassador to express their support for the alliance. Resolutions reaffirming the alliance were passed by both houses and a bipartisan “[Friends of Australia](https://usa.embassy.gov.au/news/launch-friends-australia-congressional-caucuses)” caucus was launched. This congressional [pressure](https://assets.ussc.edu.au/view/62/78/eb/86/c8/c9/3e/dc/a6/a4/06/38/51/cc/8a/ac/original/959a3d253927020b0ed1a1bd671e65306f29b4f4/security-challenges-journal-dougal-robinson.pdf) contributed to the President’s shift towards a [friendlier](https://www.sbs.com.au/news/no-greater-friends-trump-phones-to-congratulate-scott-morrison) approach to Australia — seen in its [exemption](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/how-team-australia-won-exemption-from-us-trade-tariffs/news-story/4c9f16a42b03cb3f1b476977f7da2a8b) from steel tariffs — and suggests that in some cases, Congress can act as a moderating force on Trump’s alliance management.

Ultimately however, the President has the most [significant](https://books.google.com.au/books/about/A_World_in_Disarray.html?id=VEkKDAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y) power and influence over US foreign policy, including alliance management. In recent decades, Congress has [tended](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-12-12/congress-and-war) to defer to the executive on foreign policy. In some cases, their [obstruction](https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/is-us-congress-the-main-impediment-to-a-rules-based-order) of international agreements – for example the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – undermines allied cooperation and their interests in a “rules-based order.”

Furthermore, the domestic political climate also limits Congress’ willingness to moderate the President’s anti-alliance leanings. Both parties generally [opposed](https://www.politico.eu/article/democrats-heidi-heitkamp-pounce-on-trump-trade-war-in-midterms/) the President’s initial decision to not exempt allies from tariffs and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee drafted [legislation](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/senators-introduce-legislation-to-require-congressional-approval-of-national-security-designated-tariffs) which would have made [congressional approval](https://www.csis.org/analysis/steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-push-and-pull-between-president-and-congress) for national-security tariffs a legal requirement. Yet despite bipartisan support, the Republican Senate leadership has not [allowed](https://www.businessinsider.com.au/corker-amendment-on-trump-tariffs-blocked-john-cornyn-2018-6?r=US&IR=T) this to be brought to a vote. This raises the issue that while Congress disagrees with the President over his treatment of allies and has made efforts to improve relations themselves, domestic political concerns mean that they have largely [fallen short](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-symbolic-rebuke-senate-votes-to-seek-congressional-role-in-president-trumps-tariff-decisions/2018/07/11/def7d556-851a-11e8-8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html?utm_term=.42f68db26c54) of using their constitutional foreign policy powers to overtly [challenge](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-senate/senate-will-not-poke-the-bear-trump-by-passing-tariff-measure-lawmaker-idUSKBN1J82WV) the President outside of symbolic motions and rhetoric. The upcoming midterm elections may only intensify Congress’ [dysfunction](https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-and-the-2018-us-midterm-elections-a-primer) and partisanship, leaving allies’ interests on the periphery.

While allies cannot solely rely on Congress, [increasing](https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/make-it-personal-trump-congress-and-australias-avenues-of-influence) congressional engagement would be a useful way to [cope](https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/what-should-nato-allies-do-coping-with-trump-while-preparing-for-a-post-trump-future/) with President Trump. Yet they cannot ignore the President, and while Congress may restrain him from withdrawing the US from its alliances, his words and actions still [damage](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/american-commitments-nato-trump/565601/) allies’ confidence in US commitments. Though allies are [not decoupling](https://www.csis.org/events/what-future-americas-alliances) from the US anytime soon, concerns about the possibility of longer-term anti-alliance sentiment in the US may force allies to [reflect](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-japan-angst/japan-confronts-risks-of-u-s-alliance-based-on-dollars-and-deals-not-values-idUSKBN1JE10I) on and [reconfigure](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-merkel-usa/merkel-says-europe-cant-rely-on-u-s-to-impose-world-order-idUSKBN1KA1F9) their own [strategies](https://www.cfr.org/blog/beyond-mateship-tough-choices-australian-foreign-policy).

#### Threats cannot be combined with material security guarantees

Blankenship 16 [[Brian Blankenship](http://bblankenship.weebly.com/) is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, studying international relations. His research interests focus on alliance politics, and his dissertation studies reassurance and burden-sharing in U.S. alliances, 8-15-2016, Can Obama Play the Trump Card with Allies?, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/can-obama-play-the-trump-card-with-allies/] Eric

It is important to note that there are differences between Trump’s pressure and the pressure that domestic actors have often applied on U.S. policymakers in the past. Members of Congress who propose withdrawing U.S. forces from allied soil or making strong demands of allies are elected officials who can wield direct influence over U.S. spending and foreign policy. By contrast, while he may enjoy the loyalty of a significant chunk of the electorate, unless elected, Trump holds no political power — and it is far from clear that he would gain or lose votes on the basis of allied burden-sharing performance. Thus, the Obama administration may not be able to credibly threaten negative consequences — or promise positive consequences — based on allies’ compliance with U.S. burden-sharing demands. Nevertheless, even if he does not become president, what matters is not only Trump the candidate, but what he may represent — and thus, who might take up the mantle of the free-riding issue in the future.

While Trump’s candidacy raises challenges for U.S. relationships with allies, it is important to recognize that it may also create openings for favorable bargaining. These opportunities must be managed deftly, however, lest the United States undermine the bargaining chip that its security guarantees provide it.

# AFF Answers

## Cong Threats Answers

### 2AC – Solvency -- Congressional Threats Fail

#### Congress is an illegitimate actor – structural problems destroy credibility.

Mann and Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann is a 2012 FP Global Thinker and is a senior fellow at the Brookings institution and Norman Ornstein is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a weekly columnist at Roll Call, and co-author, with Thomas Mann of It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism, Norman Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann, Norman Ornstein, 11-26-2012, Yes, Congress Is That Bad, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/26/yes-congress-is-that-bad/] Eric

What has gone wrong? Two sources of dysfunction are central to the current impasse:

The first is a mismatch between the checks and balances built into the U.S. system and the extreme polarization now separating the two major political parties. By constitutional design, U.S. policymaking moves slowly; the president cannot dictate what happens in Congress, and legislators use separate procedures in the House and Senate that then must be reconciled to write law. In the past, eventual compromise was the standard outcome, at least when some legislators worked across party lines. Not anymore.

The Democratic and Republican parties have been moving apart ideologically since the 1970s, but in the past 10 years this has dramatically accelerated. For the first time in the more than three decades since National Journal began compiling vote ratings for the U.S. Senate, the tallies for the last Congress showed that there was not a single Democrat more conservative than the most liberal Republican; the center, in other words, cannot hold — because it has disappeared. Instead, American parties now resemble parliamentary parties: Party leaders crack the whip, and fewer members are willing to flout orders and compromise. The result: gridlock.

The second major dysfunction has to do with the asymmetry of this polarization. The Republican Party has become the home of ideologically extreme insurgents who shun conventionally understood facts, evidence, and science, and scorn the very idea of working out compromises with a legitimate political opposition. This radicalized GOP is now willing to use all the levers in the constitutional system even if it means delay and deadlock.

In a parliamentary system, a fiercely oppositional minority party is to be expected. In the American system, it cannot work. With the Republicans deciding to use the filibuster in the Senate as a routine tool of obstruction (they have resorted to the filibuster with a frequency in the last three years unprecedented in U.S. history), passing legislation now in effect requires not a majority but 60 votes out of 100. What’s more, any legislation that manages to pass under those conditions, taken without broad bipartisan consensus, divides the country and is seen by many as illegitimate or ill-advised. That is the story of Barack Obama’s first two years in office. Democrats, who were in charge of both the House and Senate, pushed through a wide range of measures from health-care reform to economic stimulus to financial regulation, but the minority made a concerted effort to delegitimize them.

What came after was even worse: The 2010 midterm elections produced a divided-party government, genuine gridlock, and the least productive Congress in memory. This year saw the enactment of only 83 laws, a quarter of them naming post offices or making other symbolic acts. Of course, quality is more important than quantity (whatever else the famous "do-nothing" 80th Congress did, it passed the Marshall Plan). In the case of this 112th Congress, however, the quality is as abysmal as the quantity; the most significant public-policy action was the debacle surrounding the debt ceiling, which resulted in the first credit-rating downgrade in America’s history. Now, following that reckless hostage-taking of what should have been a standard legislative act, a totally unnecessary "fiscal cliff" looms, threatening another recession. The problems here are not redeemable with quick fixes because the divisions are tribal and the problems are as much cultural as structural.

This lethal combination of forces has serious implications not just for America’s ability to solve its problems; it also poisons America’s standing in the world — its ability to project its values abroad, garner the trust and respect of allies, and serve as a role model for nascent democracies and a counterpoint to autocracies.

#### Partisanship and the news cycle destroy effective threats.

Warburg 21 [Gerry Warburg is a professor of practice of public policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, January 2021, “Congressional Accountability in Shaping United States Foreign Policies 1970-2020,” Center for Effective Policymaking, https://thelawmakers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Working-Paper-Congressional-Accountability-in-US-Foreign-Policy-1.pdf] Eric

Research on this question, supplemented by interviews with leading policymakers, offer details that reveal how profoundly the policymaking environment has been altered.(30)

First, there are ever fewer centrists elected to Congress from either major party, and those that remain find few electoral incentives for taking tough votes on international policy. Consequently, there are fewer Members prepared to place institutional prerogatives over partisan politics. In the late 1980s, there were a dozen liberal Republicans to ‘the left’ of conservative Democrats, often from southern states, and vice versa. In the last Congress, the most conservative senator in the Democratic caucus, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, was still ranked as more liberal than the most moderate Republican, Susan Collins of Maine.(31) Those who challenge party orthodoxy, or who reach across the political aisle to support a bipartisan compromise—or to defend the institutional prerogatives of Congress—are at greater risk of being defeated. As a consequence, Members of both parties have adopted a classic ‘blame avoidance’ strategy to dodge difficult votes while reserving the ability to blame the President for foreign initiatives gone awry.(32) In fact, several powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairmen have lost their re-election bids. The list includes William Fulbright of Arkansas, Frank Church of Idaho and Charles Percy of Illinois. Many incumbents now fear primary election challenges more than general elections. Primary voters defeated relative moderates such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) in 2010, while Trump critic Bob Corker, a popular Tennessee Republican retired unexpectedly in 2019. The muchnoted ‘sorting out’ of parties has significantly increased party-line voting while dis-incentivizing would-be champions of the institution of Congress.(33) This has occurred most notably on domestic issues such as health care—not a single Republican voted for Obamacare, even after Democrats accepted scores of GOP-sponsored amendments. Stimulus spending and tax cuts also became party-line votes in the House. Yet, it also happened on issues like the Iran nuclear pact, where Republicans voted en bloc against an agreement that had been supported by U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence leaders, five United Nations Security Council partners, including key European allies, as well as Russia and China. This party-line voting on security matters and the failure to defend institutional prerogatives “makes it easier for future administrations to just ignore the will of Congress,” Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) observes, “it means there’ll be less and less bipartisanship in defending Congress.(34)

In this hyper-polarized legislative environment, bipartisan coalitions to sustain Washington’s international policy initiatives are very difficult to achieve. This harms U.S. national security interests. Former GOP Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen graphically describes the difficulty of passing even a routine State Department authorization in this environment: “The House Foreign Affairs Committee mark-up on the State Department funding bill suffered from dozens of amendments that were simply about social engineering and political messaging. When you try to bring a bill like that to the floor, with so many divisive social issues, you get a ‘No’ from leadership.”(35) Similarly, nonpartisan efforts to defend the institution of Congress have been weakened. As one former House leader and veteran appropriator, Vic Fazio of California, recently testified, “The job of the minority is now to make sure that the governing majority accomplishes little or nothing.”(36)

A second factor in Capitol Hill’s decline has been the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the rise of social media. Both have made nuanced positioning on breaking foreign developments more difficult. Flip comments by inveterate Twitter users crowd out more thoughtful analysis. Hard line positions are rewarded by voters and locked in early by earned media coverage. The President of the United States boasted by Tweet in 2019 about nominating a poorly qualified, controversial Director of National Intelligence, then counting on the press to ‘vet’ him after the presidential announcement.(37) Legislators also spend far less time in Washington working together. Bipartisan CODELS (“congressional delegations”) making fact-finding missions overseas, have been cut back. In the Senate, leaders have doubled the number of committee assignments while reducing the number of substantive bills given consideration. Consequently, recent research has shown, that there is greater policy diversification and less specialization.(38) Legislators are increasingly generalists, fewer are specialists in foreign or defense policy. The development of policymaking expertise, especially in foreign policy, an area deemed of less interest to voters, is punished rather than rewarded. In addition, term limits on committee chairs—a reform initiative from decades past—has further reduced the development of expertise necessary to stand up to a unified executive branch front led by the President.

A third factor is that the marquee foreign policymaking committees, panels that once wielded the power to check presidents, have themselves declined. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Exhibit A here. The committee was once a panel led by vigorous challengers to presidential authority. William Fulbright used it to build a national case against the Vietnam War expanded by his political ally, fellow southern Democrat Lyndon Johnson. Frank Church used the panel to build the case for nuclear arms control and the Panama Canal treaties, while checking CIA excesses. Republican Jesse Helms pressed from his leadership position on the panel to curb U.S. support for international organizations.(39) Such was the high esteem of the panel that Senator Jack Kennedy’s father, eager to prepare for the 1960 presidential contrast, implored then-Senate Majority Leader LBJ to grant his son a seat on the panel in the 1950s, blocking a more senior political rival, Estes Kefauver.

In the last Congress, the committee was led by a quiet isolationist from Idaho, Jim Risch, who is not held in high regard by foreign policy experts on both sides of the aisle. The Senate panel that once seated Dick Lugar, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel and Barack Obama still attracts White House aspirants. Ted Cruz of Texas, Rand Paul of Kentucky, and Marco Rubio of Florida all joined the panel prior to their own presidential campaigns. But this panel, and its House counterpart, are now deemed by most legislators less desirable than in previous eras. The House committee still attracts some legislators committed to a strong institutional role for Congress. But it also has Members enamored of foreign travel and well-supported by interest groups with a stake in international matters. In the House, where Members face voters every two years and are more tied to parochial districts, getting Members to serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee has been a challenge for party leaders.(40)

The reason why these two key authorizing committees have lost much of their luster and influence is clear: they rarely pass any significant legislation. In fact, few major committees of Congress act less on legislation. With no significant treaties coming before the Senate in the last decade, the Foreign Relations panel garners less public and press attention. With no authorization debates, it has legislative power over fewer funds and programs. In the void left by decades of failing to pass even an annual authorization bill for the State Department, the committees and their public education functions, even their champions and leaders concede, are less relevant.(41) Today the work of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, which employ several dozen senior staff experts on bilateral relationships and regional security challenges, is often “eviscerated by four appropriations subcommittee clerks, who are not foreign policy experts,” as one veteran legislator laments.(42) It should be noted, this phenomenon obtains on most legislation, not just on national security matters.

## General Pressure Answers

### Pressure CP---Fails---Top Level

#### Pressure fails---politics and self-interests.

Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm\_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM

2) European countries pay more in defense overhead — All armed forces require military bases, training facilities, and administrative support. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States.

A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well.

Countries have no guarantees their partners ultimately will support them in a military crisis. Thus, if sharing turns into a lock-in, countries run the risk of having access to fewer military capabilities than they might need. This explains why the width and depth of past initiatives have been generally limited.

However, this comes at the cost of intra-alliance inefficiency and thus an inferior capacity to generate military capabilities. An E.U. Defense Union could address these problems, but efforts to set this up face many of the same challenges: Why should a country tie its destiny to others? How can it ensure that its interests will be respected? And what tangible benefits would it observe in the short term, beside loss of jobs and income, following base closures and defense industry consolidation?

3) Implementing defense cooperation in Europe won’t be easy — Some analysts think that by promoting cooperation among NATO allies, any U.S. retrenchment from Europe would help address existing problems, but there are strong reasons to be skeptical.

With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon.

And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

### Pressure CP---Fails

#### Threatening to cut-off aid pushes countries closer to Russia and fails to create concessions for the US.

Jessica Trisko Darden 17. Assistant Professor of International Affairs at American University’s School of International Service and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “President Trump wants to pressure allies by cutting foreign aid. That never works.” Washington Post. 8-25-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/25/president-trump-wants-to-pressure-allies-by-cutting-foreign-aid-that-never-works/ //EM

In his speech this week on his plans for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, President Trump said he will use the threat of withdrawing foreign aid to put pressure on Pakistan to better support the American mission. Despite proposing dramatic cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development budgets, the Trump administration still requested $740 million in foreign aid for Pakistan, so this threat carries significant weight. Then, just one day later, news broke that the State Department is withholding $195 million in military aid for Egypt and has revoked another $95 million in foreign aid, seeming proof that we are willing to use aid as leverage.

But history shows that foreign aid is a poor way to get what we want. Threatening to cut off aid is almost certain to fail in bringing about political change in Egypt, Pakistan or any country that the United States has a strategic interest in supporting.

U.S. foreign aid has long been held out as a carrot to reward countries that embrace democracy and free markets. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a foreign aid agency created under George W. Bush, awards funds only to countries that are undertaking liberal political and economic reforms. During the Cold War, increased aid was also offered as a potential reward to failing states such as El Salvador. During a visit there by then-Vice President George H.W. Bush at the height of the country’s civil war, El Salvador was promised a massive increase in military assistance in exchange for the removal of military leaders suspected of human rights abuses and greater restraint by the government-aligned “death squad terrorists” who had killed thousands. While death squad killings did decline, the lull in violence was short lived. According to Human Rights Watch, there were 1,900 political killings and disappearances in El Salvador only a year after Bush’s visit. Promises of aid didn’t stop the violence, but Congress still approved the Reagan administration’s $61.7 million aid request to resupply the Salvadoran military, which was apparently running out of bullets.

The cutoff of aid has also been used as a stick — either threatened or enforced — to motivate countries to get back on track with U.S. objectives. In 2010, U.S. military aid to several Pakistani military units was cut as punishment for human rights abuses, including at least 300 extrajudicial executions in the Swat Valley. In a war for “hearts and minds,” killing civilians doesn’t help. But the Obama administration undermined the impact of the cuts by simultaneously negotiating a $2 billion counterterrorism package with Pakistan. The following year, the Obama administration suspended 40 percent of the $2 billion package in an attempt to secure greater cooperation from the Pakistani military in fighting against the Taliban — the very same thing Trump threatened.

Why does aid fail to change governments’ behavior? One of the reasons is that we give most of our foreign aid to countries that are strategically important to the United States — nations like Egypt and Pakistan. We need their continued cooperation on a range of issues, and this ultimately limits the amount of pressure we can apply. Sometimes there are developments beyond our control. Restrictions on foreign aid to Indonesia were eased in 2005 after a tsunami devastated parts of the country. Other times, the cuts in aid are too small to matter. In 2015, $5 million in aid was withheld from Mexico after the summary execution of 22 suspected gang members during the country’s ongoing drug war. But that amounted to 15 percent of U.S. support for the Mexican police and military under the Merida Initiative. The Mexican military continues to support local police forces, recently killing 17 in a firefight, which suggests that little has changed in the Mexican government’s strategy.

Often, cutting aid is simply not enough to force change. In Mali, the Obama administration suspended $70 million in bilateral aid — roughly half of U.S. aid to the country — after a 2012 coup. The State Department said aid would resume at normal levels once democratic rule was restored. The coup leader stepped down, but the military remained in power. Presidential elections were held more than a year later, after French military intervention in the country.

Pressuring countries through foreign aid can also drive them away from the United States. This fear was strongest during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was actively competing for influence in developing countries, but it’s still very real. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs has led to thousands of deaths. In response, the U.S. postponed millions of dollars in foreign aid. Duterte also rejected $280 million in aid from the European Union because it was pressuring him to improve human rights conditions. Aid can no longer buy political influence in the Philippines.

#### Non-escalatory is critical to get allies to agree

**O’Hanlon ’19** [Michael; October 2019; Senior Fellow and Director of Research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, adjunct Professor at Columbia and Georgetown University, Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University; Foreign Affairs, “Can America Still Protect Its Allies?” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-08-12/can-america-still-protect-its-allies>]

A sanctions-based strategy would be judicious and proportionate, but it would not be weak. Indeed, if Beijing or Moscow refused to either back down or otherwise resolve the dispute once the United States and its allies had deployed sanctions, Washington could raise the stakes. Recognizing that the aggressor state’s strategic aims had become fundamentally untrustworthy or hostile, Washington could seek to not only punish the perpetrator for its specific action but also limit its future economic growth. Over time, export controls and permanent sanctions could replace temporary punitive measures. This strategy would **require support** from key **U.S. allies** to be effective—one more reason why Washington needs to respond to these kinds of crises in a way that seems **judicious**, **patient**, and **non-escalatory**, so as to **strengthen its coalition** and not **scare away** key partners.

### Pressure CP---Fails---Spending

#### European countries will not increase defense commitments unliterally.

Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm\_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM

President Trump’s reassurances last week to U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May that the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) was not, in fact, “obsolete” are unlikely to have Europe taking up more of the defense burden, at least in the short term.

As discussed here in the Monkey Cage, national security adviser Michael T. Flynn wants to see other NATO members pay more of the cost of defending Europe. It’s not a new pitch, but such calls neglect the budgetary, financial and political barriers to enhanced military capabilities in Europe.

And such barriers will remain in place even if European countries succeed in implementing ambitious defense plans that include active measures to strengthen defense cooperation, endow the E.U. with defense capabilities and launch a common research fund.

Trump’s national security adviser wants to water down U.S. NATO commitments

The transatlantic gap in military capabilities — how much defense output the two sides of the Atlantic are able to generate, respectively — has three main causes that cannot easily be addressed:

1) European countries have limited defense budgets — On average, defense expenditure in Europe is just over 1 percent of GDP, while the U.S. defense budget is well above 4 percent of GDP. Would a U.S. retrenchment push European allies to fix this imbalance, and bring NATO members closer to the 2 percent threshold they pledged to move toward in 2014?

Maybe. But half of NATO’s members are small countries with small defense budgets, well below $2 billion per year. Thus, a substantial bump in their military spending won’t bring about a significant increase in Europe’s overall military investments. Estonia’s 2 percent GDP defense expenditure amounts to just $500 million, for instance. That might pay for the operational costs of a few of middle-sized U.S. warships, but wouldn’t push back a Russian invasion.

### Pressure CP---Turn

#### Threatening allies creates extended fears AND collapses deterrence.

Tad A. Schnaufer 21. Doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (UCF). Additionally, he serves as a Captain in the Florida Army National Guard. “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 1-15-2021. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/ //EM

These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the 2014 Wales Pledge. However, in the long term, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion. Deterrence works best when allies clearly express their mutual obligations to all actors on the international stage.

# !!!Bilat CPs!!!

## Top Shelf

### 1NC --- CP Shell

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase bilateral security cooperation with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ over \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### The CP competes and solves the case --- Bilat agreements allow info sharing and interoperability

**Adgie et al. ‘22** - Mary Kate Adgie is a research assistant at RAND, with a focus in international development and national security, sub-Saharan African affairs, and socio-economic development; Jason H. Campbell is a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on issues of international security, counterinsurgency, intelligence, and measuring progress in post-conflict reconstruction; Beth Grill is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation specializing in national security policy and security cooperation; Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for DoD clients; Angela O'Mahony is associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND; Rachel Tecott is an adjunct researcher for RAND Corporation who has helped to inform U.S. security cooperation and security force assistance efforts around the world; David Thaler is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation (RAND, “Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies”, 2022, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf> )//RG

The United States and its allies prioritize establishing shared standards and procedures to ensure that they have the ability to coordinate effectively in a potential conflict. Liaisons and personnel exchanges provide a way to sustain enduring relationships between U.S. and allied militaries. **The U**nited **S**tates conducts SC activities on a bilateral basis, **engaging allies in liaison and military personnel exchange programs.** The United Kingdom has as many as 15 liaison officers and 13 exchange officers placed in Army commands. These officers have the opportunity to share information on operational procedures, which helps build and sustain long-term interoperability between the two armies.19

Defense and military contacts, which are more short-term, also provide a means for sharing information. The contacts include army-to-army staff talks and key leader and senior leader engagements. According to G-TSCMIS, Australia and the United Kingdom have the highest number of SC engagements among highly capable partners, including planning conferences, bilateral and multilateral coordination meetings, and staff talks; the majority of these engagements are focused on interoperability.

Multilateral engagements and such organizations as NATO and ABCANZ provide mechanisms for developing shared standards for the United States and its allies. NATO Standardization Agreements, for example, provide the basis for developing common operational and administrative procedures and logistics that enable one NATO country to operate with and support another member’s military forces. ABCANZ focuses on developing common standards for the land forces of the highly capable allies. Regional working groups have also developed in recent years to serve as an institutional mechanism to share information. Together, they have become part of an emerging SC planning process initiated by the United States and its highly capable allies.

Developing Compatible Military Technology and Weapon Systems

Coordination with allies on the development of weapons technology aimed toward improving interoperability has gained greater attention in recent years. Increased U.S.-British technical interoperability was the purpose of a 2020 Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Secretary of the Army and the British Minister of Defence, **which emphasized** the development of a **bilateral modernization plan that covers several modernization activities**. This agreement led the Army’s Futures Command to conduct a series of modernization workshops to collaborate on networks, long-range precision fires, future vertical lift, soldier lethality, and precision navigation and timing to create more interoperable systems.20 These modernization workshops contribute to higher-level U.S.-British Capabilities and Research Cooperation– Army talks and U.S.-British General Officer Roundtables (GORTs).

The United States has cooperative research development test and evaluation and science and technology programs with countries throughout the world, but its cooperative production arrangements are primarily with its highly capable allies. Both Australia and the United Kingdom have signed defense trade cooperation treaties with the United States to meet specific operational and cooperative requirements. These treaties allow for the exchange of technology that would otherwise be limited by export controls and afford opportunities for combined research and coordination that can improve interoperability in the long term.

The relationship with Australia is underpinned by an agreement on science and technology cooperation. The 2007 U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Treaty underpins this trade, permitting the license-free export of most defense articles between the two countries in support of combined military operations, cooperative defense research, and other projects for government end use.21 U.S.-British defense technology exchanges are covered under the U.S. DoD–British Ministry of Defence Reciprocal Defense Procurement memorandum of understanding that was amended in January 2018.22 These are long-standing agreements that provide the framework for defense technology exchanges.

### 2NC --- Solvency Run

#### The aff is slow, the cp is fast

Kilman et al., 20 (Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow at CNAS, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, 3-29-2020, " Forging an Alliance Innovation Base," CNAS,  [https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/forging-an-alliance-innovation-baset](https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/despite-ukraine-focus-asia-pacific-play-prominent-role-nato-summit), LASA-CSK)

Speed: U.S. action through large-scale international groupings is generally slow and cumbersome. By contrast, working bilaterally with allies can yield rapid results, in part by leveraging existing mechanisms for alliance management designed to translate policy dialogue into concrete outcomes. Minilateral consultations, though less conducive to swift action than bilateral discussions, remain agile compared with multilateral export control regimes like Wassenaar. Disproportionate impact: Leadership in some critical technologies such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) is concentrated among a small number of U.S. allies.98 In these instances, minilateral and even bilateral consultations can have an outsized impact in denying China access to technologies that could underpin its future commercial prowess and military effectiveness.

## Solvency

### Solvency --- TL

#### Bilat agreements solve – they allow info sharing and interoperability

**Adgie et al. ‘22** - Mary Kate Adgie is a research assistant at RAND, with a focus in international development and national security, sub-Saharan African affairs, and socio-economic development; Jason H. Campbell is a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on issues of international security, counterinsurgency, intelligence, and measuring progress in post-conflict reconstruction; Beth Grill is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation specializing in national security policy and security cooperation; Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for DoD clients; Angela O'Mahony is associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND; Rachel Tecott is an adjunct researcher for RAND Corporation who has helped to inform U.S. security cooperation and security force assistance efforts around the world; David Thaler is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation (RAND, “Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies”, 2022, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf> )//RG

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#### Unilateral and NATO norms fail – only bilateral relations solve norms and deterrence

Goldman 20 [Emily, Director of the US Cyber Command; “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy”; Fall 2020 ; DOA: 7/20/22; <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10950>; Lowell-ES]

America’s approach to building cyber norms should adapt to the following realities. First, the United States is not in a hegemonic position to define the agenda for norms in cyberspace. For a single actor to set the public agenda and drive a convergence of behavior, it would need to have control over the primary incentives and disincentives within the system, which the United States does not possess. Nor is there a clear manner in which the United States could obtain such primary control, due to the highly diffuse nature of cyberspace. Second, what is and what is not currently acceptable varies greatly depending on national perspectives, even among liberal democratic states. Despite the stated desire of the United States to establish norms through international cooperation, such norms have not emerged. The result is intense competition to drive a convergence of expectations on behavior in cyberspace.

An alternative yet related approach to building norms is to model good behavior. Convergence of norms will occur over time as other actors see that more beneficial outcomes flow from modelled good behavior than from bad behavior. This approach presents several challenges. First, behavior that might be categorized as unacceptable still produces benefits that outweigh costs. Second, adversaries cite various allegations of American bad behavior in cyberspace — global surveillance and the Stuxnet hack of the Iranian nuclear program are two examples — in labeling the United States a hypocritical standard-bearer for norms. Third, as both state and nonstate actors continue to advance their interests through behaviors that the United States considers unacceptable, modelling can easily be misunderstood as tacit acceptance.41

A third approach is reaction to a massively disruptive or destructive event that galvanizes global attention. This is how norms against genocide were set after the Holocaust. This approach presents obvious challenges. Relying on disaster to set norms is not an acceptable strategy. Nor does it seem likely that cyber capabilities will generate the level of abhorrence that characterize attitudes toward nerve agents, for example, and which have led to self-imposed proscriptions on their use.42

A fourth approach is for convergence of expectations to organically evolve through interaction. Common law demonstrates how norms emerge through practice and mature through political and legal discourse. The process of norm convergence for cyberspace has been troubling, however. For the last 10 years, the United States has witnessed the emergence of de facto norms antithetical to U.S. interests, defined by massive theft of intellectual property, expanding control of internet content, attacks on data confidentiality and availability, violations of privacy, and interference in democratic debates and processes. These activities have become normalized because the United States did not push back on them persistently and early on.43 This has encouraged more experimentation and envelope-pushing short of armed conflict. Conversely, if the United States began countering such practices, it could help to counteract this trend and encourage a form of normalization more suited to meeting U.S. interests.

These pathways can be mutually reinforcing. The first two approaches have largely succeeded with U.S. allies and partners, but important differences with major competitors remain. Existing conditions do not allow the United States to dictate norm adoption: The opening decades of the 21st century are not the late 1940s, and no state is sufficiently powerful to dictate the rules of the road. Moreover, the third approach may be inoperable. Waiting for a disaster is politically and morally problematic. The fourth approach of “normalization” holds more promise for engaging with competitors and steering Moscow and Beijing toward preferred norms. Norms are constructed through “normal” practice and then become codified in international agreements. By persistently engaging and contesting cyberspace aggression, the United States can draw parameters around what is acceptable, nuisance, unacceptable, and intolerable. The United States should not abandon U.N. First Committee processes on responsible state behavior in cyberspace, or other avenues for socialization such as international institutions or cyber capacity-building programs. But to be more effective, explicit bargaining can be reinforced by tacit bargaining through maneuver with non-likeminded states in the strategic space below armed conflict.44 Diplomats have an important role to play in this process, by engaging directly with opponents and communicating and explaining U.S. preferences to allies and partners.45 Diplomats can also assist by mobilizing coalitions — of governments, industries, academia, and citizenry, at home and abroad — for competition with ideological foes.

### Solvency --- subs, NC3

#### Bilat security coop solves interoperability – it exists now, but needs to be strengthened

**Adgie et al. ‘22** - Mary Kate Adgie is a research assistant at RAND, with a focus in international development and national security, sub-Saharan African affairs, and socio-economic development; Jason H. Campbell is a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on issues of international security, counterinsurgency, intelligence, and measuring progress in post-conflict reconstruction; Beth Grill is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation specializing in national security policy and security cooperation; Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for DoD clients; Angela O'Mahony is associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND; Rachel Tecott is an adjunct researcher for RAND Corporation who has helped to inform U.S. security cooperation and security force assistance efforts around the world; David Thaler is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation (RAND, “Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies”, 2022, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf> )//RG

Allies such as the United Kingdom and Australia support and encourage interoperability discussions and new investments during senior-level interactions with the Army. For example, interoperability discussions have historically dominated the agenda for the U.S.-British army-to-army staff talks. The Multinational Fusion Cell in the HQDA brings together assigned personnel from multiple allied countries (the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, and others) **to focus on interoperability and to develop U.S.-allied bilateral interoperability roadmaps**. Standing organizations, such as ABCANZ, also exist to work through interoperability issues at the operational level. Large-scale exercises, such as the aforementioned biannual Talisman Sabre series between the United States and Australia, are very much focused on addressing interoperability challenges identified from recent operations and planning for future operations. NATO defines interoperability along three dimensions—human, procedural, and technical—which is a helpful way to categorize interoperability challenges.34 We find general agreement among our interlocutors that SC with highly capable allies to support human, procedural, and technical interoperability is advancing at the operational and tactical levels, but there is concern about a lack of multiyear funding and programming to guide longer-term planning for multinational interoperability exercises.35

Despite this focus, interoperability initiatives at the strategic level have been relatively ad hoc from allies’ perspectives. The Army’s Interoperability Campaign Plan frames and institutionalizes interoperability efforts internally and operationalizes it with designated partners. Allies support the Army’s focus on interoperability writ large, but the links between interoperability planning and ongoing SC activities needs to be stronger. As an example, the GORT, a bilateral event between the United States and the United Kingdom at the three- and four-star level, is not explicitly linked to the discussions that occur at the one- and two-star levels. According to key allied officials, issues raised at the GORT level should be automatically addressed at the subsequent Army staff talks (ASTs) and drive the discussions at the lower level working groups. Interoperability issues and priorities raised at the GORTs/staff talks should also **be linked to other key bilateral SC activities, creating a real battle rhythm for interoperability.**

Moreover, allies have suggested that although **bilateral vision statements for interoperability**—such as the emerging one with the United Kingdom—**are positive steps**, their language could be made stronger and clearer. They suggest dropping the term vision and **making bilateral campaign plans**. In addition, aspirational verbs in Army plans, such as institutionalize, should be replaced by stronger verbs, such as guarantee.36

Both British and Australian officials talk about wanting to be the United States’ partner of choice; the United Kingdom has in place an explicit strategic communications campaign plan that focuses on improved access and science and technology collaboration. For the United Kingdom, this partnering includes such areas as energy; **antisubmarine warfare**; hypersonics; **network command, control, and communications**; and nuclear collaboration. For Australia, areas include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; radars; and other high-technology systems. The emphasis on being a partner of choice refers to being capable, likeminded, and committed. It is understandable why key allies desire to have the strongest language possible in interoperability planning documents.

### Solvency --- Interoperability

#### Bilateral cooperation solves interoperability best

Hura et al ‘2

(Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Laron, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Dan Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, RAND Project Air Force, “Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations,” 2000, pg online <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235/RAND_MR1235.pdf>)

The implications are twofold. The first is that interoperability planning must be adaptive enough to accommodate the possibility of coalitions of different sizes and composed of different coalition partners. “Plug-and-play” is a concept that is well known at the technological level. But it is also required at the national level to provide for the possibility of different combinations of coalition partners; to manage the comings and goings of coalition members as the mission focus changes and/or missions are added, completed, or abandoned; and to minimize disruptions to the overall coalition effort. This suggests a focus on long-term interoperability solutions, including organizations, doctrine, procedures, and system architectures that can accommodate the dynamic character of coalitions, including transitions. [Table A.3 OMITTED] The second implication is that because the United States’ NATO allies vary in their coalition participation with the United States, the United States might be able to achieve important interoperability through a series of bilateral rather than alliance-wide efforts.

### Solvency --- Cyber

#### Bilateral coordination solves Cyber Security best

Goldman 20 [Emily, Director of the US Cyber Command; “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy”; Fall 2020 ; DOA: 7/20/22; <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10950>; Lowell-ES]

Communicate and Build Consensus

The State Department’s foreign service officers forward-deployed as “cyber diplomats” can strengthen consensus among allies and partners on the nature of the cyber security problem and on the need for action to address it. To do so, they should be conversant with the U.S. government’s efforts to address cyber competition and armed with information to speak authoritatively about them. The State Department has long promoted a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The key elements of that framework include: (1) affirmation that established principles of international law apply to state behavior in cyberspace;62 (2) adherence to certain non-binding norms of state behavior in cyberspace during peacetime; and (3) consideration, development, and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace. Since not all states share American views on responsible behavior in cyberspace, the United States is working with partners and allies on collective attribution and imposition of consequences.

These initiatives are now being complemented by the Department of Defense’s strategy of defend forward and U.S. Cyber Command’s operational approach of persistent engagement. The State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officers in missions around the world need to be well-versed in these other efforts and prepared to explain them to foreign partners on a routine basis. America’s partners want to understand U.S. government strategy and policies.63 It is U.S. policy that cross-domain responses to cyber aggression should be complemented with steady and sustained activities to make networks more resilient, to defend them as far forward as practicable, and to contest the most dangerous adversaries.64 Every diplomatic engagement that includes cyber issues would be an opportunity to build support for these mutually reinforcing approaches.

Bolster Cyber Cadre

The greatest talent, most consequential research and development, and most innovative applications of cyber and other emerging technologies are globally distributed across individuals, commercial entities, governments, and academia. Competing successfully requires recognizing, understanding, and leveraging insights and advances wherever they reside in real time. The nation that best understands and can most rapidly harvest the benefits of changing knowledge (e.g., quantum encryption, artificial intelligence, machine learning, high performance computing, big data, 5G) will be best positioned to secure its future. Conversely, states that lag behind competitors will find closing gaps a daunting and risky challenge. 5G represents the proverbial canary in the coal mine because the United States lags behind China in deployment. Unless the United States ensures the talent is in place to monitor and lead on future technologies, it may again be caught unprepared.

The State Department does designate foreign service officers with a cyber portfolio, but they are usually assigned as an additional duty, often to economic officers at embassies and consulates. One option would be a dedicated cadre of “cyber diplomacy-coned” officers,65 or even a regional dedicated officer cadre located at a large or strategic embassy in each region to augment the part-time officers at post. These cyber diplomacy-coned foreign service officers would report on priorities and trends in research and investments across governments, industries, academia, and research institutes worldwide, and identify where adversary regimes are vulnerable to diplomatic, information, military, and economic threats.66 They would “identify and catalyze opportunities,” in the words of the U.S. National Security Strategy,67helping to set the conditions for competition by building mechanisms for information sharing and agile collaboration.

Enable Defend Forward

The U.S. National Cyber Strategy’s guidance to promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, one that ensures there are consequences for irresponsible behavior, is a key objective for the United States. To succeed, this framework should be pursued in tandem with an active approach to stem ongoing adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict. The Department of Defense is now defending forward, outside its existing networks, to mitigate threats before they reach the United States. It is time for the State Department to join in these efforts.

An informal division of labor currently exists between the departments of State and Defense, whereby the former promotes norms in traditional diplomatic channels while the latter pursues defend forward through military channels. Yet this leaves several problems unresolved. Parallel communication increases the risk of messaging fratricide across military and diplomatic channels in partner nations. Military cyber operations may engage foreign policy sensitivities that the State Department is better equipped to address. On the other hand, State Department desk officers may throw a wrench into planning because they do not understand Defense Department strategy.

The United States needs to operate continuously alongside allies and partners. Leadership from the State Department can increase the speed, agility, and scale of defend forward activities and operations by working through diplomatic channels to set the conditions for the United States to operate by, with, and through foreign partners and their networks in order to expose, contest, and defend against adversary cyber aggression. Sustained diplomacy can help institutionalize these operational partnerships and make defend forward more anticipatory and effective. Institutionalized cooperation, including the conduct of joint and coalition operations and the development of agreed-upon legal and policy frameworks, is essential to prevail in long-term strategic competition.

Leadership from the State Department can increase the speed, agility, and scale of defend forward activities and operations...

The State Department can set the conditions for consensual foreign partner-enabled discovery operations (i.e., “hunt forward” operations) through bilateral engagements.68 These operations enable the United States and its partners to understand an adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will in turn enable network defense of U.S. partners, improve anticipatory resilience of U.S. and partner networks, and thwart cyberspace aggression. The State Department can scale the process of explaining the Defense Department’s defend forward strategy, enabling the United States to proactively set the conditions for “hunt forward” operations. The State Department can also actively ensure Defense Department cyber teams receive support from U.S. embassy country teams and benefit from insights about foreign partner networks gained through State and USAID-led cyber security capacity-building programs.

## Net Benefits

### 2NC --- Slow Adoption NB

#### Solvency and QUICK ACTION is a net benefit to the counterplan --- the counterplan negotiates short, less time-consuming agreements that quickly spill-over --- that’s \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ --- the plan gets bogged-down in the bureaucratic nightmare of NATO ---

#### A --- Slow Adaptation

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/> //um-ef)

Organizational structures and processes. This project’s focus groups concluded that NATO’s rigid organizational processes that hold onto the past could result in an Alliance “unable to evolve with member states’ national interests.” Bureaucratic politics within the Alliance structures could cause NATO’s slow adaptation to contemporary needs and values. For instance, the participants listed the top-down defense planning process of determining capability requirements as a case where the Alliance and evolving national interests do not align.

#### B --- Civil-Military Frictions

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/> //um-ef)

Furthermore, civil-military frictions on both NATO and national levels could negatively affect readiness of the forces. Long decision-making processes and underdeveloped institutional procedures in national headquarters could prevent the Alliance from developing a legal framework for a common course of action under the NATO flag; for instance, in addressing new adversaries that use unconventional means such as cyber. Put simply, NATO cannot be faster than the individual countries that make it up.

#### C --- Size of the Alliance

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/> //um-ef)

Lastly, size matters; cohesion is more difficult to forge and maintain in an ever-enlarging alliance, especially when increasingly divergent national interests tend to change the modus operandi of the Alliance. More rather than less often, NATO’s international staff will need to find compromise during its decision-making processes between a political and formal equality hoped to enhance Alliance cohesion on the one hand and the desirable Alliance effectiveness on the other hand.

#### And, that causes the U.S. to get frustrated and leave the project before the benefits happen --- the cp solves best

Lawrence et al ‘11

(Anthony Lawrence, and Tomas Jermalavičius, International Center for Defense and Security, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?,” https://abcd.icds.ee/2011-3/summary-2/)

“Smart defence” or more “pooling and sharing” and better burden sharing could provide a way to increase collective capabilities even while spending is declining. This is not an entirely new way of thinking if defined it as the sum of all cooperative efforts and initiatives within the EU and NATO, rather than just as common ownership of assets and capabilities. Initiatives such as cooperative capability, security cooperation, mutual development or multinational formations such as Eurocorps – all designed to increase the capacity of the military to work together – have existed for a long time. New initiatives such as NATO’s strategic airlift consortium further advance this thinking and practice. We are already witnessing the dividends of these approaches in operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, there are many areas where this must be taken further and produce more – all very well illustrated by capability gaps in operations in Libya: air-to-air refuelling, ISTAR, combat SAR, tactical airlift etc. It does not matter through what sort of arrangement or under which nation’s lead this is delivered, as long as it is actually delivered rather than producing the very modest results of many past initiatives (DCI, PCC etc.) or projects (e.g. helicopter initiative in NATO). Civilian capabilities will also have to be enhanced through cooperative efforts such as the Weimar initiative, since the management of many contemporary crises requires civilian inputs. Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness. “Pooling and sharing” will work best if it comes in a “bottom up”, pragmatic fashion – much in the way of the recent UK-France defence cooperation agreements – and if they are linked with U.S. capabilities. Indeed, it is likely that most of the workable arrangements will be bilateral and multi-bilateral rather than genuinely multilateral. “Pooling and sharing” has its limits, some of which arise from the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon and then implementing decisions in a consensus-based decision-making culture in organisations such as NATO and the EU. More fundamentally, however, diverging strategic cultures in Europe mean that there is no common threat perception and no common understanding of why and in what circumstances the use of military force is necessary and appropriate, which may render “pooled and shared” assets and capabilities unusable. There are interventionist countries keen on using force to advance interests and values, and those who exercise extreme caution and would reserve the use of force for the defence of the Alliance‘s territory. (This was illustrated by the challenges of reaching a common position with regard to NATO’s intervention in Libya.)

### 2NC --- Net Benefits --- Delay/Costs

#### The plan causes drawn-out negotiations that delay the plan’s benefits and increase costs

OTA ‘90

(U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment,“Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology,” May 1990 OTA-ISC-449 NTIS order #PB90-254160 pg online @ <https://ota.fas.org/reports/9005.pdf> //um-ef)

European and American defense analysts have traditionally agreed about the desirability of increased cooperation in defense technology. The current disarray in the Warsaw Pact leads to a sharply reduced threat perception, while concurrently Western governments are under pressure to provide increased economic assistance to Eastern Europe. Both factors will tend to accelerate the decrease in Western defense spending. Yet, at the same time, the increasing sophistication of weapons systems demands ever higher investments in research and development. The resultant high per unit cost of weapons systems and consequently decreased ability of NATO governments to purchase sufficient numbers to meet projected forces requirements, risks so-called ‘‘structural disarmament. Collaboration provides one answer to this dilemma in theory by reducing duplicative R&D and achieving economies of scale through longer production runs. It also provides for a more robust and cost-effective Alliance defense through standardization and improved interoperability. This, of course, presents the argument in a somewhat idealized form. NATO collaborative projects have generally required lengthy negotiations and complex management systems, which increase costs in relation to the number of participating countries. While there is no established, accurate method of matching collaborative costs against savings resulting from elimination of duplication of weapons systems, the assumption that cooperation provides the greater overall benefit has rarely been challenged.

### 2NC --- Avoids Ptix & NATO BAD

#### The cp provides a mechanism for U.S. policymakers to do the best parts of the plan and avoid ties to NATO

Shifrinson ‘21

(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @ <https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/> //um-ef)

America’s aversion to cost and risk also impacted NATO’s internal politics. Reluctant to tie the U.S. too firmly to Europe’s defense, American leaders demonstrated a proclivity for working behind the scenes to set alliance policy with individual allies. This often meant determining the alliance’s agenda separately with each of the so-called Big 3 — France, Britain, and West Germany — rather than allowing NATO, with its “one state, one vote” procedures, to determine U.S. policy. At the same time, U.S. leaders began objecting to allied “free-riding” starting in the 1960s. These protestations were present even in the 1950s, when no less a figure than President Eisenhower complained of “having the whole defense burden placed on U.S. shoulders” and charged the Western Europeans with nearly “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.”4 Assertions of this kind were increasingly frequent during the second half of the Cold War. By that time, not only had Western Europe effectively recovered from the deprivations of World War II; the United States also faced mounting economic problems and political dislocations at home. Combined, these developments spurred a growing domestic debate over the necessity and wisdom of American patronage of states that seemed able to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. The net result was a sustained American drive throughout the 1970s and 1980s to push Western European states to assume greater burdens. U.S. officials threatened that the United States might abandon NATO if the allies did not spend more on their defense. Starting in 1981, Congress required the Defense Department to issue an annual report on allied contributions to the “common defense” so as to monitor, and potentially penalize, free-riders and those falling short of their obligations. In 1984, a group of senators led by Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat, proposed withdrawing substantial U.S. forces from NATO on an annual basis if European members of the alliance did not increase their military budgets. A bipartisan congressional panel in 1988 bluntly concluded that “our allies are not sufficiently aware of the strong political pressure in this country to reduce our defense commitments to our allies unless they are willing to shoulder more of the burden. This view is shared by the Congress. Therefore, the panel states in the strongest possible terms that Europeans had better be prepared to defend their own territory without a large-scale U.S. ground commitment, because that commitment cannot be guaranteed forever.”5

## DCA Mechanism

### 1NC --- CP Shell

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreements with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ over \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Bilateral DCAs solve and compete – they are not alliances, but they operate as effectively as them.

**Kinne ‘18** – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf> )//RG

Bilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, are now the **most common form** of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes, DCAs have been largely ignored by scholars. Why have DCAs proliferated? I develop a theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueled demand for DCAs. **States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas** with like-minded states. Yet, demand alone cannot explain DCA proliferation; to cooperate, governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. I show that network influences increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. DCAs become easier to sign as more states sign them. I identify two specific network influences—preferential attachment and triadic closure—and show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.

On 26 June 2015, the US-Brazil defense cooperation agreement entered into force. This agreement, the first formal defense treaty between Brazil and the US in over thirty years, is ambitious in scope, promoting cooperation in “defense-related matters, especially in the fields of research and development, logistics support, technology security, and acquisition of defense products and services,” as well as “exchanges of information,” “combined military training and education,” “joint military exercises,” “meetings between equivalent defense institutions,” and “exchanges of instructors and training personnel.”Footnote 1 Since the end of the Cold War, **the US has signed similar bilateral defense cooperation agreements**, or DCAs, **with dozens of partners**. And the US is not the only country active in DCAs. In 2015 alone, nearly a hundred DCAs were signed between countries as diverse as Indonesia and Turkey, South Africa and Liberia, and Argentina and Russia.

**DCAs are a novel form of defense cooperation.** At their core, these agreements establish long-term institutional frameworks for routine bilateral defense relations, including coordination of defense policies, joint military exercises, working groups and committees, training and educational exchanges, defense-related research and development, and procurement. As frameworks, DCAs reserve specific details of implementation for protocols and implementing legislation. This flexibility means DCAs can both improve traditional defense capabilities and address such protean nontraditional threats as terrorism, trafficking, piracy, and **cyber security**. Importantly, **DCAs contain no mutual defense or nonaggression obligations. They are not alliances**. And unlike the forms of defense cooperation that dominated great-power politics during the Cold War, they are typically highly symmetric, mutually committing signatories to a common set of guidelines.

### 1NC/2NC --- DCAs Spill-Over

#### DCAs spill over – they facilitate trust and cooperation which creates favorable conditions for more DCAs

**Kinne ‘19** – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, <https://escholarship.org/content/qt9w01x2xp/qt9w01x2xp_noSplash_55bbf5575b57f411fe9f941715ebb307.pdf> )//RG

In developing a comprehensive theory of DCA formation, I synthesize cooperation theory with network-analytic insights.7 States cooperate in order to obtain joint gains.8 Exogenous macro-level shifts in the global security environment— including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in interstate war, and the growth of nontraditional security threats—have increased the joint gains of defense cooperation and thus **increased demand for DCAs**. These systemwide trends translate into specific dyadic influences. Faced with an increasingly complex security environment, states use DCAs to (1) modernize their militaries and improve their defense capacities, (2) improve coordinated responses to common security threats, and (3) align themselves with communities of like-minded collaborators. At the dyadic level, demand for DCAs depends on whether potential partners can help one another meet these goals.

However, joint gains tell only part of the story. Even when demand for cooperation is high, information asymmetries may limit the supply of cooperative institutions. States often lack credible information about one another’s trustworthiness, or willingness to cooperate rather than exploit the cooperation of others for unilateral benefit.9 Because DCAs involve sensitive national security issues, including access to classified information, coordination of defense policies, and proliferation of sophisticated weapons technologies, they inherently involve issues of trust. States further may lack information about one another’s institutional design preferences, such as the preferred scope and precision of formal agreements, which leads to distributional conflicts.10 **If states are unsure of others’ trustworthiness** or unsure about the types of agreements others are willing to sign, the supply of **DCAs will remain low**.

The logic of joint gains thus does not explain how, despite persistent mistrust and distributional conflicts, states have managed to sharply increase their participation in DCAs. I argue that when governments create DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and their preferred institutional designs to third-party observers. **This information subsequently** **ameliorates cooperation problems for others, creating favorable conditions for new DCAs**. In short, DCAs involve network influence— **relations between one pair of states affect relations between others.** I consider two specific types of network influence: preferential attachment, where highly active states or “hubs” in the network endogenously attract new partners, and triadic closure, where states that share DCA ties with the same third parties or “friends of friends” are more likely to cooperate directly. These network influences are empirically observable reflections of the underlying informational value of the ties of others.11

While network influences have been documented previously in international relations,12 I extend those insights by focusing more directly on causal mechanisms. Placebo-like tests, combined with extensive assessment of testable implications, show that the influence of triadic closure and preferential attachment varies according to the quality of governments’ informational environment, which strongly suggests that network influences indeed depend on an informational mechanism. More generally, the empirical analysis indicates that, post-Cold War, network influences quickly became the driving force behind DCA proliferation. Out-of-sample predictions show that although exogenous dyadic factors and corresponding shifts in the global security environment are important determinants of defense cooperation, network influences dramatically improve our ability to predict who signs DCAs, and when. Exogenous influences may stimulate demand, but **network influences ensure supply**.

### 2NC --- Competition

#### DCAs are framework treaties that are distinct from mutual defense alliances like NATO

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The universe of defense agreements is large. Treaty records reveal agreements on everything from war cemeteries to nuclear materials to military cartography. The vast majority of these agreements focus narrowly on specific threats or issues, and many follow from unique historical events, such as wars, occupations, state failures, or colonialism. Glaring asymmetries are common, and few agreements are long term. **DCAs are different**. I define DCAs **simply as formal bilateral agreements that establish institutional frameworks for routine defense cooperation.** DCAs typically involve relatively symmetric, long-term commitments for both sides, with an emphasis on coordinating core areas of defense policy and encouraging interpersonal contacts. A 2006 DCA between France and India illustrates:

1.1 The purpose of the Agreement is to promote cooperation between the Parties in the defence and military fields, defence industry, production, research and development, and procurement of defence materiel.

1.2 This Agreement shall establish a framework which aims to cover all cooperation activities conducted by the Parties in the field of defence.

1.3 The forms of such cooperation may be specifically defined by way of agreements between the relevant minstries of the Parties.Footnote 13

Beyond this basic definition, DCAs exhibit specific characteristics. First, as Article 1.2 suggests, **DCAs are framework treaties.** A framework is “a legally binding treaty … that establishes broad commitments for its parties and a general system of governance, while leaving more detailed rules and the setting of specific targets either to subsequent agreements between the parties, usually referred to as protocols, or to national legislation.”Footnote 14 For example, although DCAs often touch on arms trade, the agreements themselves establish only general procedures for procurement and acquisition. Execution of contracts requires subsequent instruments. As Article 1.3 indicates, much implementation occurs separately. Accordingly, leaders often describe DCAs as “legal umbrellas” for defense cooperation.Footnote 15

Second, DCAs emphasize day-to-day interactions in core defense areas, which typically include (1) mutual consultation and defense policy coordination; (2) joint exercises, training, and education; (3) coordination in peacekeeping operations; (4) defense-related research and development; (5) defense industrial cooperation; (6) weapons procurement; and (7) security of classified information. The primary goal of DCAs, then, is to encourage substantive cooperation in these core areas. Importantly, **DCAs do not include mutual defense commitments**. Public officials often emphasize this fact. Indonesia's defense minister, following a controversial 2007 DCA with China, made this clear: “We only want to improve our defense cooperation with China. We have no intention of signing a defense treaty with China.”Footnote 16

Third, DCAs commonly establish **bilateral** committees, working groups, and other mechanisms to encourage cooperation. The France-India DCA created the High Committee on Defence Cooperation, tasked with “defining, organizing, and coordinating bilateral cooperation activities.”Footnote 17 Many DCAs also require signatories to develop annual defense cooperation plans that detail summits, policy goals, exercises, exchanges, and pending contracts. An illustrative 2011 DCA between Czech Republic and Moldova stipulates that “the Parties shall work out and approve annually **bilateral cooperation plans**,” which “shall be worked out by 1 December of the current year.”Footnote 18

Fourth, the language and content of the agreements themselves are highly symmetric, using phrases such as “the Parties” and “the Signatories” in lieu of proper nouns. While asymmetries of course exist in implementation (for example, because of relative power), these are separate from the treaties themselves and best addressed with control variables. Fifth, DCAs are long-term agreements, with a modal length of ten years. Many DCAs are indefinite.

A final important characteristic is that defense partners frequently sign multiple DCAs. They may, for example, replace a prior agreement, or they may simply prefer a piecemeal approach, where they address issue-areas in separate agreements rather than in a single general agreement. In practice, over the 1980–2010 period, about half of countries that signed a DCA subsequently signed at least one more. These subsequent **DCAs are novel legal instruments, not merely amendments**. I later capitalize on this feature of DCAs to improve causal inference.

**Together, these characteristics define DCAs as a distinct form of cooperation**. The appendix further describes how DCAs differ from defense and nonaggression pacts, as well as status of forces agreements (SOFAs), strategic partnerships, and confidence-building measures (CBMs). It also includes a full-text example of a DCA. Between DCAs, the primary source of heterogeneity is issue scope. Some agreements, like the France-India DCA, cover all possible areas of defense cooperation. Others are narrower, only partly covering the core issue areas I described. For example, countries may sign one DCA on mutual consultation and another on defense industry cooperation. Governments nonetheless recognize these narrower agreements as elements of a larger defense framework; indeed, they often use general DCAs to pull together various piecemeal efforts. When Bangladesh and China signed a DCA in 2002, their respective prime ministers described the need to “institutionalize the existing accords in defence sector and also to rationalize the existing piecemeal agreements to enhance cooperation in training, maintenance and in some areas of production.”Footnote 19 Whether DCAs take the form of one agreement or a package of agreements, they move toward the singular goal of an institutionalized defense framework. I explore DCA heterogeneity in the appendix and show that the empirical results are robust even when restricting the analysis to the most general DCAs.

#### DCAs operate outside of alliances and are essential to global security

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International defense cooperation is a complex, heterogeneous phenomenon. While military alliances dominate the study of this topic, **countries routinely engage in defense cooperation outside of alliances**. This article draws attention particularly to defense cooperation agreements, which are ambitious agreements that establish institutional frameworks—or legal umbrellas—for the entirety of their signatories’ cooperative defense activities. DCAs promote **substantive**, routine, day-to- day interactions between governments, militaries, defense industries, and other actors relevant to global security. Not only have DCAs exploded in number in recent decades, but anecdotal evidence suggests that **governments view DCAs as essential elements of their global security strategies**. Preliminary statistical evidence further suggests that DCAs may **have tangible effects on a wide range of activities,** from arms trade to peackeeping to bilateral lending and militarized interstate disputes (cf. Kinne 2016, 2018; Kinne and Bunte 2018).

#### DCAs are mutually exclusive with and distinct from alliances – alliances focus on conflict, and DCAs focus on routine activities

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Browsing the “military matters” category of the UNTS reveals agreements on military cemeteries, radar stations, tobacco use by military personnel, and various other topics. Even seemingly trivial defense agreements are numerous. Accordingly, I distinguish DCAs from those defense agreements that have previously received scholarly attention, such as nonaggression pacts, mutual defense pacts, strategic partnerships, and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs).

Defense pacts and nonaggression pacts have been heavily studied (e.g., Gibler 2009; Mattes and Vonnahme 2010; Walt 1987). Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long (2002) place both agreement types under the broader definition of a military alliance:

Alliances are written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two inde- pendent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.

Alliances focus primarily on conflict, especially of the interstate variety. **By contrast, DCAs exclusively address issues of cooperation.** Of course, these substantive focuses may overlap. Alliances may require cooperation in order to achieve their goal of minimizing or preventing conflict. Indeed, some alliances promote forms of cooperation—working groups, exercises, training and exchange—that overlap with DCAs. Yet, while conflict-related obligations are a necessary condition for alliances, additional provisions regarding cooperative activities are not. **DCAs**, on the other hand, are defined precisely by their goal of institutionalizing routine cooperative defense activities. Indeed, **DCAs overtly exclude the mutual defense commitments that define alliances as such**.15

Even when alliances discuss cooperation more generally, they do not engender umbrella frameworks for the full range of states’ defense activities. Provisions on peacetime cooperation are in fact uncommon outside of ambitious alliances like NATO. Leeds et al. (2002) find that while about half of alliances involve mutual consultation, less than 15% mandate interpersonal contact during peacetime. And while many alliances encourage “economic cooperation, protection of minorities, scientific or cultural exchange, environmental protection, etc.,” these activities are overtly non- military (Leeds 2005: 30). **By contrast**, **routine activities** like joint exercises, officer exchanges, procurement and acquisition, joint weapons collaborations, and defense industrial cooperation **are the core purview of DCAs.**

**The distinction between alliances and DCAs is straightforward.** The primary goal of an alliance is to specify obligations contingent on armed conflict. The primary goal of a DCA is to establish generic frameworks for routine cooperative defense activities**. The two agreement types are mutually exclusive. Alliance and DCA obligations are** also **empirically distinct**. At the dyad-year level, the correlation between DCAs and alliances is typically less than 0.2. The vast **majority of DCA partners lack a direct alliance of any form**.

### 2NC --- Perm: Do CP

#### NATO is a collective noun referring to the 30 members

**NATO 22** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO "10 things you need to know about NATO," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5-10-2022, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/126169.htm----GDS> T File 10 things you need to know about NATO Collective defence: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 and is a group of 30 countries from Europe and North America that exists to protect the people and territory of its members. The Alliance is founded on the principle of collective defence, meaning that if one NATO Ally is attacked, then all NATO Allies are attacked. For example, when terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11 2001, all NATO Allies stood with America as though they had also been attacked.

#### The only possible interpretation of “the” is all, not some nor any

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 15 (“Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC,” File Name: 15a0087p.06, Lexis)//BB

Turning from "authorized by law," we find another reason to disqualify special counsel as officers under the plain meaning of the Dictionary Act. Mainly, that Headnote 13 Special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the definition in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 1, restricts the court's interpretation of that language. The word "the" frequently (but not always) indicates a particular thing. It can also be used to refer to something generically, as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question--which could be the (Ohio) Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction--that it refers to a specific thing--all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs interpretation of texts. More like this Headnote End Headnote 13 special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the Dictionary Act's definition restricts our interpretation of that language. "[T]he word 'the' frequently (but not always) indicates 'a particular thing.'" NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014). It can also be used to refer to something generically, id., as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question—which could be the Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction—that [\*\*22] it refers to a specific thing—all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876, 187 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2014) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042, 182 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2012) ("And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs our interpretation of texts.").

#### “The” NATO means the group as a whole

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 2003 (“Vlt Corp. v. Lambda Elecs.,” 01-CV-10957-PBS, Lexis)//BB

1. It Depends On What the Word "The" Means The first skirmish involves the word "the." The claim language states "circuitry for recycling the magnetizing energy stored in said transformer to reset it." (Emphasis added). Lambda asserts that the word "the" means all of the magnetizing energy in the transformer. Vicor contends that the claim allows for the possibility that some of the energy may be recycled [\*\*10] to reset the core while other energy is delivered to the load. In other words, it argues that the word "the" can mean "some of the," and explains that the word "the" was used to distinguish "the magnetizing" energy from the more general term "energy" that is used earlier in the preamble. Nice linguistic jousting, but the use of the word "magnetizing" alone would have been an adequate adjective to single out the kind of energy intended for recycling. If only some of the transformer's energy needed to be recycled, the word "the" would not have been used. Lambda's argument that the word "the" connotes all the magnetizing energy is persuasive because it gives ordinary and common sense effect to the word "the" in the claim language. See Merriam-Webster's [\*352] Collegiate Dictionary 1221 (10th ed. 1993) (giving one definition of "the" as: "used as a function word before a noun . . . to indicate reference to a group as a whole"). This claim thus describes an invention that recycles all of the magnetizing energy to reset the transformer core.

#### And, if the resolution were meant to apply to individual countries it would have said ‘NATO Ally’ --- that’s the legal term the usfg uses

22 USC § 2796d(d)

(pg online @ <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=22-USC-1901145194-1497205300&term_occur=999&term_src=> //um-ef)

NATO ally

For purposes of this section, the term “NATO ally” means a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (other than the United States).

#### And, NATO refers to the formal institution --- Not the member countries

Johnston ‘19

(Seth, Fellow, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” pg online @ <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan> //um-ef)

This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Solves Better

#### DCAs are empirically better at promoting collective defense and cooperation – traditional alliances are inadequate

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Do DCAs matter? Related work explores DCAs as an independent variable.20 Here, I briefly presage those findings. Diplomatic correspondence reveals that states increasingly view **traditional military alliances as inadequate** to the current global security environment. Shortly after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, US diplomats reported that the new French government considered its alliances with African governments to be “patently absurd and out of date.”21 France sought to “radically convert the present system of defense agreements,” which were mostly traditional postcolonial defense pacts, and focus instead on “combating illicit trafficking and terrorist acts,” while also encouraging “cooperation on defense and security, favoring the rise in strength of African capacities to carry out peacekeeping.”22 African leaders supported these shifts. Comoros, for example, argued for a “new military cooperation arrangement with France,” focusing not on traditional mutual defense issues, but on “**training and exchange programs**.”23

Leaders also frequently tout the material benefits of DCAs. For example, the 2011 annual plan between France and Estonia “lays down nearly twenty different activities,” varying from “training of Estonian air force ground intercept controllers” to “participation of French ships in the Baltops and Open Spirit exercises” to “admitting a French student to the Baltic Defense College.”24 Russia’s defense minister boasted that the 2016 annual plan with Belarus “stipulates over 130 events and measures.”25 According to Indonesia’s national news agency, Indonesia’s numerous DCAs have allowed it to obtain Sukhoi fighters and Mi-17 helicopters from Russia, platform dock ships and submarines from South Korea, and C-802 missiles from China.26 And a 2008 DCA between Latvia and Norway allowed Latvia to increase its peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan and coordinate with Norwegian command.27

[figure omitted]

These historical anecdotes accord with statistical patterns. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between DCAs and a host of defense and security outcomes. The figure shows that after signing a DCA, dyads are more likely to jointly contribute to peacekeeping missions; more likely to collaborate in joint military exercises; more likely to collaborate on the same side of a militarized interstate dispute (MID); less likely to fight directly in an MID; more likely to engage in arms trade; and more likely to **have cooperative interactions overall**, as defined by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS). Related work employs a battery of network selection and coevolution models to address potential omitted variables, reverse causation, statistical dependencies, and other threats to inference, and finds that the basic patterns shown in Figure 2 are extremely robust.28 In short, **DCAs have a powerful impact on defense and security outcomes.**

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Readiness/Mod

#### DCAs solve military readiness – modernization improves capacity

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**Governments increasingly turn to DCAs as a means of improving their military capacity**. For example, Bulgaria has waged a modernization campaign since the 1990s, involving dozens of DCAs that, according to US diplomats, are “based on the premise that Bulgaria faces new asymmetrical security threats rather than traditional threats to its national territory.”57 In 2011, Indonesia pursued DCAs with a wide swath of partners—including Russia, South Korea, China, Serbia, and India—in an effort to “modernize the country’s main armament system.”58 Modernization also includes R&D and industrial cooperation. In 2005, Ukraine’s defense minister argued that a DCA with Russia would capitalize on the “scientific and industrial potentials of Ukraine and Russia” and enable “co-production arrangements for defense-industry enterprises in the development and production of armaments and military hardware.”59 Officer exchanges and training programs comprise yet another source of military capacity. A defense official from the Philippines, following a 2006 agreement with Australia, observed: “It’s like a basketball game. We need to practise with other players from other teams to learn new skills and techniques to raise the level of our game.”60 The defense minister averred, “In three years, we could raise the military’s readiness from **45 percent to 70 percent**.”61

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Threats

#### DCAs solve common threats, both emerging and traditional

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States respond not merely to global threats but to **threats shared in common** with potential partners. For example, the Grand Mufti of Brunei argued for a DCA with Indonesia by appealing to a sense of shared fate, declaring that “in the future, we will likely face nontraditional threats, which do not recognize state borders. **It is thus a must for two neighboring countries to set up military cooperations**.”62 Indonesia’s defense minister explained his country’s 2016 DCA with Sweden by stating that “our common enemy is terrorism.”63 Although asymmetric threats receive disproportionate attention, leaders also retain concerns about traditional interstate threats. The defense ministers of Iran and Syria described a 2006 DCA as a response to the “common threat” posed by the United States and Israel.64 Iran’s defense minister similarly declared that a 2005 DCA with Tajikistan would “deter foreign forces who aim to find a foothold in the region on the pretext of restoring security.”65

#### DCAs spill over into broader cooperative communities that strengthen regional stability

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Scholars have long argued that states use defense ties to signal affinity with particular collaborators.66 A Brazilian military analyst, explaining the 2010 DCA with the US, argued that “Brazil is aligning itself strategically with the US, like the European nations have done with NATO,” while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the deal as “a formal acknowledgement of the many security interests and values we share.”67 At their most ambitious, alignment efforts coalesce into **nascent communities**.68 Upon signing a DCA with Chile in 2012, the Canadian government reiterated a commitment to “working with like-minded nations to promote peace and security throughout the Americas.”69 In 2012, a Philippines senator argued that a DCA with Australia—complementing DCAs with South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia—would finalize a **pan-Asian “security umbrella.**”70 And Secretary Ash Carter’s farewell memo describes the above-mentioned principled security network as “open to all that seek to **preserve and strengthen the rules and norms that have undergirded regional stability** for the past seven decades.”71

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Russia/Cyber

#### Bilat DCAs are key – solves Russian aggression and cyber warfare

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In the years since, US defense policy has evolved to manage an increasingly complex security environment. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently articulated the need for a “principled security network,” of which **bilateral defense agreements are a key component**.55 This network would address both traditional concerns (for example, “**Russian aggression** from the east”) and new threats like terrorism, piracy, refugee flows, humanitarian assistance, natural disasters, and **cyber warfare**.56 In short, the new global security environment has increased demand for novel forms of cooperation. Governments do not simply sign DCAs wantonly. States differ in their exposure to novel security threats, and **partnerships with some states offer more promise in managing these threats** than others. I employ historical accounts to identify three related but analytically distinct pressures on bilateral demand for defense cooperation. Subsequently, I translate these bilateral influences into a series of control variables.

### 2NC --- Solvency --- General

#### DCAs are proliferating, but maintaining compliance is insufficient – creating new ones is key

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Exogenously motivated demands for defense cooperation, though important, do not explain how states have managed to overcome the information asymmetries that plague cooperative efforts. While some powerful, wealthy governments may be willing to risk cooperation despite uncertainty, **DCAs have proliferated far beyond the powerful and wealthy**. Even former adversaries like Australia and Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina, and Ukraine and Russia have now signed DCAs. I argue that when states sign DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and design preferences to third-party observers, and those revelations in turn drive empirically observable network influences. As the density of the DCA network increases, network influences multiply. Information about the trustworthiness and institutional design preferences of prospective partners becomes more readily available, merely supplementary. Post-Cold War, **they are** in fact **the primary determinants of new DCAs**.

I thus operationalize DCAs as a global network, where a network is simply a collection of “nodes” (that is, countries) connected to one another via “edges” (that is, DCAs), and where the edges, though separable, are not independent of one another. The probability of a tie between a given i and j is then endogenous to the probability of a tie between i and k, or k and j, or k and l, and so on. Figure 4 illustrates the DCA network in Asia in 2010. As a network, the probability of any given edge is a function, in part, of other edges in the network, which defines the phenomenon of network influence. Conditional on the various exogenous influences discussed previously, the probability of a DCA between a given i and j depends on who else has signed DCAs.

In theorizing network influences, I focus on the capacity of DCA creation itself to signal information to observant third parties. I emphasize **DCA creation—rather than compliance** with DCAs **over time**—for three reasons. First, although DCAs often incorporate “trust-building” measures, ex ante trust remains a necessary condition. Second, even if compliance increases ex post trust, these effects may not be measurable. Some DCA activities—sharing of classified information, joint military research, defense policy coordination—are difficult to observe. Third, DCAs reveal information about scope, depth, and other institutional design issues immediately upon signature, regardless of compliance. Nonetheless, I later identify areas where ex post trust, generated by observed compliance, further strengthens network influences, particularly when mediators are involved.

#### DCAs are comprehensive solutions to cooperation problems – they are diverse and taken seriously

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Defense cooperation agreements are an exciting new phenomenon. Nearly as many countries now participate in DCAs as in traditional military alliances. The shifting global security environment has generated demand for new forms of defense cooperation. However, states continue to face long-standing cooperation problems, such as informational asymmetries and distributional conflicts, which dampen willingness to cooperate and lead to an undersupply of defense agreements. A comprehensive approach to DCAs reinforces the important role of exogenous security influences while also emphasizing the importance of network influences. The DCA network helps to **endogenously alleviate cooperation problems** and **encourage otherwise chary states to sign agreements**. In-depth empirical analysis shows not only that these network effects are **key drivers of defense cooperation**, but that the network effects themselves likely derive from informational mechanisms. States respond to the ties of others precisely because those ties reveal strategically valuable information about trust, reliability, and institutional design preferences.

The study of DCAs promises fruitful insights on contemporary internatonal security. I consider three avenues of future research to be especially promising. First, the substantive impact of DCAs deserves consideration. Voluminous anecdotal evidence shows that **governments take DCAs very seriously**—an insight reinforced by the dramatic proliferation of DCAs over the past two decades. And DCAs often espouse ambitious goals, such as the coordination of the entirety of their respective signatories’ defense relations. Yet we know relatively little about how DCAs accomplish these goals. Figure 2 shows that **the potential impact of DCAs is wide ranging**, involving arms trade, defense spending, joint military exercises, training and exchange, and militarized conflicts.

Second, variation in the scope of DCAs raises questions of institutional design. In some cases, states assemble a single general defense framework. In other cases, states assemble multiple DCAs in piecemeal fashion. What explains the choice between these two options? Institutional design concerns permeate DCAs, including questions of treaty duration, ease of termination, prospects for renewal, and, of course, scope. Are these features a consequence of regime type, development, pre-existing legal commitments, or other influences? Might these design features themselves be potentially endogenous to the network? I have argued that network ties convey information on design preferences, which suggests that particular institutional features may diffuse throughout the network and, via this diffusion process, emerge as equilibrium design choices for states. That is, not only do pre-existing DCA ties **encourage the formation of new DCAs**; they might also encourage the formation of specific types of DCAs.

### 2NC --- Solvency --- Cooperation

#### DCAs solve – they empirically lead to cooperation and reduce disputes.

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Defense cooperation has long intrigued scholars of international relations. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is, perhaps most of all, a treatise on alliance politics. Like Thucydides, contemporary scholars have focused heavily on formal military alliances—and have produced a formidable literature.1 Yet, governments rarely sign new alliances, and the global alliance structure has remained relatively static for decades. While alliance-making experienced a resurgence in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, only a dozen new alliances have emerged since 9/11—most of them ententes or nonaggression pacts rather than mutual defense pacts (Gibler 2009).

When governments pursue cooperation in defense, military, and security issues, they increasingly turn not to alliances, but to a type of framework treaty known as a defense cooperation agreement, or DCA. **Nearly always bilateral, DCAs establish broad legal umbrellas** for the range of cooperative defense activities in which states might engage, from coordinating defense policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology. In short, DCAs facilitate the routine interactions that comprise day-to-day defense cooperation. Taken as a whole, these agreements provide insight into the pragmatic tools that governments have developed to address the complex threats, both interstate and nontraditional, that define the contemporary global security environment.

The distinctions between DCAs and other agreement types are apparent in their institutional characteristics. **While alliances focus** primarily **on contingencies surrounding conflict, DCAs exclusively address cooperation.** They contain no mutual defense or nonaggression commitments. Indeed, most DCA partners lack a formal alliance altogether. DCAs also fundamentally differ from status of forces agreements, strategic partnerships, and other commonly studied defense agreements. And unlike these other agreement types, DCAs have proliferated rapidly. DCAs are often extensive and ambitious in scope, implementing institutional frameworks for the entirety of their signatories’ cooperative defense relations. They also tend to be relatively symmetric in the commitments they impose on signatories, and they endure for periods of 5–10 years or longer.

Anecdotal **evidence of DCAs’ significance abounds**. After the loss of its Soviet sponsor in the early 1990s, Mongolia deployed a web of nearly three dozen DCAs to ensure access to defense-related training, education, materiel, weapons, and research.2 A historic 2014 DCA between Russia and Pakistan led to arms transfers, counterterror drills, joint antidrug exercises in the Arabian Sea, and even the participation of a Pakistani warship in Russia’s Navy Day parade.3 More generally, Kinne (2018) shows that DCAs increase the frequency of joint military exercises, contributions to peacekeeping missions and multilateral uses of force, arms trade, and overall cooperative bilateral events, while reducing the frequency of militarized disputes. In short, **DCAs are now central to governments’ defense strategies**.

### 2NC --- Solvency --- AT: Trust Deficit

#### Engaging in DCAs builds trust and confidence – that overcomes pre-agreement mistrust

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If states lack sufficient ex ante trust (that is, prior to treaty signature), cooperative efforts may fail.42 Unsurprisingly, the language of trust permeates DCA negotiations. Australia’s controversial 1995 DCA with Indonesia reflected the new reality that Australia “no longer sees Indonesia as an expansionist threat.” Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating bluntly stated: “It is a declaration of trust.” Indonesia’s President Suharto echoed the sentiment, asserting that “if there is still suspicion about Indonesia, then it should be eliminated.”43 Because trust is a necessary condition for defense cooperation, **the creation of a DCA functions as a reassuring signal of cooperative intent** to observant third parties.

**DCAs** also **increase ex post trust**. For example, the defense minister of Iran referred to his country’s 2002 DCA with Kuwait as a “**trust-building effort**,” echoing a phrase that appears repeatedly in leaders’ statements and in the texts of DCAs themselves.44 The prime ministers of China and India made this logic explicit in a joint public statement on their 2005 DCA, noting that “broadening and deepening of defense exchanges between the two countries [are] of vital importance in enhancing mutual trust and understanding between the two armed forces.”45 **DCAs build confidence** by repeatedly engaging governments in concrete acts of cooperation that entail non-trivial risks.46 While collaboration problems primarily involve issues of ex ante trust, I show later that **increased ex post trust amplifies the network effects of DCAs**.

## Aff Answers

### 2AC --- DCAs – L2NB

#### DCAs strengthen NATO – allow NATO members to signal alignment

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Fourth, traditional military alliances exercise influence in a variety of ways. Allied countries are better equipped to meet one another’s modernization needs, more likely to face common threats, and more likely to share foreign-policy goals. Thus, alliances should generally increase demand for DCAs. However, I anticipate a unique influence for NATO because its unusually broad mandate spills into issue areas—training, defense research, joint exercises, etc.—also addressed by DCAs. Accordingly, demand for DCAs should be lower between NATO states. At the same time, because **DCAs are an important mechanism for prospective NATO members to signal alignment**, I anticipate a positive effect for pairings between NATO members and Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) states.

### 2AC --- DCAs Fail

#### DCAs fail

#### 1 – variation and uncertainty doom proceedings – Singapore and Indonesia prove

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Coordination problems are also apparent in DCAs. Variations in the institutional characteristics of DCAs partially reflect distributional concerns. Governments worry about asymmetric gains—that is, the possibility that one’s partners will gain more than oneself.47 Further, negotiators know that revealing a preference for particular design features may lead others to increase their demands accordingly. Given these incentives, governments anticipate that their interlocutors may not be fully transparent about their treaty preferences. **That uncertainty,** in turn, **increases the risk of bargaining failure.** Given their broad flexibility as framework agreements, DCAs particularly raise concerns about **scope, precision, and the degree of reliance** on implementing arrangements.

A contentious 2007 negotiation between Singapore and Indonesia offers an illuminating example. In response to Singapore’s request for access to Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA included a seemingly benign implementing arrangement that designated an “Area Bravo” southwest of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.48 Almost immediately upon signature of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of disingenuousness and began speculating on the “broad latitude” that the Singapore military would wield in Area Bravo, involving naval exercises, air support, live fire, and even participation of third parties—all of which, given Singapore’s growing military strength, would likely intensify over time.49 Indonesia’s defense minister, seizing on ambiguities within the agreement, declared that “Singapore still wants rules of their own, without having to negotiate ... on their military training here.”50 He further asserted, “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and scope of Singapore military training, including how many times Singapore can fire its missiles in our territory.”51 While Singapore’s true preferences remain opaque, **the mere perception of duplicity by the Indonesian government was sufficient to doom the proceedings.**

#### 2 – mistrust and obligational concerns

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DCAs show strong evidence of **collaboration problems**. When governments coordinate their defense policies, pool defense-related research-and-development (R&D) resources, transfer sophisticated weapons and military technologies, exchange classified information, hold joint exercises, and so on, they engage in inherently risky activities that **create opportunities for exploitation.** The key danger in signing a DCA with an untrusted partner is that **the partner might** ultimately **employ the gains of cooperation for its own strategic advantage**. In the event of direct confrontation, the improvements in military capacity that DCAs enable—better training, access to classified material, first-hand knowledge of others’ tactics and operating procedures—can be readily used to exploit a nominal defense partner. These concerns further extend to relations with third parties, both governmental and nongovernmental. For example, the US has long worried that military cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indirectly supports extremist organizations. More benignly, DCA partnerships also involve **managerial concerns** about the ability of partners to fulfill their obligations.40 In 2007, for example, the Japanese self- defense force unintentionally leaked classified details of the US-built Aegis weapons system, causing a furor in the US defense community.41 For all these reasons, DCAs require credible assurances of trustworthiness.

### 2AC --- Unilat Fails

#### US unilat foreign policy fails – makes us unable to tackle common challenges or succeed domestically

**Haass ‘21** - President of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The World: A Brief Introduction (Richard, Foreign Affairs, “The Age of America First”, December 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-09-29/biden-trump-age-america-first> )//RG

Whatever the failings of this new paradigm, there is no going back; history does not offer do-overs. Nor should Washington return to a foreign policy that, for much of three decades, largely failed both in what it did and in what it did not do.

The starting point for a new internationalism should be a clear recognition that although foreign policy begins at home, it cannot end there. The United States, regardless of its diminished influence and deep domestic divisions, faces a world with both traditional geopolitical threats and new challenges tied to globalization. An American president must seek to fix what ails the United States without neglecting what happens abroad. Greater disarray in the world will make the task to “build back better”—or whatever slogan is chosen for domestic renewal—much more difficult, if not impossible. Biden has acknowledged the “fundamental truth of the 21st century . . . that **our own success is bound up with others succeeding as wel**l”; the question is whether he can craft and carry out a foreign policy that reflects it.

**The U**nited **S**tates also **cannot succeed alone. It must work with others**, through both formal and informal means, **to set international norms and standards and marshal collective action**. Such an approach will require the involvement of traditional allies in Europe and Asia, new partners, countries that may need U.S. or international help at home, and nondemocracies. It will require the use of all the instruments of power available to the United States—diplomacy, but also trade, aid, **intelligence, and the military**. Nor can the United States risk letting unpredictability give it a reputation as unreliable; other states will determine their own actions, especially when it comes to balancing or accommodating China, based in no small part on how dependable and active they believe the United States will be as a partner.

**In the absence of** a new **American internationalism, the** likely **outcome will be a world that is less free, more violent, and less willing** or able **to tackle common challenges**. It is equal parts ironic and dangerous that at a time when the United States is more affected by global developments than ever before, it is less willing to carry out a foreign policy that attempts to shape them.

### 2AC --- Perm Do CP

#### The strategic concept refers to ‘NATO’ as the MEMBERS of the alliance

Sula et al ‘13

(Ismail Erkam Sula \*\* PhD Candidate, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations;, and Cagla Luleci“Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: The Evolution of NATO’s Security Agenda,” pg online @ <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/19311> //um-ef)

The Strategic Concept is also clear with regard to the referent object of security. In the broadest sense, NATO refers to the security of the ‘alliance’ constituted of North America and Europe (NATO 1991, Article 16). However, throughout the whole Strategic Concept NATO makes clear that its security conception refers to the member states of the alliance. In particular NATO refers “to security amongst the members of the alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other” 46. NATO refers to ‘collective security’ as a broad framework that is constituted of member states. In terms of both agency and referent object the security conception of NATO remains both statist and state-centric. With regard to the policy to

# NATO Bad

### 1NC --- CP Shell

#### Text: The United States federal government should end its security cooperation with The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

#### The counterplan ENDS NATO and any permutation LINKS --- U.S. security cooperation is what keeps NATO alive --- if the U.S. reduces its commitments to NATO it will whither and European Allies will shift to collective defense

Shifrinson ‘21

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Although Trump has now left office, NATO is nonetheless in for difficult times, as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020, the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other NATO members.16 The net result presents two possible avenues for deeper, substantive divides in the alliance. First, if competition with Beijing escalates, the United States may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to European affairs. This would invert the Cold War experience, creating the potential for the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere and NATO’s European members seek alternatives for their security. Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear; as American priorities change, NATO cohesion may decline as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become possible. President Biden’s path forward Recognizing these limits, what are the options for the United States under the Biden administration? Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. Great powers no longer pose threats to dominate the region’s security or deny the independence of most countries therein. China, of course, is making economic and political inroads in the area, but is also encountering increasing opposition as it overplays its hand and, in any case, does not threaten the survival or sovereignty of European states. Russia, on the other hand, has notable military capabilities that can threaten neighbors along its immediate perimeter, but it lacks the wherewithal to imperil countries much beyond that. Moreover, its force structure seems designed to raise the costs for any U.S.–led NATO operation near Russia’s own borders, just as Europe’s member states have the economic and military capacity to oppose any Russian designs. As a result, a stable European balance of power can exist. This is a sea-change from the postwar, or even post–Cold War periods. NATO’s original purpose has been vindicated; the victory is won. Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. In addition, the United States faces diminishing returns, and several negative results, from continuing its present approach to NATO. The alliance has now been enlarged to the point where few strategically meaningful European actors exist outside of NATO’s orbit, even as those that exist, such as Ukraine, would constitute a net loss for U.S. national security by risking a direct conflict with Moscow. In short, little can be gained from continued expansion. Likewise, as European leaders continue pressing for greater autonomy from the United States and NATO, the U.S. will generate increased friction with its allies if it continues to suppress their initiatives in this direction. This tension, meanwhile, comes at a time when Europe itself is of diminishing relative importance to an American grand strategy increasingly fixed on Asia, as most of the actors involved recognize. As the U.S.–led alliance continues moving toward Russia’s borders, it may play some role in driving Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in international affairs. In short, U.S. policy in Asia complicates U.S. strategy in Europe, and vice-versa. The United States requires a course correction. U.S. policy toward NATO now injects a large degree of instability and unsustainability into the region, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the Biden administration should consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO. Ending enlargement In coordination with its partners, the United States should credibly renounce further NATO enlargement. Whatever one makes of the merits of America’s post–1945 presence in Europe, the gains from further enlargement are few and the risks substantial. Several pathways exist to develop a policy of ceasing enlargement. Most directly, the U.S. government could simply declare it will not support the alliance’s further growth; thanks to NATO’s “one state, one vote” procedures, this would be enough to scuttle a further expansion push. Less unilaterally, U.S. planners could attempt to craft an intra–NATO consensus that expansion is no longer worth the costs. Given that many alliance members have long been skeptical of the merits of expansion — German policymakers, for example, were famously ambivalent over the Bucharest Declaration of 2008, which embraced Ukraine’s and Georgia’s interest in NATO membership — forging a broad front on this agenda ought not be difficult. Along the way, U.S. and allied diplomats should also seek to dampen the membership aspirations of those states still outside the alliance. Cutting troop commitments Second, the U.S. government should forgo permanently stationing combat forces in the Eastern European states admitted to NATO since the Cold War. Amid mounting calls to bolster the alliance’s presence along the so-called “eastern flank” due to collapsing relations with Moscow, the U.S. government should encourage European NATO members to bear primary responsibility for defense obligations east of the Oder–Neisse line. Not only have NATO’s European members taken an active role in the alliance’s ongoing “Enhanced Forward Presence” in Poland and the Baltic States; there is more than enough latent military capability in the European portion of the alliance to see this task through.17 For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact (excluding Albania and the Baltic States) that have joined NATO since 1995 have nearly the same gross domestic product ($1.55 trillion, measured in 2010 dollars) as Russia ($1.76 trillion). Their population, 92 million people versus Russia’s 144 million, is also significant. Add in the other European members of NATO, and the numbers shift decisively against Russia. Although non–U.S. military investments in NATO remain underwhelming, even limited growth in non–U.S. NATO defense capabilities could thus provide a significant force able to take the lead in Eastern Europe. The United States should promote this result, with the goal of shifting the defense burden in Europe to the highly capable states in the area to reduce U.S. defense obligations. Rebalancing trans–Atlantic politics The United States ought to prepare for a broader recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe. Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, conditions are ripe to empower the European allies. The objective should be to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States steps back from active management of European security. The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort rather than the manager of early squabbles.